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Abstract 
The ever-increasing demand for IT support within businesses, communi-
ties and everyday life has raised the complexity and distribution of modern 
IT systems, as well as the amount of included software, to levels never 
known before. In this situation, assuring the reliability of an IT system 
– namely, its ability to deliver service as expected to its users – consti-
tutes a major challenge. The reliability of an IT system during its run-time 
depends on its software implementation, its usage and its underlying hard-
ware infrastructure. 
Approaches to architecture-based software reliability prediction (ASRP) 
constitute a means to anticipate the reliability of an IT system before its 
operation. They build upon an architectural model capturing the software 
components together with their interactions and reliability characteristics. 
Evaluating the model – through analytical solving or through simulations 
– yields the expected operational reliability of the system under study. Be-
ing model-based, such approaches allow for early reliability assessments 
already during design stages, guiding design decisions and helping to iden-
tify critical parts of the architecture with respect to reliability. 
However, existing reliability prediction approaches are limited in their 
applicability because they implicitly “hard-code” or neglect several factors 
which inﬂuence a system’s reliability: (i) the reliability impact of imper-
fect hardware resources, (ii) the system’s ability to recover from local fail-
ures and to prevent them from reaching the system’s boundaries, and (iii) 
the system’s usage proﬁle and its inﬂuence on the control and data ﬂow 
throughout the architecture. Neglecting these factors leads to inaccurate 
prediction results; implicit “hard-coding” of information strongly reduces 
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the reusability of the models and the support they can give in evaluating 
different design alternatives. 
This thesis proposes PCM-REL, a novel approach to integrated software 
architecture-based reliability prediction for IT systems, which explicitly 
considers the reliability-relevant factors discussed above, offering 
• a combined consideration of software and hardware reliability im-
pacts by modelling both software components and hardware resour-
ces with their speciﬁc failure potentials, and by providing an inte-
grated analysis method taking into account these potentials; 
• a consideration of fault tolerance capabilities by modelling how ser-
vice execution can recover from local failure occurrences, carry out 
failure-handling behaviours and avoid the occurrence of system fail-
ures; 
• explicit modelling of a system’s usage proﬁle and the inﬂuence of 
input parameters on the service execution through the concept of pa-
rameter dependencies. 
The approach is realized based on the Palladio Component Model (PCM), 
which offers a design-oriented modelling language for component-based 
software architectures. While the PCM traditionally allows for perfor-
mance predictions based on the created architectural speciﬁcations, the the-
sis adds capabilities for reliability modelling and prediction by extending 
the PCM modelling language with reliability-speciﬁc constructs, and by 
providing an automated analysis method – based on a discrete-time Markov 
chain (DTMC) model – for the reliability evaluation of architectural spec-
iﬁcations created in terms of PCM-REL instances. Compared to related 
ASRP approaches, PCM-REL offers a signiﬁcantly improved decision sup-
port for software architects during system design, improved reusability of 
the created model artefacts and support for a distributed component-based 
development process. 
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The thesis includes two major case studies to validate the PCM-REL ap-
proach, giving evidence of 
• the feasibility of the included abstractions of the provided modelling 
language; 
• the feasibility of deriving input estimates for the required reliability 
annotations; 
• the validity of the Markov analysis itself; 
• the signiﬁcance and robustness of the obtained prediction results in 
the light of uncertain inputs. 
The ﬁrst case study features a prototypical system implementation and 
compares prediction results with measurements. The second study relates 
to an industrial system and allows for demonstrating the estimation of relia-
bility annotations based on existing information sources. Together, the two 
studies provide comprehensive evidence for the validity of PCM-REL. 
The approach and its contributions have been described in the Trans-
actions of Software Engineering (TSE) journal [BKBR11] (currently ac-
cepted for publication and available in an online pre-print version) and fur-
ther peer-reviewed publications [BZ09, BKBR10, BBKR11]. 
iii 

Kurzfassung 
Der ständig steigende Bedarf an IT-Lösungen in Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft 
und Alltag hat die Komplexität und Verteilung moderner IT-Systeme auf 
einen nie dagewesenen Grad ansteigen lassen. Angesichts dieser Tatsache 
stellt die Zusicherung der Zuverlässigkeit eines IT-Systems – d.h. seiner 
Fähigkeit, eine Dienstleistung wie von seinen Benutzern erwartet zu er-
bringen – eine große Herausforderung dar. Die Systemzuverlässigkeit zur 
Laufzeit hängt von der Software-Implementierung ab, ebenso wie von der 
Systemnutzung und der zugrundeliegenden Hardware-Infrastruktur. 
Ansätze zur architekturbasierten Vorhersage der Software-Zuverlässig-
keit stellen eine Möglichkeit dar, die zu erwartende Zuverlässigkeit eines 
IT-Systems schon vor seiner Laufzeit abzuschätzen. Sie basieren auf Archi-
tekturmodellen, welche Software-Komponenten, deren Interaktionen und 
Zuverlässigkeitsaspekte erfassen. Eine analytische oder simulationsbasierte 
Auswertung dieser Modelle liefert die gewünschte Abschätzung. Mit Hil-
fe solcher Methoden ist es möglich, Zuverlässigkeitsbetrachtungen bereits 
in frühe Phasen des Systementwurfs miteinzubeziehen, um so Entwurfs-
entscheidungen zu unterstützen und kritische Bereiche der Architektur zu 
erkennen. 
Allerdings sind bestehende Ansätze für Zuverlässigkeitsvorhersagen in-
sofern eingeschränkt, als sie wesentliche zuverlässigkeitsrelevante Aspekte 
einer Systemarchitektur implizit in das Modell “hartkodieren” oder gänz-
lich vernachlässigen. Diese Aspekte beinhalten erstens die Beeinträchti-
gung der Systemzuverlässigkeit durch fehlerhafte Hardware-Ressourcen, 
zweitens die Fähigkeit des Systems, intern auftretende Fehler selbständig 
zu behandeln und vor seinen Benutzern zu verbergen, und drittens das Be-
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nutzungsproﬁl des Systems und seinen Einﬂuss auf den Kontroll- und Da-
tenﬂuss innerhalb der Architektur. Eine Vernachlässigung dieser Aspekte 
führt zur Verfälschung der Vorhersageergebnisse; eine implizite Abbildung 
der Informationen im Modell verringert dessen Wiederverwendbarkeit er-
heblich, so dass die Auswertung verschiedener Entwurfsalternativen nur 
sehr eingeschränkt unterstützt wird. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit führt mit PCM-REL einen neuartigen Ansatz zur 
integrierten Zuverlässigkeitsvorhersage für IT-Systeme basierend auf ihrer 
Software-Architektur ein, der die oben diskutierten zuverlässigkeitsrele-
vanten Aspekte wie folgt berücksichtigt: 
• durch eine kombinierte Betrachtung von Zuverlässigkeitsbeeinträch-
tigungen durch Software und Hardware, bei der sowohl Software-
Komponenten als auch Hardware-Ressourcen mit ihren speziﬁschen 
Fehlerpotentialen modelliert und durch eine integrierte Analyseme-
thode bei der Vorhersage berücksichtigt werden, 
• durch die Betrachtung von Fehlertoleranzmechanismen, bei der die 
Behandlung lokal auftretender Dienstausführungsfehler durch aus-
gleichende Maßnahmen zur Verhinderung von Systemfehlern in die 
Modellierung mit aufgenommen wird, 
• durch eine explizite Modellierung des Benutzungsproﬁls des Sys-
tems sowie der Auswirkung von Eingabeparametern auf die Dienst-
ausführung, ausgedrückt durch das Konzept der parametrischen Ab-
hängigkeiten. 
Der Ansatz basiert auf dem Palladio-Komponentenmodell (PCM), das eine 
entwurfsorientierte Modellierungssprache für komponentenbasierte Soft-
ware-Architekturen bereitstellt. Während der PCM-Ansatz traditionell die 
Systemmodellierung und Modellauswertung hinsichtlich der Systemper-
formanz ermöglicht, fügt die vorliegende Arbeit die Fähigkeit der zuver-
lässigkeitsorientierten Modellierung und Zuverlässigkeitsvorhersage hin-
zu. Dazu erweitert die Arbeit die bestehende PCM-Modellierungssprache 
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um zuverlässigkeitsspeziﬁsche Konstrukte und stellt – basierend auf einem 
diskreten Markovkettenmodell – eine automatisierte Analysemethode zur 
Verfügung, welche als PCM-REL-Modellinstanzen bereitgestellte Archi-
tekturspeziﬁkationen hinsichtlich ihrer Zuverlässigkeit auswertet. Im Ver-
gleich zu verwandten Arbeiten bietet PCM-REL eine wesentlich verbes-
serte Entscheidungsunterstützung für Software-Architekten beim System-
entwurf, eine erhöhte Wiederverwendbarkeit der entstehenden Modellarte-
fakte, sowie die Unterstützung eines verteilten komponentenbasierten Ent-
wicklungsprozesses. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beinhaltet zwei umfassende Fallstudien zur Vali-
dierung von PCM-REL. Die Fallstudien geben Anhalt dafür, 
• dass die in der bereitgestellten Modellierungssprache beinhalteten 
Abstraktionen für die Zuverlässigkeitsvorhersage nicht ungeeignet 
sind, 
• dass die als Eingaben für das Verfahren benötigten Zuverlässigkeits-
abschätzungen machbar sind, 
• dass die Analysemethode selbst valide ist, und 
• dass die Methode signiﬁkante und im Hinblick auf unsichere Einga-
ben ausreichend robuste Vorhersageergebnisse erzielt. 
Die erste Fallstudie stellt eine prototypische Systemimplementierung zur 
Verfügung und vergleicht die erhaltenen Vorhersageergebnisse mit Mess-
werten. Die zweite Studie behandelt ein industrielles System und demons-
triert die für die Eingaben benötigten Zuverlässigkeitsabschätzungen basie-
rend auf realen Informationsquellen. Insgesamt geben die beiden Fallstudi-
en umfassenden Anhalt für die Validität von PCM-REL. 
Der Ansatz und seine Beiträge wurden in einem Artikel [BKBR11] im 
Journal “Transactions of Software Engineering” (TSE) und in weiteren von 
Experten begutachteten Veröffentlichungen beschrieben [BZ09, BKBR10, 
vii 
BBKR11]. Der TSE-Artikel ist gegenwärtig für die Veröffentlichung ak-
zeptiert und in einer vorläuﬁgen Online-Version verfügbar. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis proposes PCM-REL, an approach to integrated software archi-
tecture-based reliability prediction for IT systems, which explicitly consid-
ers software and hardware failure potentials of a system under study, in-
cluded fault tolerance capabilities, as well as the system’s usage proﬁle and 
the propagation of input parameters. This chapter motivates and introduces 
the approach and its contributions from a high-level perspective. The chap-
ter starts by motivating the need for architecture-based software reliability 
prediction (Section 1.1), formulates a problem statement (Section 1.2), dis-
cusses existing solutions, their shortcomings and the corresponding thesis 
contributions (Section 1.3), brieﬂy describes the realization and validation 
of the proposed approach (Section 1.4), introduces an illustrating example 
(Section 1.5) and gives an outline of the remaining chapters (Section 1.6). 
1.1 Motivation 
IT systems are steadily growing in size and complexity, in response to the 
expanding demands of businesses and communities for IT support. The 
systems possess potentially complex architectures of interconnected and 
hierarchically composed software components, and they are often based on 
IT infrastructures with physically distributed computing nodes. They re-
quire the interoperation of their constituent software, hardware and network 
parts, and they provide a potentially heterogeneous set of software services 
to their users. The development and engineering of such systems presents 
signiﬁcant challenges, which are tackled by the software engineering disci-
pline through providing corresponding processes, methods and tools. 
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One of the most fundamental characteristics of an IT system beyond its 
pure functionality is its reliability – namely, its ability to deliver its in-
tended services to its users. Formally, the IEEE Standard Glossary of Soft-
ware Engineering Terminology [IEE90] deﬁnes reliability as “the ability of 
a system or component to perform its required functions under stated con-
ditions for a speciﬁed period of time”. A system service should meet the 
expectations of its users, conducting all required processing steps, achiev-
ing valid computational results, delivering all expected outputs, and not 
producing any unwanted side effects. If a system deviates from its intended 
service, it exhibits a failure. As a quality attribute, reliability is especially 
important if a system’s provided services are mission-critical, with failure 
occurrences implying high reputational or ﬁnancial losses, environmental 
damage, or even loss of life. The critical role of reliability is demonstrated 
by numerous historical and current IT project failures, which involve re-
liability problems of the developed IT systems. One such example is the 
case of the Sainsbury’s food retailer attempting to introduce an automated 
supply chain management system in 2004 to manage its stocks [Mes04]. 
As the system failed to properly trigger the ﬂow of merchandise from the 
company’s depots and warehouses to its stores, Sainsbury’s was forced to 
hire approximately 3 000 additional clerks to stock its shelves manually. 
The overall loss resulting from the failed project was estimated to more 
than USD 500 million. As another example, a defective computer-assisted 
dispatch system introduced at the London Ambulance Service in 1992 was 
held responsible for several losses of life due to signiﬁcantly delayed as-
signing of ambulances [Fin93]. 
Out of the various efforts to attain and assure IT system reliability, this 
thesis focuses on the problem ﬁeld of architecture-based software reliabil-
ity prediction (ASRP) [Gok07, GPT01, IN08]. This problem ﬁeld is mo-
tivated by the observation that the achievable reliability levels of many IT 
systems are essentially determined by the fundamental architectural deci-
sions made during the design stages of those systems. This is especially 
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true for systems with complex software architectures, such as business in-
formation systems or industrial control systems. As a consequence, sys-
tem design activities, which precede the actual development for initial sys-
tem creation as well as system evolution, should be enriched by systematic 
consideration of reliability aspects. Approaches in the ﬁeld of ASRP sup-
port software architects, who face principal questions such as the following 
ones: Which design alternative (out of a given set of possible alternatives) 
promises the highest system reliability? What are the expected reliability 
impacts of individual failure potentials contained in the system’s architec-
ture? Which architecture parts or service execution steps are most criti-
cal (namely, most likely to cause failures)? Does a planned architectural 
change have an effect on the expected reliability of the system? If so, is 
the effect positive or negative? Out of a given set of possible architectural 
changes, which one promises the greatest reliability improvement? Such 
questions are answered by ASRP approaches through evaluating an archi-
tectural speciﬁcation of a system under study in terms of a system model, 
enriched by probabilistic annotations representing the system’s failure po-
tentials. Based on these inputs, the approaches quantitatively predict the 
reliability of the ﬁnal system. Multiple design alternatives can be evaluated 
and ranked according to their reliability by conducting individual predic-
tion runs for all alternatives. Being based on a system model rather than 
the system itself, the approaches can already be applied at early design 
stages, when the system is not yet available and ready for observation of 
its actual reliability. 
While ASRP approaches do constitute a promising means for a more 
systematic consideration of reliability aspects throughout system develop-
ment processes, they also face signiﬁcant and partially unsolved challenges 
with respect to their practical applicability. To this end, modelling lan-
guages must be provided that adequately capture the different reliability-
inﬂuencing factors of a system and its environment, such that relevant de-
sign decisions can be reﬂected in the system models, and input estimates 
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for the required probabilistic model annotations can be feasibly determined. 
Moreover, the reliability evaluation of the models must take into account 
the individual speciﬁed failure potentials, reﬂecting their speciﬁc natures, 
their interplay and their inﬂuence on the system’s reliability as perceived 
by its users. This thesis focuses on a speciﬁc set of factors which are insuf-
ﬁciently captured by existing ASRP approaches, namely hardware-related 
failure potentials, fault tolerance capabilities of a system under study, as 
well as the system’s usage proﬁle. The following sections introduce the 
tackled scientiﬁc problem, the state-of-the-art of existing ASRP approaches 
and the contributions of the thesis in greater detail. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Motivated by the discussion of the previous section, the central prob-
lem tackled by this thesis is to predict the reliability of IT systems with 
component-based software architectures, taking into account relevant relia-
bility-inﬂuencing factors in a comprehensive way, and supporting the cor-
responding design decisions. To solve this problem, an approach shall be 
developed that provides an architecture modelling language and a method 
for analysing a system’s architectural speciﬁcation to obtain the predic-
tion results. 
The goal of comprehensive reliability modelling and prediction includes 
the challenge of adequately representing the individual failure potentials of 
a system under study, as well as evaluating their quantitative impacts on 
the system’s reliability. The failure potentials may relate to each of the 
software, hardware or network dimensions. Software implementations can 
be ﬂawed due to programming errors, speciﬁcation errors or natural limi-
tations of the implemented computational procedures. Hardware resources 
exhibit limited availability due to physical degradations and wear-out. Net-
work connections can be affected by various phenomena such as commu-
nication overload, transmission protocol errors, physical interference of 
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transmission lines or unavailability of transmission devices. Moreover, fail-
ure potentials can be introduced in a system by utilizing imperfect system-
external services. However, existing failure potentials do not necessarily 
lead to failures perceived by the system’s users. A ﬂawed implementation 
part may never be visited by the system’s service execution, an unavail-
able hardware resource may not be required, a failing network link may not 
be utilized, and an imperfect system-external service may not be invoked. 
Moreover, the system may include capabilities to tolerate certain failure 
potentials and to recover from local failure occurrences during the service 
execution, preventing them from reaching the system’s boundaries. 
The reliability impacts of existing failure potentials signiﬁcantly depend 
on the overall software architecture, including the system’s internal struc-
ture of interconnected software components with their interfaces and be-
haviour, as well as the allocation of software components to a hardware 
resource environment, the utilization of system-external services and the 
system’s usage proﬁle. These factors determine the potential points of fail-
ure within the architectural control ﬂow, as well as the probability that they 
are actually visited by the service execution upon a certain system service 
invocation. The additional consideration of the system’s included fault tol-
erance capabilities allows for determining points of recovery in the control 
ﬂow including their reliability-improving effects. The envisioned reliability 
modelling language shall capture all these aspects, and the analysis method 
shall take them into account in order to achieve an integrated reliability 
evaluation of the system under study. 
1.3 Existing Solutions and Thesis Contributions 
As discussed earlier, the thesis is situated in the problem ﬁeld of architec-
ture-based software reliability prediction (ASRP). Approaches in this ﬁeld 
constitute the closest related work with respect to the targeted problem of 
comprehensive reliability modelling and prediction. They build upon a 
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model of a software architecture, which – in its prevalent form – repre-
sents the involved software components and the transfer of control between 
them during the service execution; existing failure potentials are expressed 
through independent failure probabilities associated with individual visits 
to components. Based on such a model, the approaches predict the reliabil-
ity of the software architecture as the probability that the service execution 
is successfully completed, without any failure occurrence triggered by a 
visited component. 
When comparing the state-of-the-art in the ASRP ﬁeld with the problem 
statement given earlier, several limitations of existing ASRP approaches 
become apparent, which signiﬁcantly limit their applicability to software 
development processes in practice. By overcoming these limitations, this 
thesis achieves its main scientiﬁc contributions: 
• Combined consideration of software and hardware failure potentials: 
Most ASRP approaches focus purely on software failure potentials, 
thereby neglecting the reliability impacts of imperfect hardware re-
sources. As a consequence, predictions tend to be over-optimistic, 
and the introduced inaccuracies may lead to wrong design decisions, 
if such decisions relate to the overall architecture of an IT system 
rather than its software parts only. While a few ASRP approaches 
do consider hardware failure potentials, they do not provide an inte-
grated analysis combining both dimensions [ST07a, ST06], or they 
have a less differentiated view on the hardware layer [Gra05]. In 
contrast, the thesis offers a combined consideration of software and 
hardware failure potentials, taking into account the speciﬁc nature 
of the failure potentials of both dimensions, and deriving an overall 
system reliability value as the result of an integrated analysis method. 
• Consideration of fault tolerance capabilities: Typically, ASRP ap-
proaches assume that each local failure occurrence during service 
execution inevitably leads to a system failure perceived by the users, 
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even though many systems exhibit fault tolerance (FT) capabilities 
allowing for autonomous failure recovery. This assumption either 
leads to over-pessimistic prediction results, or it forces modellers 
to implicitly encode FT capabilities into correspondingly decreased 
software failure probabilities, providing insufﬁcient model expres-
siveness and decision support with respect to FT. Some approaches 
take a step forward and offer basic FT considerations limited to spe-
ciﬁc FT mechanisms and failure situations (such as [CG07b, GL05, 
ST06, WPC06]). This thesis offers a signiﬁcantly advanced consider-
ation of FT capabilities, explicitly modelling how certain parts of the 
service execution can recover from failure occurrences by carrying 
out failure-handling behaviours. These capabilities enable software 
architects to comprehensively evaluate different FT mechanisms and 
their effect on the system’s reliability. 
• Explicit consideration of usage proﬁles and the propagation of input 
parameter properties: The success probability of service execution 
depends on the execution paths taken through the architecture, which 
in turn depend on the sequences of service invocations of a speciﬁc 
usage scenario, as well as the properties of the input parameters of 
each invocation1. Existing ASRP approaches generally provide only 
implicit means to account for a system’s usage proﬁle and its in-
ﬂuence on the service execution. Hence, the usage inﬂuences are 
“hard-coded” in the architectural models, which strongly reduces the 
reusability of the corresponding model artefacts. This is also true for 
a few advanced approaches (such as [CSC02, GPHG+03, PDAC05, 
YCA04]), which explicitly model some usage aspects but hard-code 
other aspects. In contrast, this thesis provides an explicit representa-
tion of a system’s usage proﬁle with all its relevant aspects, including 
1The term “property” refers to any characteristic of an input parameter that may inﬂuence 
the process of service execution, such as the value of an integer parameter, the size of a list 
of data objects, or the encoding of a string parameter. 
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the input parameter properties of service invocations and their inﬂu-
ence on the service execution. Thanks to this contribution, software 
architects can easily evaluate architectural candidates under varying 
usage proﬁles. 
1.4 Realization and Validation 
In order to realize the envisioned contributions, this thesis proposes PCM-
REL, an approach to integrated software architecture-based reliability pre-
diction for IT systems, which builds upon the existing Palladio Compo-
nent Model (PCM) [BKR09]. The PCM provides a design-oriented mod-
elling language for component-based software architectures, enforcing a 
strict separation of modelling concerns along the lines of multiple envi-
sioned developer roles in a distributed component-based development pro-
cess. The modelling language includes a repository model for the speciﬁ-
cation of software components, a system model capturing component in-
stances and their interconnections, a resource environment model specify-
ing computing nodes, hardware resources and network connections, an al-
location model mapping software components to computing nodes, as well 
as a usage model capturing the system’s usage proﬁle. While traditional 
applications of the PCM are in the area of software performance predic-
tion, the thesis extends its capabilities to realize comprehensive reliability 
modelling and prediction. To this end, the thesis develops a methodolog-
ical basis for integrated IT system reliability prediction, extends the PCM 
meta-model by corresponding reliability-speciﬁc modelling constructs and 
develops an analysis method based on Markov chains [Tri02] for the relia-
bility evaluation of architectural speciﬁcations created in terms of PCM-
REL instances. 
The thesis includes two major case studies, which serve to give evidence 
of the feasibility of PCM-REL’s included modelling abstractions, the fea-
sibility of deriving input estimates for the required reliability annotations, 
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the validity of the Markov analysis itself, as well as the signiﬁcance and 
robustness of the obtained prediction results in the light of uncertain inputs. 
The ﬁrst case study is based on the audio hosting example as introduced 
in the following section; it features a prototypical system implementation 
and compares prediction results with measurements. The second study re-
lates to an industrial system with SMTP processing functionality and allows 
for demonstrating the estimation of reliability annotations based on exist-
ing information sources. Both studies support the claim for the validity 
of the approach. 
In conclusion, PCM-REL fulﬁls the criteria deﬁned with respect to the 
targeted scientiﬁc problem; it overcomes central weaknesses of existing 
ASRP approaches, and it constitutes a comprehensive and validated solu-
tion for supporting software architects through integrated reliability predic-
tion for IT systems. 
1.5 The Audio Hosting Example 
This section introduces an exemplary application scenario for PCM-REL, 
which serves to illustrate reliability modelling concepts throughout the the-
sis, and which provides a basis for one of the case studies conducted for 
validation purposes. The example focuses on MediaServ, a ﬁctive com-
pany that offers various hosting solutions for media ﬁles such as images, 
audio or video ﬁles. MediaServ pursues two types of business models. As 
a software provider, the company offers software components to third party 
service providers, which use the components to build and promote their 
own hosting services. Additionally, MediaServ acts as a service provider 
itself and offers a hosting service to end customers. Figure 1.1 gives an 
overview of these scenarios. 
MediaServ provides solutions for different kinds of media hosting use 
cases, ranging from repositories for online media shops and portals to stor-
age facilities for limited user groups or communities. The required instal-
9 
1 Introduction 
MediaServ – Media Hosting Solutions
Media Hosting as a Service
Media Hosting Software
Service Provider
Service Customer
Service Customer
Service Customer
Media Hosting 
Components
MediaServ
Hosting Service
Third Party 
Media Hosting 
Services
Figure 1.1: Media Hosting Solutions Offered by MediaServ 
lation sizes and expected functionalities vary accordingly. A new devel-
opment project of the company aims at a lightweight audio hosting ser-
vice, providing a centralized storage for audio ﬁles, corresponding up- and 
download functionality and user management enabling restricted data ac-
cess and individual audio collections per user account. A web-based front 
end allows for user registrations and transfers of individual ﬁles and ﬁle 
collections. The service also includes processing capabilities such as the 
adaptation of audio compression levels. 
The hosting solutions developed by MediaServ exhibit a non-perfect re-
liability. Even though the company applies rigorous quality assurance to 
its development processes, a certain probability of failure always remains. 
Software bugs in the developed components may lead to failures during 
the execution of MediaServ’s and third party hosting services. Addition-
ally, unavailable hardware resources and transmission failures of network 
connections may lead to failures on the service level. Depending on the 
established service usage contracts, MediaServ may be held responsible 
for failures of its hosting service, as well as third party service failures 
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caused by MediaServ’s software components. Hence, reliability is an im-
portant factor for the company to consider. However, the impact of the 
different failure potentials on the overall service reliability is not trivial to 
determine, as it depends on the underlying software architecture and the 
service usage proﬁle. 
MediaServ attaches importance to the reliability of its offered hosting 
solutions. The company uses PCM-REL for reliability modelling and pre-
diction throughout the system design stages. The application of PCM-REL 
allows MediaServ to anticipate the expected reliability of its planned audio 
hosting service, to assess the reliability impacts of individual failure poten-
tials contained in the architecture, and to select out of a range of possible 
design alternatives the most reliable one. 
1.6 Contents and Outline 
This section gives a brief overview of the contents and structure of the the-
sis. First, Chapter 2 introduces the existing foundations upon which the 
PCM-REL approach builds. The discussion covers basic concepts related 
to IT systems and reliability (Section 2.1.1), the overall scientiﬁc context of 
reliability engineering and software reliability engineering (Section 2.1.2), 
as well as the directly related ﬁeld of architecture-based software reliabil-
ity prediction (ASRP, Section 2.5). Further relevant areas of discussion 
include existing methods for specifying and estimating software and hard-
ware failure potentials (Sections 2.2 and 2.3), an overview of the area of 
fault tolerance (FT, Section 2.6) and a brief introduction to Markov chains 
and their underlying theory (Section 2.4), upon which PCM-REL and many 
ASRP approaches build. In addition, Section 2.7 introduces the PCM as a 
conceptional and technical foundation for PCM-REL. 
Chapter 3 builds upon the foundations given in the previous chapter and 
develops an own PCM-REL methodology, based on an integrated perspec-
tive on IT systems (Section 3.1) which combines the perspectives of the 
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hardware-oriented and software-oriented reliability communities. The dis-
cussion is complemented by putting reliability prediction into the context 
of an envisioned reliability-aware system engineering process (Section 3.2). 
Further discussions cover the adoption of PCM methodology by PCM-REL 
(Section 3.3), as well as the degrees of freedom that PCM-REL offers for 
reliability modelling (Section 3.4). 
Chapter 4 focuses on the modelling capabilities of PCM-REL, which 
extend the PCM meta-model by reliability-speciﬁc concepts and modelling 
constructs. Section 4.1 introduces the notion of an overall behavioural view, 
which combines all speciﬁcations of user and system behaviour, and which 
serves as a basis for deﬁning the concepts of a successful run through a 
usage scenario, the potential points of failure and points of recovery in the 
control ﬂow, the occurrence of failures-on-demand and their propagation 
throughout the architecture. Section 4.2 further introduces the differenti-
ation of multiple failure-on-demand types, and the following Sections 4.3 
to 4.6 deal with the speciﬁcation of failure potentials related to software, 
hardware, network and system-external services. Section 4.7 describes the 
speciﬁcation of capabilities for failure recovery, and Section 4.8 shortly in-
troduces PCM-REL’s tool support for reliability modelling. 
Chapter 5 describes the Markov analysis method provided by PCM-REL 
for the reliability evaluation of its architectural speciﬁcations. In order to 
cover all relevant aspects for integrated IT system reliability prediction, 
PCM-REL develops novel ways to apply existing Markov theory, and it 
includes a space- and time-efﬁcient algorithm for transforming a PCM-REL 
instance into a discrete-time Markov chain. Section 5.1 gives an overview 
of the involved concepts, before Sections 5.2 and 5.3 go into the details of 
evaluating the potential hardware states of a system under study, as well 
as its behavioural speciﬁcations. Section 5.4 adds a consideration of the 
method’s complexity, and Section 5.5 shortly describes the integration of 
automated evaluation capabilities in PCM-REL’s tool support. 
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Chapter 6 reports on two major case studies that serve to validate the PCM-
REL approach. Against the background of the overall state-of-the-art in 
the validation of software reliability predictions (Section 6.1), the thesis 
sets up its speciﬁc validation goals (Section 6.2) and develops a plan how 
to achieve these goals through the case studies (Section 6.3). Sections 6.4 
and 6.5 then describe the studies. The ﬁrst study is based on the audio host-
ing example. It demonstrates PCM-REL’s reliability evaluation capabilities 
and compares the obtained prediction results against a simulation, as well as 
measurements conducted on an implemented prototype. The second study 
examines the Astaro Security Gateway (ASG) as an industrial IT system. 
The study focuses on the SMTP processing functionality of ASG instal-
lations. It derives an architectural speciﬁcation including input estimates 
for reliability annotations from existing information sources and conducts 
a reliability evaluation to answer relevant system design questions. Sec-
tion 6.6 brieﬂy reports on further case studies and validation experiments 
conducted for PCM-REL. 
Chapter 7 provides an in-depth review of the PCM-REL approach com-
pared to its related work. Three Sections 7.1 to 7.3 speciﬁcally focus on 
the three main contributions of PCM-REL, namely the combined consid-
eration of software and hardware failure potentials, the consideration of an 
IT system’s fault tolerance capabilities, as well as the explicit consideration 
of usage proﬁles and the propagation of input parameter properties. The 
discussion mainly focuses on, but is not limited to, related approaches in 
the ﬁeld of ASRP. Section 7.4 then summarises the innovative features of 
PCM-REL and sets them in relation to existing efforts and results specif-
ically in the ASRP ﬁeld. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a short summary (Section 8.1), an 
overview of completed and ongoing research efforts related to PCM-REL 
(Section 8.2), an examination of future work potentials (Section 8.3) and a 
ﬁnal assessment and outlook (Section 8.4). 
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2 Foundations 
The PCM-REL approach presented in this thesis builds upon a signiﬁcant 
amount of existing knowledge and methodology in several areas related to 
IT systems and their reliability characteristics. As a foundation for the pre-
sentation of the approach itself, this chapter provides overviews and discus-
sions of all relevant aspects which form the context of the approach. More 
concretely, Section 2.1 explains basic reliability concepts and presents ex-
isting approaches in the area of hardware and software reliability analyses. 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 then discuss the state of the art in deriving hardware 
and software reliability estimates, which are required for the application 
of PCM-REL. An introduction to Markov chains as the underlying formal-
ism of PCM-REL is provided by Section 2.4, and the ﬁeld of architecture-
based software reliability prediction (ASRP), to which PCM-REL belongs, 
is introduced by Section 2.5. Section 2.6 gives an overview of fault toler-
ance in IT systems, and Section 2.7 concludes by presenting the Palladio 
Component Model (PCM) as the conceptional and technical foundation of 
PCM-REL. 
2.1 IT Systems and Reliability 
This section provides a high-level overview of the scientiﬁc context of the 
PCM-REL approach. Section 2.1.1 discusses foundational concepts and 
terms of IT systems with a special focus on reliability, before Section 2.1.2 
introduces the problem ﬁeld of analysing hardware and software reliability, 
to which PCM-REL presents an integrated solution. 
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2.1.1 Basic Concepts 
Although there is ongoing discussion about notions and terms in the ﬁeld 
of IT systems and reliability, Avižienis et al. [ALRL04] have deﬁned a set 
of core concepts as part of a widely accepted taxonomy of dependable and 
secure computing. The thesis takes part of their deﬁnitions as a terminolog-
ical foundation. The authors introduce a system generically as an entity that 
interacts with its environment delivering services through well-deﬁned ser-
vice interfaces. The system may be recursively composed of components 
which are systems themselves. A service failure is any deviation of the sys-
tem’s behaviour from its intended functionality, as perceived by a system 
user1. Errors are defective parts of a system’s state which may lead to ser-
vice failures. Faults, in turn, constitute the adjudged or hypothesized causes 
of errors. Reliability is associated with the ability of a system to provide 
service free of failures. It is one out of several dependability attributes next 
to availability, safety, integrity and maintainability. While the scope of the 
taxonomy provided by Avižienis et al. is very broad, the thesis focuses on 
IT systems as computer-based systems comprising software components, 
hardware resources and network connections. PCM-REL measures sys-
tem reliability as the probability that a system usage scenario comprising a 
series of service invocations is completed without any system-level failure-
on-demand (see Section 4.1). 
Apart from the basic deﬁnitions given above, the taxonomy also includes 
a classiﬁcation of service failures that illustrates the broad range of possi-
ble deviations from the intended system functionality. In case that a ser-
vice includes the provision of data to its users, deviations are classiﬁed as 
content failures if the provided data is not as intended. Any service that 
involves actions within speciﬁed time frames may suffer from timing fail-
ures if actions are conducted too early or too late. Halt failures result from 
a complete cancellation of service delivery; erratic failures are temporary 
1The term failure may be used as an abbreviation for service failure. 
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service disruptions that usually occur at unpredictable points in time. De-
pending on the question if a system can detect a service failure and notiﬁes 
its users about it, the failure is either signalled or unsignalled. A further 
important criterion is the severity of the consequence of failure for the sys-
tem’s environment ranging from minor failures up to catastrophic failures. 
Based on the conﬁned scope of the thesis, PCM-REL allows for specifying 
custom types of failures-on-demand (see Section 4.2) induced by software, 
hardware or network. The possible range of those types is comparable to 
the range of service failure types described here. 
The taxonomy further categorizes the efforts to attain dependability and 
security into four major groups: 
• Fault prevention aims to reduce the number of faults introduced in a 
system. The range of measures includes following best practice for 
system design and implementation, as well as improving the quality 
of the engineering process. 
• Fault tolerance summarizes all built-in capabilities of a system to 
avoid service failures in the presence of faults. It involves error de-
tection (identifying the presence of errors) and system recovery (re-
moving the errors and possibly identifying the error-causing faults 
and reconﬁguring the system so that they cannot be activated again). 
• Fault removal aims to reduce the number and severity of faults. Dur-
ing system development, a wide range of measures may be taken to 
identify and eliminate different kinds of faults, including static soft-
ware analysis, theorem proving, model checking, symbolic software 
execution and various software and hardware testing methods. Dur-
ing system operation, faults may be removed through corrective or 
preventive maintenance. 
• Fault forecasting aims to estimate current or future dependability and 
security characteristics of a system under study, such as the number 
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of existing faults or the expected frequency and severity of service 
failures. Available analysis methods can roughly be classiﬁed as be-
ing qualitative (e.g. Failure Modes And Effects Analysis), quantita-
tive (e.g. Markov chains, stochastic Petri nets) or mixed (e.g. relia-
bility block diagrams, fault trees). 
Each of the four categories has its own importance, even if the focus is 
narrowed down to reliability as one speciﬁc dependability attribute. PCM-
REL as a reliability prediction approach belongs to the fourth category. 
While the ﬁrst three categories aim to decrease the likelihood of service 
failures as far as possible, approaches in the fourth category acknowledge 
the fact that in virtually all cases a certain potential of failure remains, and 
they make estimates about this potential and its consequences. 
2.1.2 Hardware and Software Reliability Analyses 
The scientiﬁc context of the PCM-REL prediction approach is determined 
through the reliability-tailored fraction of the analysis methods introduced 
in Section 2.1.1 under the aggregated term fault forecasting. While var-
ious methods have been researched extensively and are widely accepted, 
they do not necessarily focus on software or on the software part of IT 
systems. Most approaches that have gained a certain level of industrial ac-
ceptance by now are more generally tailored towards industrial products 
with mainly electronic components or parts. The approaches focus on the 
physical wear-out effects of individual parts and on the various states of 
degraded service – referred to as failure modes – of a whole product or 
system resulting from the failure of its individual parts. Hence, their rea-
soning is based on a primarily hardware-oriented perspective. Target met-
rics of interest may be qualitative (such as identifying the different failure 
modes of a system) or quantitative (such as estimating system failure rates 
or frequencies of occurrence of critical failure modes). Available analy-
sis methods include the Failure Modes And Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
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its extension for consideration of criticality (FMECA), fault trees, relia-
bility block diagrams, Markov-based analyses, reliability growth analy-
ses and others. Each method comes in a number of variations, and often 
a combination of multiple analyses is applied to a certain system under 
study. A number of standards exist describing how the methods can be 
applied [Aut08, Int04, Int06a, Int06b, Int06c, Int06d, Uni06]. Both com-
mercial tool suites and consulting services are offered for conducting the 
analyses, and they are used mainly by automotive, aeronautics, telecom-
munications, medical and electronics industries. The term reliability en-
gineering has been coined to denote the systematic consideration of relia-
bility aspects throughout design and production processes (see [Bir10] for 
a comprehensive overview). 
The ever increasing amount of software in modern products and systems 
has led to a situation where the failure potential of many systems is sig-
niﬁcantly inﬂuenced by both their software and hardware portions, or even 
dominated by software. Determining reliability characteristics of such sys-
tems, which have been termed software-intensive systems [WH07] or soft-
ware systems, presents a severe challenge to reliability engineers [Ham92]. 
On the one hand, there exist similarities between the logical composition of 
software components and the physical composition of electronic parts. In 
both cases, individual components or parts may fail, and failures may have 
effects on other parts as well as the whole system, leading it into states of 
degraded service. On the other hand, while electronic parts can be char-
acterised through basic failure models (see Section 2.2) and failure rates 
can be feasibly determined for them, software components are signiﬁcantly 
more difﬁcult to handle. They do not fail due to wear-out but due to the 
activation of their comprised software faults. Fault activation patterns may 
be complex and unique for each individual component. Moreover, com-
ponent reliability heavily depends on the usage of the components, which 
in turn depends on the system’s usage in non-trivial ways. Even minimal 
changes in system usage (such as a changed input parameter value of a ser-
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vice invocation) may lead to a completely different control and data ﬂow 
throughout the system, activating different software faults. Hence, the ag-
gregation of component reliabilities to a system-level reliability metric is 
far less intuitive than for hardware-dominated systems. 
In spite of these differences, there have been efforts to reuse hardware-
oriented analysis methods for software systems, resulting in software-
speciﬁc or combined hardware-software analyses (see [PA02] for an ex-
ample of FMEA tailored towards software and [LN97] for an overview). 
However, such efforts remain limited in their applicability to systems with 
rather basic functionality and static control and data ﬂow. For more com-
plex software, the abstractions are either too simplistic or the analysis effort 
gets out of hand. Even the enumeration of potential failure modes of soft-
ware systems may be hard to achieve in a comprehensive and consistent 
manner (for example, Vijayaraghavan identiﬁed more than 700 individual 
failure modes in e-commerce systems [Vij03]). The only analysis methods 
that have undergone a major evolution towards software-speciﬁc applica-
tion are reliability growth analyses. In their software-speciﬁc form, these 
methods focus on the process of testing software systems or components 
and removing detected faults. Software Reliability Growth Models (SRGM, 
see [Ape05] for an introduction and [SGNG10] for a most recent overview) 
map the increasing reliability of the systems or components under test to 
parametrized statistical functions, allowing for estimations how the relia-
bility growth will continue during further test activities, and when given 
reliability goals are expected to be reached (see Section 2.3.1 for a detailed 
discussion). Traditionally, SRGMs have been applied at the system level, 
thereby avoiding the consideration of individual software components and 
their reliability impact. Authors such as Musa [Mus04] have much focused 
on the SRGM approach and have coined the term software reliability engi-
neering to denote the software-speciﬁc evolution of reliability engineering 
with SRGMs as a central ingredient (also see [Lyu07] for a more recent 
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overview). The IEEE Standard 1633 “Recommended Practice on Software 
Reliability” [IEE08] follows this pattern and focuses mainly on SRGMs. 
However, the applicability of system-level SRGMs to modern highly dis-
tributed component-based software systems is limited. SRGM analysis re-
sults cannot be reused across a family of similar systems, as the individ-
ual reliability impacts of the changed components are unclear. Moreover, 
the application of SRGMs requires the installation and execution of the 
complete system under study. Hence, SRGMs cannot easily be used to 
make comparisons between several system design alternatives, especially 
not at early design stages, when the system is not yet ready for execu-
tion. To this end, another family of analysis methods has emerged within 
a ﬁeld of research called Architecture-Based Software Reliability Predic-
tion (ASRP) throughout the thesis (see Section 2.5 for further details). 
Approaches in this ﬁeld explicitly take into account the architecture of 
a software system, namely its internal structure as a composition of soft-
ware components. They model the transfer of control between components 
and provide a means to express system-level reliability based on individual 
component reliabilities. Still, the approaches face the challenge of esti-
mating the failure rates of the individual components. To this end, they 
can employ component-level SRGMs and other estimation methods (see 
Section 2.3). 
While ASRP approaches constitute a major step forward in analysing 
the reliability of component-based software architectures, their practical 
applicability is still limited due to missing support for expressing hardware 
failure potentials and fault tolerance capabilities, as well as implicit usage 
proﬁle encoding in the employed architectural models (see Chapter 7). This 
thesis proposes PCM-REL to overcome these weaknesses and to provide a 
comprehensive approach to integrated IT system reliability prediction. 
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2.2 Hardware Reliability Estimation 
This section gives an overview of existing failure models and reliability 
estimation techniques for hardware resources in IT systems such as hard 
disk drives and CPUs, based on results from the reliability engineering do-
main. The discussion provides a foundation for the modelling of hardware 
resources and their reliability in PCM-REL (see Section 4.4). 
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Figure 2.1: Hardware Resource Failure Model 
Typically, a hardware resource is modelled as having two basic service lev-
els or resource availability states which may be termed OK (fully available 
– the resource serves all requests) and NA (not available – the resource 
does not serve any request). The main reason for a resource becoming un-
available is physical wear-out. Although the model is coarse-grained and 
does not account for intermediate service levels, it is a widely established 
abstraction chosen for individual resources. As Figure 2.1 shows, non-
repairable resources have a lifetime measured from the start of operation t0 
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to the ﬁrst failure t1. In contrast, repairable resources switch between in-
tervals of uptime (such as [t0, t1] and [t2, t3]) and downtime (such as [t1, t2]). 
A switch back from NA to OK is often achieved through replacing a broken 
resource with a functionally equivalent one, rather than actually repairing 
the existing resource2. The length of a resource uptime interval is referred 
to as Time To Failure (TTF); the downtime interval length is called Time 
To Repair (TTR). The Time Between Failures (TBF) refers to the time span 
between two consecutive switches to NA. The notions of TTF and TBF 
may also refer to the lifetimes of non-repairable resources. 
Based on the described failure model, the reliability of a hardware re-
source is characterised through statistical measures such as its expected 
TTF, TTR and TBF values – also referred to as Mean Time To Failure 
(MTTF), Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) and Mean Time Between Fail-
ures (MTBF, which constitutes the inverse of the resource failure rate). For 
repairable resources, a Steady-State Availability Av denotes the expected 
fraction of uptime measured over the inﬁnite time interval [t0,∞): 
MT T F MT T F 
Av := = (2.1)
MT T F +MT T R MT BF 
To model the availability state progression of resources over time, TTF 
and TTR values are typically assumed to follow an exponential distribution 
with expected values equal to MTTF and MTTR. The exponential distri-
bution is chosen because it readily lends itself to analytical evaluations, 
even though it is not the most accurate abstraction [SG07]. Alternatively, 
Weibull, Gamma and Lognormal distributions have been used to charac-
terise the TTF and TTR values. 
The problem of hardware resource reliability estimation can be narrowed 
down to estimating MTTF and MTTR values. Based on these estimates, 
MTBF and Av values can be readily determined. The estimation of MTTR 
2Hence, a repairable resource model often reﬂects the usage of a series of non-repairable 
resources with replacement intervals after each resource wear-out. 
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values is relatively straightforward as resource repair and replacement fol-
lows a controlled process rather than physical indeterminism. A TTR may 
include several aspects such as the time to detect a resource failure, the 
time to conduct the repair or replacement, and the duration of required re-
initializations. These aspects can be determined for most IT systems and 
application scenarios to derive MTTR values. For the estimation of MTTF 
values, several sources of information are available. First, hardware ven-
dors conduct internal studies of their products and publish MTTF values 
denoting their expected lifetimes. Vendor estimates are based on data gath-
ered from customer reclamations and conducted service jobs, as well as 
accelerated stress tests, where “stress” refers to environmental character-
istics such as voltage, temperature, humidity, physical vibration and me-
chanical forces [Yan99]. Second, vendor-independent studies have been 
conducted evaluating empirical resource failure and replacement data, es-
pecially for hard disk drives [PWB07, SG07]. These studies calculate 
Annualized Failure Rates (AFR) over a large population of functionally 
equivalent resources, from which MTTF estimates can be derived. Third, 
IT system or infrastructure providers can estimate MTTF values for their 
hardware resources based on their own experiences gathered during sys-
tem operation. 
As an alternative to direct resource reliability estimation, existing reli-
ability engineering techniques (see Section 2.1.2) can be used to assess 
complex hardware resources based on their constituent parts. For example, 
an MTTF estimate for an array of hard disks may result from a reliability 
block diagram that models the internal structure of the array and contains 
MTTF estimates for the individual hard disks. Such an analysis may be 
performed as a preliminary step providing input to PCM-REL resource en-
vironment models (see Section 4.4). 
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2.3 Software Reliability Estimation 
This section discusses strategies for software reliability estimation, with a 
special focus on determining failure rates or failure probabilities of soft-
ware components. Such estimates can be used as an input information for 
approaches to architecture-based software reliability prediction (ASRP). 
Software reliability is modelled stochastically because – although software 
fails systematically (in contrast to randomly failing hardware) – software 
failures are uncertain from an engineer’s point of view [Lit05]. “System-
atic” means that the same failures will always result from the same set of 
circumstances. “Uncertainty” relates to the nature and frequency of those 
circumstances and includes several aspects. First, there is missing knowl-
edge about the faults contained in the software, as well as their activation 
patterns. Second, reliability models include probabilistic abstractions from 
the actual system behaviour to reduce modelling complexity. Third, the sys-
tem usage presents a source of indeterminism as the exact nature, sequence 
and timing of system invocations by users is unknown in advance. 
Reliability estimations for software components are signiﬁcantly more 
difﬁcult than for hardware resources, for reasons outlined in Section 2.1.2. 
However, the need for corresponding methods is steadily increasing, and an 
own ﬁeld of research has emerged around the issue. While this thesis does 
not focus on the problem of software reliability estimation itself, the appli-
cation of PCM-REL does require deriving input estimates for the modelled 
software failure potentials. To this end, an exemplary estimation process 
was conducted as part of a PCM-REL case study, which is documented in 
Section 6.5. Here, the discussion focuses on major families of software 
reliability estimation methods, including software reliability growth mod-
els (Section 2.3.1), software defect prediction models (Section 2.3.2) and 
others (Section 2.3.3). 
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2.3.1 Software Reliability Growth Models 
Software Reliability Growth Models (SRGM), which have been brieﬂy in-
troduced in Section 2.1.2, are one of the most successful families of analy-
sis methods within the software reliability engineering discipline [Lyu07]. 
Beyond system-level black box testing, they can also be used to determine 
failure rates of software components as an input to Architecture-Based Soft-
ware Reliability Prediction (ASRP) [GPT01]. The following discussion 
introduces the basics of SRGM approaches and reﬂects possibilities and 
challenges of their application. 
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Figure 2.2: Software Reliability Growth Modelling Scheme 
Figure 2.2 depicts the general SRGM scheme. SRGM approaches observe 
a software system or component under test and record how the number of 
detected faults increases during the test. The test time may be measured in 
terms of system or component execution time (for continuous applications) 
or as the number of performed test runs (for terminating applications). At 
any point in time t1 during testing, a parametrized statistical mean value 
function m(t) can be ﬁtted to the existing history of fault detection since 
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test start t0, and this function can be used to predict the further progres-
sion of the testing process. Such information allows for estimating the 
total detected number of faults at the planned end of test t2. More im-
portantly, many SRGMs include an estimation of the total number of faults 
comprised in the system or component under test at t0, thereby indicating 
the remaining or residual number of faults during the operational phase 
(namely, after t2). Corresponding to the different test progression types 
one may encounter in practice, various different mean value functions have 
been proposed by several authors (see [SGNG10] for an overview of the 
most important ones). The proposals are generally based on the assump-
tion that the rate of fault detection decreases over time, leading to mean 
value functions with decreasing slopes. Moreover, most SRGM approaches 
share the common assumptions that each detected fault is removed instanta-
neously (or alternatively, testing stops upon fault detection and is resumed 
after fault removal), and that fault removal activities do not introduce new 
faults into the system or component under test. 
Beyond the essentially static information about the number of existing 
faults comprised in systems and components under test, SRGM approaches 
also reason about their dynamic reliability characteristics, namely their fail-
ure rates. Assuming that each failure occurring during the test corresponds 
to the detection of one new fault, the fault detection history also indicates 
all times between failures in [t0, t1]. From this information, a failure inten-
sity function λ (t) may be derived that indicates the system or component 
failure rate at time t. Failure intensity functions directly follow from mean 
dm(t)value functions through derivation (namely, λ (t) = ) and are expected dt 
to decrease over time. Through determining λ (t), the expected failure rate 
at the planned end of test t2 can be predicted. Alternatively, t2 can be dy-
namically chosen to fulﬁl a given failure rate requirement. It may also be 
possible to anticipate a system’s or component’s operational failure rate as 
being the one expected at the end of test, namely λ (t2). However, such an 
estimation is only credible if an overall ﬁeld usage proﬁle of the system 
27 
2 Foundations 
or component at the operational phase can be determined, and if statistical 
testing is applied – namely, if test inputs are randomly selected according 
to the ﬁeld usage proﬁle. 
SRGM approaches have been pointed out by several authors as a pos-
sible means of gathering input information for ASRP approaches [Eve99, 
GPT01, GWTH98]. SRGMs may be used to estimate current or future 
failure rates of software components which already exist and have under-
gone a certain amount of testing. A very recent case study by Koziolek 
et al. [KSB10] on a large industrial control system illustrates this usage 
of SRGMs. On the other hand, successful usage of SRGMs is still chal-
lenging. Apel [Ape05] lists open issues directly related to SRGM research, 
including the problem of choosing between the various proposed SRGMs 
and characteristic mean value functions for concrete use cases3, as well as 
the lack of empirical validation (especially regarding long-term prediction 
quality). Moreover, it is often not feasible or possible to apply SRGMs in 
practice without violating their underlying assumptions [BKH09, Woo97], 
thereby weakening the signiﬁcance of their prediction results. In particular, 
if SRGM analyses are based on standard unit tests and their failure reports, 
it may be difﬁcult to gain meaningful results from their application. Time 
stamps of bug entries usually refer to calendar time instead of execution 
time, test inputs are generated to locate as many faults as possible (and not 
to represent an identiﬁed ﬁeld usage proﬁle), fault removals may not be in-
stantaneous, and new faults may be introduced during removal activities. 
If, on the other hand, SRGMs are applied under strict conformance to all 
their underlying assumptions, their practical applicability is limited. For 
example, they can only be used to assess relatively low reliability levels 
(such as failure rates of 10−2 to 10−4h−1 [BF93, GPT01]); otherwise, the 
testing effort gets out of hand. 
If system test runs are used to derive component-level reliability esti-
mates, additional issues need to be considered. For example, to evaluate 
3However, a recent work of Sharma et al. [SGNG10] tackles this issue. 
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failure rates of components as the ratio between their overall invocation 
counts and successful invocation counts, it must be determined how of-
ten each component is invoked in each test run, and which component is 
to blame in case of a failed test run. Moreover, a potentially large num-
ber of test runs must be conducted so that a statistically relevant amount 
of successful and failed invocations of each component can be observed. 
If, on the other hand, SRGMs are applied to each component in isolation, 
care must be taken to test each component according to its individual usage 
proﬁle within the overall architecture (which means that component-level 
usage proﬁles need to be determined prior to the application of SRGMs). 
A body of work exists to improve SRGM approaches and tackle their 
issues (see [Lyu07] for a summary). Still, successful application of SRGMs 
in practice requires care. The use of SRGMs as an input to ASRP has 
been demonstrated by Koziolek et al. [KSB10], but needs to be further 
investigated with respect to the challenges discussed above. 
2.3.2 Software Defect Prediction Models 
The notion of Software Defect Prediction Models (SDPMs) captures a wide 
and heterogeneous ﬁeld of efforts related to estimating the amount of faults 
or defects comprised in software systems or components. Widely estab-
lished target metrics are defect count (number of defects) and defect density 
(number of defects related to code size). Defect prediction approaches use 
various kinds of artefacts emerging from speciﬁcation, design, implementa-
tion and test stages as possible sources of information. The most important 
factors that have been assumed to inﬂuence the amount of defects in soft-
ware include the following: 
• Size and complexity: The amount of software defects is expected 
to generally increase with the size and complexity of the system or 
component under study. Measures of code size include the number 
of Lines Of Code (LOC), code segments or machine code instruc-
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tions. Examples for code complexity metrics include Halstead’s Vol-
ume, Difﬁculty and Effort metrics [Hal77] (correlated with the num-
ber of operands and operators in the code) and McCabe’s Cyclomatic 
Complexity [McC76] (correlated with the number of decision state-
ments). As an alternative, Function Points (originally deﬁned by Al-
brecht [Alb79]) measure the amount of functionality offered by a 
system or component and examine requirements and design speciﬁ-
cations rather than code. 
• Test-related factors: At any point in time during the testing stages, an 
existing test history may be exploited to estimate the total or remain-
ing number of defects. Metrics of interest include the number of al-
ready detected defects (differentiated according to test iterations, test 
approaches or associated function points) and the already achieved 
test coverage (which may refer to statement coverage, branch cover-
age, code sequence and jump coverage, see [VM94]). Another metric 
of interest is the testability [VM95] of a given system or component 
(namely, the likelihood that potential defects will be detected through 
test), which is determined through static code analyses. 
• Process quality: Software is expected to generally contain less de-
fects if created following a high-quality development process. A 
process quality model that has been used to derive defect density 
estimates is the SEI Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [DS97]. 
Many earlier works on SDPMs tried to derive straightforward general for-
mulae for the number of defects based on existing sets of empirical data 
from software development (see, for example, [CW90, Gaf84]); however, 
the validity of their results is questionable. Fenton et al. [FN99] have iden-
tiﬁed substantial ﬂaws in such works including incorrect use of statisti-
cal analyses with misleading results, as well as a tendency towards over-
simpliﬁcation by focussing on a partial subset of the relevant factors only. 
Nevertheless, research in this ﬁeld is very active until today (see [CD09] 
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for a recent review). More advanced prediction approaches have been 
developed using Bayesian networks [FNM+08], Capture-Recapture mod-
els [BEFL00] and other formalisms. Machine learning and data mining 
techniques are increasingly employed to derive defect estimations from 
code metrics data [MGC07, MGF07]. 
While the wealth of existing SDPMs can in theory be used to derive input 
information for ASRP approaches, there is no straightforward relation be-
tween the number of faults of a software component and its failure rate. The 
latter depends on the likelihood that existing faults will actually be activated 
under a certain component usage proﬁle. In contrast to SRGMs (see Sec-
tion 2.3.1), SDPMs do not deﬁne the process of gathering data in such a way 
that it provides information about both faults and failures. This is a major 
obstacle against the use of SDPMs for architecture-based software reliabil-
ity prediction – in fact, it is a weakness of SDPMs as such [FN99], limiting 
the signiﬁcance of their prediction results. Moreover, a recent study by 
Zimmermann et al. [ZNG+09] suggests that reusing defect prediction re-
sults across multiple software development projects may be invalid, even if 
these projects stem from the same domain or employ the same underlying 
development process model. Still, SDPMs are an extensively researched 
means guiding decisions in software development processes, and further re-
search efforts may close the gap towards usage for reliability prediction. 
2.3.3 Further Approaches to Software Reliability Estimation 
Beyond SRGMs and SDPMs, various further efforts have been made to 
estimate failure rates of software systems and components. At late test-
ing stages, a validation test or operational test may be conducted to assure 
required reliability levels [MMN+92, MIO90, LW97]. The system or com-
ponent is tested as if executed in the ﬁeld – namely, according to its ﬁeld 
usage proﬁle. By applying frequentist inference [Cox06], upper bounds 
for failure rates can be deduced with certain levels of conﬁdence from a 
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certain amount of failure-free execution. For example, 4603 successfully 
executed independent test runs give a 99 percent upper conﬁdence bound 
on a failure rate of 10−3. Methods and tools from model-based testing 
(MBT) [UPL11, Pre03, PPW+05] can be applied to support and partially 
automate the testing process4. For example, the J Usage Model Builder 
Library (JUMBL) [Pro03] automatically generates test cases according to 
a usage proﬁle speciﬁed in terms of a Markov model, and it determines re-
liability estimates and conﬁdence levels from a set of executed test cases 
and their results. As of today, the potentially very high testing effort as-
sociated with such methods constitutes a major challenge and essentially 
limits their applicability to cases with relatively low reliability require-
ments [GPT01]. 
Component reliability models are a further means speciﬁcally tailored 
to component-level reliability estimation [CRMG08, CMRK10, Imm06, 
TW99]. Markov models are used to indicate different component states 
between which a component switches forth and back over time according 
to speciﬁed transition probabilities. Typically, the states are grouped into 
two categories, where one category corresponds to normal operation and 
the other one to failure. Cheung et al. [CRMG08] identify several sources 
of information that can be used to construct component reliability models, 
including existing component speciﬁcations, expert knowledge, component 
use case descriptions, simulations and existing functionally similar compo-
nents. Applying Markov theory allows for determining reliability charac-
teristics of a component such as the component failure rate or the fraction 
of time in which the component provides normal operation. Approaches 
to component reliability modelling seem promising due to their ﬂexibility. 
Being model-based in nature, they do not necessarily require a component 
to already be implemented and executed under test, and they are not re-
4In general, the main goal of MBT is to support the identiﬁcation of faults in the system, or 
to verify that certain parts of the system’s behaviour conform to its speciﬁcation. A model 
captures the system’s intended behaviour; it serves as a way to specify the possible system 
inputs, as well as the relation between inputs and expected outputs. 
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stricted to assessment of low reliability levels. On the other hand, there is 
no straightforward general way to construct the models, and the problem 
of stochastic estimation is not resolved but rather decomposed to a set of 
intra-component properties. When used as an input to ASRP approaches, 
care has to be taken so that each component reliability model reﬂects the 
individual usage proﬁle of the component within the architecture. Further 
research regarding component reliability models would be valuable to fa-
cilitate a more wide-spread use. 
Further attempts to derive component reliability estimations from vari-
ous inﬂuencing factors have been summarized by Palviainen et al. [PEO11] 
under the term heuristic reliability evaluation. Considered factors may in-
clude component maturity levels, size and complexity metrics (as also used 
for software defect prediction, see Section 2.3.2), testing and operational 
data from existing similar components, reputation of or experiences with 
component vendors (in case of externally acquired components), level of 
experience of involved software developers (in case of in-house develop-
ment), and others. However, the results of such estimations are typically 
only valid within speciﬁc project contexts and cannot be easily transferred 
across development projects or companies. Palviainen et al. [PEO11] con-
sider them as weak compared to component reliability models and test-
based approaches. 
2.4 Markov Chains for Reliability 
This section gives a short introduction to Markov chains, which are used as 
a modelling formalism by many approaches to architecture-based software 
reliability prediction (ASRP), and which also constitute the underlying for-
malism of PCM-REL (see Chapter 5). The discussion is limited to aspects 
relevant in the context of the thesis; for a detailed account, see [Tri02]. 
A Markov chain is a random process (namely, a process whose devel-
opment over time is not pre-determined but described by probability dis-
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tributions) which (i) has a discrete (ﬁnite or countable) state space, and 
which (ii) exhibits the Markov property (namely, the future development 
of the process does not depend on its history but only on its present state). 
Continuous-time Markov Chains (CTMC) allow for state transitions at any 
time; Discrete-time Markov Chains (DTMC) restrict transitions to certain 
points in time, according to a discrete time scale. Many real-life processes 
can feasibly be represented by Markov chains, and a comprehensive theory 
has been developed to examine various properties of the created chains. 
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Figure 2.3: DTMC Example 
A DTMC can be described through a set of states S := {s1, ...,sn} and tran-
sitions T := {t1, ..., tm}, where each transition tk connects a source state 
Source(tk) ∈ S and a target state Target(tk) ∈ S and is associated with a 
transition probability value P(tk) ∈ [0,1]. Alternatively, the DTMC can 
be described through its n-by-n transition matrix P, with each entry pi j ∈
[0,1] ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..,n} denoting the transition probability from si to s j. For 
each row, the sum of its entries equals to one: ∑nj=1 pi j = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..,n}. 
As an example, Figure 2.3 shows a DTMC that represents weather condi-
tions, together with its transition matrix. On each day, the weather is in one 
of the states Sweather := {s1 := Sun,s2 := Rain,s3 := Snow}. The weather 
may change between days or stay the same. For example, a sunny day is 
followed by another sunny day with probability p11 = 0.6, by rain with 
p12 = 0.3 or by snow with p13 = 0.1. The Markov property dictates that 
tomorrow’s weather only depends on today and not on the weather history 
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of previous days. While this is a simplifying assumption compared to re-
ality, it keeps the model analytically tractable. In spite of its simplifying 
abstractions, the model may still be a feasible representation of the cor-
responding real-world process with respect to a certain purpose, such as 
forecasting tomorrow’s weather. 
A DTMC state si ∈ S is an absorbing state if it – once visited – is never 
left again: pii = 1 and pi j = 0 ∀ j �= i. An absorbing DTMC has at least 
one absorbing state and a possible path from each state to an absorbing 
state. Each run through an absorbing DTMC eventually ﬁnishes in one of its 
absorbing states with probability 1, no matter how the DTMC is structured 
and in which state the process starts. If the DTMC has multiple absorbing 
states, Markov theory allows for calculating the absorption probabilities 
for each of them (depending on the initial state in which the process starts). 
This calculation involves determining two reduced transition matrices Q 
(considering non-absorbing states only) and R (considering transitions from 
non-absorbing to absorbing states), calculating the fundamental matrix N =
(I −Q)−1 based on Q and the identity matrix I, as well as multiplying N 
and R (for further details, see [KB09]). 
A CTMC is described through a set of states S and transitions T like a 
DTMC. However, the transitions tk of the CTMC are annotated with tran-
sition rates R(tk) ∈ R+0 rather than probabilities, and the CTMC is char-
acterized through a rate matrix R. A positive rate ri j > 0 indicates that 
transitions from state si to s j occur with frequencies determined by an ex-
ponential distribution Exp(1/ri j) with parameter 1/ri j. A zero rate ri j = 0 
indicates that the corresponding transition never occurs. In contrast to a 
DTMC speciﬁcation, each state of a CTMC has an individual variable so-
journ time according to a continuous time scale. The expected sojourn time 
of each state can be determined based on all outgoing transitions and tran-
sition rates of the state. 
DTMCs, CTMCs and related formalisms (such as semi-Markov pro-
cesses [BL08]) are a powerful and widely established means for ASRP 
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approaches to represent software architectures in terms of interconnected 
components, as well as the transition of control between them during ser-
vice execution (see Section 2.5). In contrast to other formalisms that fo-
cus on a system’s inputs, internal state progressions and produced outputs 
(such as ﬁnite state machines [HMU01], state charts [Har87] or timed au-
tomata [AD94]), Markov models provide a high-level architecture-oriented 
representation of system behaviour, naturally capturing uncertain aspects 
such as system usage and its inﬂuence on the service execution through 
the probabilistic model annotations. Existing Markov theory [Tri02] can 
readily be applied to evaluate the created models with respect to reliabil-
ity. The PCM-REL approach developed in this thesis focuses on absorbing 
DTMCs and explores novel ways to use them for comprehensive reliability 
modelling and prediction (see Chapter 5). 
2.5 Architecture-Based Software Reliability Prediction 
This section shortly introduces the ﬁeld of architecture-based software re-
liability prediction (ASRP; for surveys, see [Gok07, GPT01, IN08]), to 
which also PCM-REL belongs. As the general discussion in Section 2.1.2 
shows, ASRP approaches aim to overcome the weaknesses of traditional 
reliability analysis methods regarding component-based software systems. 
Like reliability block diagrams, fault trees and related analyses, ASRP ap-
proaches assume that the overall failure potential of a system can be de-
termined from a set of internal failure potentials associated with individual 
system components or parts, together with a structural view indicating how 
the components themselves or their failure potentials are related to each 
other. However, traditional ways to express system structure and usage re-
lationships between components (such as OR or AND relationships in fault 
trees) are too simplistic to cover the potentially complex interrelations of 
software components. Therefore, ASRP approaches choose more expres-
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sive formalisms to represent system structure, based on an architectural 
view on the system and the control ﬂow of its service execution. 
An early publication of Roger Cheung in 1980 [Che80] had much inﬂu-
ence on the development of the ﬁeld and serves as a raw model for many 
ASRP approaches until today. The approach expresses a system’s archi-
tecture through an absorbing DTMC whose states represent the individual 
software components. Transitions represent the transfer of control between 
components when executing a certain system service operation or task. The 
transition probabilities allow for expressing the fact that different control 
ﬂow paths through the architecture may be taken, depending on the sys-
tem’s internal state at the time of service execution, as well as the speciﬁc 
input data given to the service invocation. For reliability evaluation, each 
component is annotated with an individual independent failure probability, 
denoting the possibility that a visit to this component during service execu-
tion produces a service failure. The DTMC is augmented with two “ﬁnal” 
absorbing states, indicating successful service execution and service fail-
ure. Without loss of generality, another “initial” state can be added such 
that service execution always starts in this state. Markov theory allows for 
calculating the probability of successful service execution as the probability 
of reaching the success state from the initial state (see Section 2.4). By its 
construction, the formalism assumes a “terminating application” (namely, 
a limited service behaviour that always ends up in either of the success 
and failure states). Being based on the architectural model and component 
failure probabilities only, the approach can be applied even before the sys-
tem itself is implemented, thereby anticipating or predicting the expected 
reliability of the implemented system at run-time. However, applying the 
approach is only possible if the required inputs can feasibly be obtained; 
sensitivity analyses should be conducted to assess the impact of uncertain 
input estimations (see Section 6.1). 
As an example for a software architecture modelled through an absorb-
ing DTMC, Figure 2.4 shows an architecture with three components A, B 
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Figure 2.4: Example of an Architectural DTMC Model 
and C, augmented by an initial state I and the absorbing success and failure 
states S and F . The parameters of the model to estimate are the transi-
tion probabilities p1 to p3, as well as the failure probabilities of the com-
ponents f p(A) to f p(C). Given these estimations, the model allows for 
calculating the probability of successful service execution. Moreover, the 
model indicates the possible control ﬂow paths and their probabilities. For 
example, service execution may follow the path I-B-C-S with probability 
p2 × (1 − f p(B))× (1 − f p(C))(1 − p3). A cycle exists between states B 
and C, leading to an inﬁnite overall number of possible paths through the 
model. By its construction, the model assumes the Markov property with 
respect to the transfer of control between components. This assumption can 
lead to paths that are possible in the model but not in reality. For example, 
the number of performed cycles between components B and C in the ﬁg-
ure may be limited to a maximum number of n in reality, while the model 
allows for an arbitrary number of cycles before moving on to either suc-
cess or failure. However, the method can still provide sufﬁciently accurate 
results, if transition probabilities are chosen such that the additional paths 
of the model have low occurrence probabilities or mutually even out their 
reliability impacts. For architectural cycles such as the one between B and 
C, a well-established method is to choose transition probabilities such that 
the expected number of performed cycles in the model corresponds to the 
average number of performed cycles in reality. 
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Throughout the years, numerous ASRP approaches have been presented, 
including [BMP09, CG07a, DS95, FGGM10, GL05, GPHG+03, Gra05, 
KM97, PDAC05, RSP03, RRU05, ST07a, ST06, WPC06, YCA04, ZL10], 
and others. Beyond absorbing DTMCs, other DTMC and CTMC types, as 
well as semi-Markov processes, have been used to represent the software 
architecture and its failure potentials; a comprehensive overview is given 
by the survey of Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [GPT01]. Further categories of 
approaches use less related formalisms, but are still counted towards ASRP 
by the survey. These categories include the path-based and the additive ap-
proaches. Path-based approaches explicitly enumerate the possible control 
ﬂow paths through the architecture, together with their occurrence proba-
bilities. While these approaches are not affected by the Markov assump-
tion, the potentially high number of possible paths often makes a compre-
hensive enumeration impossible and instead requires considering the most 
frequent paths only. Additive approaches calculate a system’s failure rate 
in a straightforward fashion as the sum of the individual component fail-
ure rates, thereby imposing the strong assumption that service execution 
essentially always visits each of the system’s components. 
Existing ASRP approaches include several differences and extensions 
compared to the Cheung model, such as the consideration of error propaga-
tion [CG07a, FGGM10, MZ08, PDAC05], inclusion of uncertainty analy-
sis [GPK03, YST01] or provision of a design-oriented input modelling lan-
guage [BMP09, CSC02, GPHG+03, RSP03, RRU05, YCA04]. However, 
their consideration of reliability-inﬂuencing factors is still incomplete, and 
their capabilities to support software architects during system design are 
correspondingly limited. They have no or only basic means to take hard-
ware failure potentials into account (see Section 7.1) and to express fault 
tolerance capabilities of the system under study (Section 7.2). Further-
more, they encode the inﬂuence of the system’s usage proﬁle implicitly into 
model parameters such as transition probabilities, thereby strongly reduc-
ing the reusability of the architectural speciﬁcations (Section 7.3). Hence, 
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the PCM-REL approach presented in this thesis constitutes further progress 
in the ASRP ﬁeld. It overcomes the mentioned weaknesses and provides a 
comprehensive solution supporting the design of IT systems. 
2.6 Fault-Tolerant IT Systems 
Fault tolerance (FT) has brieﬂy been introduced in Section 2.1.1 as one 
of the four means to attain dependability and security. The notion of FT 
includes any capabilities of an IT system to autonomously prevent the oc-
currence of system service failures in the presence of faults that have al-
ready been activated and resulted in errors within the system5. Obviously, 
such capabilities inﬂuence the probability of successful service execution. 
PCM-REL allows for explicit modelling of FT capabilities and takes them 
into account for reliability prediction. This section introduces the most 
important concepts related to FT, based on existing overviews and sur-
veys [ALRL04, Kie03, Lyu95, Lyu07, MR07, Ran75]. 
Existing techniques to achieve fault tolerance have a wide and heteroge-
neous scope. In order to achieve a categorization, several authors distin-
guish between hardware fault tolerance and software fault tolerance, de-
pending on the question if a FT technique mainly targets hardware faults 
or software faults. Typically, both kinds of faults are different in nature 
(physical faults in hardware versus design faults in software) and produce 
different failure behaviour (randomly failing hardware versus systemati-
cally failing software, see Section 2.3). However, various interdependen-
cies between both dimensions exist, and several FT techniques combine 
capabilities for tolerating hardware and software faults [LABK90]. 
Other proposals for FT categorization refer to redundancy. Employing 
redundancy means provisioning a system with additional resources beyond 
those that are required as a minimum for proper functioning. Redundancy 
is the most fundamental concept enabling fault tolerance. Kienzle [Kie03] 
5Existing FT synonyms include self-repair, self-healing and resilience [ALRL04]. 
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distinguishes functional redundancy, data redundancy and temporal redun-
dancy for software FT. Functional redundancy denotes the presence of mul-
tiple software designs (namely, different implementations, also referred to 
as design diversity) of the same functionality. Data redundancy refers to the 
presence of multiple different expressions of the same data (also referred to 
as data diversity), as well as the presence of additional FT-speciﬁc data. 
Temporal redundancy includes all time overheads during service execution 
induced by FT activities. Other authors [Lyu07, TP00] more roughly dis-
tinguish between single-version software techniques (denoting the absence 
of functional redundancy) and multi-version software techniques (employ-
ing functional redundancy). To include hardware FT into the consideration, 
one could extend Kienzles categorization by adding physical redundancy, 
namely the replication of identical hardware resources. 
A wide variety of fault tolerance mechanisms has been proposed that fol-
low a general pattern of activities as outlined by Avižienis et al. [ALRL04]. 
The two main involved activities are error detection and system recovery, 
where the latter includes error handling and possibly fault handling. Error 
detection denotes identifying the presence of an error and can be performed 
on-demand (for example, checking the result of a computation with an ac-
ceptance test) or pre-emptively (for example, by regular system health tests, 
heartbeat or ping/echo signalling). Error handling removes the error from 
the system and may involve a rollback to a prior error-free system state, 
a rollforward that reaches a new state without error, or a compensation 
that masks an existing error using the redundancy contained in the system. 
The system may conduct error handling on-demand (for example, after the 
identiﬁcation of a wrong computational result by an acceptance test) or 
pre-emptively (for example, by regular restart of software components as a 
means of software rejuvenation [HKKF95]). Fault handling shall prevent 
existing faults from being activated again and may include fault diagnosis, 
isolation, component or system reconﬁguration and reinitialization. Fault 
handling may be followed by fault removal through corrective maintenance 
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(which requires the participation of an external agent and is therefore not 
included in the notion of FT). 
The majority of the proposed software FT mechanisms are either com-
pletely pre-emptive in nature (carried out as independent periodic activi-
ties), or they focus on the ability of an individual service execution to toler-
ate activated faults in an on-demand fashion. The latter category includes, 
amongst others, Recovery Blocks, Retry Blocks, N-Version Programming 
and N-Copy Programming [Kie03]. Recovery Blocks include the sequen-
tial execution of a primary behaviour and, potentially, further alternative 
behaviours. The result of each alternate is checked by an acceptance test; 
upon failure, a rollback to an established checkpoint is performed. The re-
covery block is left after either one alternate succeeds or the last alternate 
fails. Recovery Blocks employ functional redundancy (multiple alternates 
providing equal functionality) and temporal redundancy (the overhead of 
executing alternative behaviours). Retry Blocks are similar to Recovery 
Blocks but do not employ functional redundancy. Instead, they execute the 
same behaviour multiple times with different re-expressions of the input 
data. N-Version-Programming and N-Copy-Programming are the parallel 
equivalents to Recovery and Retry Blocks, respectively: they execute all 
functional or data alternatives concurrently. Instead of conducting costly 
acceptance tests for explicit error detection, they typically rely on voting 
algorithms to select among the results of the alternatives. Several varia-
tions of these mechanisms have been proposed, including their extension 
towards hardware FT through replication of the underlying hardware re-
sources [LABK90]. Additionally, FT mechanisms have been proposed that 
explicitly consider the interdependencies of multiple concurrent service ex-
ecutions. These include Transactions with FT-speciﬁc extensions, Conver-
sations and Atomic Actions [Kie03]. 
Traditionally, fault tolerance has been associated with implementation 
and technological levels of an IT system rather than the architectural level. 
Hence, it was not in the primary focus of research related to software ar-
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chitecture. Within the speciﬁc ﬁeld of ASRP, still very few approaches ex-
plicitly consider FT capabilities (see Section 7.2). However, the structural 
and behavioural aspects of FT mechanisms clearly have an architectural 
dimension. FT mechanisms may assign special responsibilities to architec-
tural components or even introduce new components for FT-speciﬁc pur-
poses. Muccini et al. [MR07] provide a comprehensive survey of works 
that deal with the architectural aspects of FT. Examples of FT capabili-
ties explicitly introduced as architectural patterns or styles include Ideal-
ized Fault-Tolerant Components [GRdL02], Recovery-Aware Components 
(RAC) [YSP09, YSP11] and Redundant Arrays of Independent Compo-
nents (RAIC) [LR02]. Furthermore, Harrison et al. [HA08] examine sev-
eral traditional architectural patterns and describe how they can be extended 
with FT capabilities. 
PCM-REL acknowledges the fact that fault tolerance is part of an IT sys-
tem’s design and may considerably inﬂuence its reliability. The approach 
offers explicit modelling of FT capabilities in terms of a speciﬁc action type 
that has the ability to recover from failure-on-demand occurrences during 
service execution. See Section 4.7 for a detailed discussion. 
2.7 The Palladio Component Model 
This section introduces the Palladio Component Model (PCM) [BKR09], 
which provides the conceptional and technical foundation for PCM-REL. 
The description focuses on the PCM as a design-oriented modelling lan-
guage for component-based software architectures, allowing for distributed 
model creation by multiple independent developer roles. The discussion of 
the PCM’s meta-model is not exhaustive but reduced to the core concepts 
that are required for understanding the following thesis chapters. In particu-
lar, all performance-speciﬁc parts are omitted from the discussion (for a full 
discussion of the original PCM meta-model, see [RBB+11]). PCM-REL 
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builds upon the presented core concepts and adds new concepts to create an 
architectural modelling language for IT system reliability (see Section 4). 
2.7.1 PCM Developer Roles 
Component-based development is – ideally – a distributed process with 
multiple contributing developer roles which are independent and decou-
pled from each other. The PCM approach supports this idea by splitting 
the meta-model into independent parts along the concerns of each role, 
and by representing reusable real-world artefacts through reusable speci-
ﬁcations on the model level. In the envisioned development process, com-
ponent developers create individual software components and store them 
in a repository. As “units of composition with contractually speciﬁed in-
terfaces and explicit context dependencies only” [Szy02], software com-
ponents are subject to being reused in varying contexts [RPS03]. System 
architects take components from the repository, connect them according 
to their provided and required interfaces, and deﬁne a system boundary 
with system-provided and system-required service interfaces. System de-
ployers know about the available IT infrastructure and allocate a system’s 
software components to the computing nodes of the infrastructure. Finally, 
domain experts contribute knowledge about the expected usage proﬁle of 
the system. 
According to the discussed developer roles and responsibilities, the PCM 
provides a repository model representing the component repository and 
containing the individual component speciﬁcations, a system model spec-
ifying component instances, connections and the system’s boundaries, a 
resource environment model for the IT infrastructure, an allocation model 
mapping software components to computing nodes, and a usage model 
specifying the system’s usage proﬁle. All these meta-model parts are in-
troduced in detail in the following subsections. 
44 
2.7 The Palladio Component Model 
Repository
+id : string
+entityName : string
Entity
RepositoryComponent
Interface
1
+components
*
1
+interfaces*
BasicComponent CompositeComponent
InterfaceProvidingRequiringEntity
Role RequiredRoleProvidedRole
1
+providedRoles *
1
+requiredRoles *
VariableUsage
1
+componentParameters
*
*
+providedInterface
1 *+requiredInterface
1
Figure 2.5: PCM Meta-Model Classes for Components, Roles and Interfaces 
2.7.2 Repository Model 
The PCM repository model contains all speciﬁcations for which component 
developers are responsible, namely component types, interfaces, data types 
and component behaviour. Figure 2.5 gives a high-level overview of the 
meta-model classes involved in component deﬁnitions. The Repository
constitutes the top-level entry point to the model and contains a list of 
RepositoryComponents and Interfaces. RepositoryComponents
are InterfaceProvidingRequiringEntities – namely, they can pro-
vide or require Interfaces through the speciﬁcation of contained Pro-
videdRoles and RequiredRoles. This concept allows for reusing in-
terface deﬁnitions within multiple component speciﬁcations. A compo-
nent is either a BasicComponent (which cannot be further decomposed) 
or a CompositeComponent (see Section 2.7.3 for further explanation of 
composition concepts). Each component can be parametrized through 
VariableUsages (see Section 2.7.6), expressing variable component con-
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Figure 2.6: PCM Meta-Model Classes for Data Types and Parameters 
ﬁgurations. Moreover, components, roles and the repository itself are 
Entities, equipped with a unique id and a name. 
Figure 2.6 further details the speciﬁcation of interfaces and data types. 
Each Interface contains a list of Signatures, deﬁning input Parame-
ters and a return type of a speciﬁc service operation. Both the parameters 
and the return type refer to DataTypes speciﬁed within the repository. 
While a fully featured type system is out of scope of PCM modelling, 
the approach does support the speciﬁcation of PrimitiveDataTypes, 
CollectionDataTypes and CompositeDataTypes. Primitive types con-
form to one out of a list of given types including “int”, “string”, “bool”, 
and others. Collection types represent a set of data items of a speciﬁc base 
type. Composite types contain a list of InnerDeclarations pointing 
to contained types. 
For BasicComponents, each offered service operation (as speciﬁed 
through the provided roles of the component) must be accompanied by 
a corresponding behavioural speciﬁcation as shown in Figure 2.7, deﬁn-
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Figure 2.7: PCM Meta-Model Classes for Behavioural Speciﬁcations 
ing how the component reacts when the service operation is invoked. To 
this end, the component’s execution is represented by a hierarchy of nested 
ResourceDemandingBehaviours, with the topmost behaviour being a 
ResourceDemandingSEFF (where “SEFF” stands for service effect speci-
ﬁcation). Each behaviour contains a sequence of AbstractActions, with 
each action pointing to its predecessor and its successor. Different action 
types represent different kinds of execution steps. AbstractLoopActions
represent a repeated execution of a referenced body behaviour. They are 
either standard LoopActions with a loop iteration count speciﬁed through 
a PCMRandomVariable (see Section 2.7.6) or CollectionIterator-
Actions with an iteration count given by the size of a Parameter with 
a CollectionDataType. BranchActions represent decisions within the 
service execution control ﬂow. They contain a set of AbstractBranch-
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Transitions between which a decision is to be made. Each transition 
references an own body behaviour. While a ProbabilisticBranchTran-
sition contains a ﬁxed value expressing the probability of being taken, a 
GuardedBranchTransition evaluates a PCMRandomVariable (see Sec-
tion 2.7.6) as a condition for being taken. A ForkAction deﬁnes a set 
of concurrently executed forked behaviours. An ExternalCallAction
represents an invocation of another service operation provided by a foreign 
component. To avoid direct wiring between components, the call only ref-
erences the corresponding RequiredRole of the current component and 
the Signature of the invoked service operation. Moreover, input parame-
ter properties of the call can be determined through VariableUsages. An 
InternalAction represents a computational step during service execu-
tion. It abstracts from the details of the computation and instead only lists 
its associated resource consumption through ParametricResourceDe-
mands. A resource demand refers to a certain ProcessingResourceType
(e.g. a CPU or hard disk). StartActions and StopActions act as de-
limiters of action sequences. 
Figure 2.8 shows part of a modelled PCM repository instance for the au-
dio hosting example as introduced in Section 1.5. The ﬁgure shows deﬁni-
tions of components, interfaces, roles and data types. A BasicComponent
“WebFrontend” has RequiredRoles pointing to Interfaces “IUserMan-
agement” and “IAudioManagement” and a ProvidedRole pointing to an 
Interface “IWebFrontend”. “IAudioManagement” is provided by the 
“AudioManagement” component, which in turn requires multiple other in-
terfaces. The interfaces contain signatures specifying service operations, 
including input parameter names and data types, as well as a return data 
type. The example contains PrimitiveDataTypes such as “string” or 
“int”, as well as CompositeDataTypes “UserLoginInfo” and “AudioFile” 
with inner declarations and a CollectionDataType “AudioFileList” rep-
resenting a set of audio ﬁles. Furthermore, the ﬁgure indicates that each 
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Figure 2.8: Repository Model for the Audio Hosting Example (Excerpt) 
component contains a behavioural speciﬁcation for each provided service 
operation in terms of a ResourceDemandingSEFF. 
Figure 2.9 continues the example by showing two of the Resource-
DemandingSEFFs speciﬁed for the audio hosting scenario. When the “I-
WebFrontend.DownloadCollection” operation of the “WebFrontend” com-
ponent is invoked, a sequence of 5 actions is executed. After the Start-
Action, an InternalAction “ParseWebRequest” represents initial re-
quest processing requiring a “CPU” ProcessingResourceType. As a 
consequence, the “WebFrontend” component must be allocated to a com-
puting node with a modelled CPU resource (see Section 2.7.4). The fol-
lowing ExternalCallAction represents an invocation of the “Retrieve-
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Figure 2.9: Behavioural Speciﬁcations for the Audio Hosting Example (Excerpt) 
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Files” operation of the required “IAudioManagement” interface, speci-
fying a VariableUsage for the “IDs” input parameter of the call (see 
Section 2.7.6). Another InternalAction “CreateWebResponse” and a 
StopAction conclude the modelled behaviour. 
The second ResourceDemandingSEFF shown in Figure 2.9 depicts the 
behaviour of the “AudioManagement” component upon invocation of the 
“IAudioManagement.RetrieveFiles” operation. A LoopAction “Process-
RequestedElements” iterates over all IDs given as an input to the call. Its 
body behaviour includes an invocation to “IAudioDBAccess.RetrieveFile” 
for retrieving the audio ﬁle from the underlying database, as well as further 
invocations to trigger ﬁle encoding and watermarking. File encoding is only 
to be performed if the requested bitrate for the download is smaller than the 
original encoding stored in the database. In the PCM model, the encod-
ing decision is represented by a BranchAction “EncodingCases” and two 
ProbabilisticBranchTransitions “PerformEncoding” and “NoEn-
coding”, each with an estimated branch probability 0.5 of being taken. 
In the latter case, no encoding is performed and “NoEncoding” contains an 
empty body behaviour with only a StartAction and a StopAction. Af-
ter all requested IDs have been processed, the last execution step is another 
ExternalCallAction triggering the packaging of all collected audio ﬁles 
into a ZIP archive that is offered for download. 
2.7.3 System Model 
The PCM system model captures the modelling responsibilities of sys-
tem architects. Figure 2.10 shows the involved meta-model classes. The 
System is the topmost entry point to the model. It is both an Interface-
ProvidingRequiringEntity and a ComposedStructure. The latter 
provides the ability to instantiate RepositoryComponents through As-
semblyContexts and to to connect these instances through Assembly-
Connectors. The connectors associate component instances through their 
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Figure 2.10: PCM System Meta-Model Classes 
RequiredRoles and ProvidedRoles (such that a component requiring a 
certain interface is connected to another component providing this inter-
face). The system itself offers services to users or requires services from 
other systems through its own required and provided roles. It can also 
contain SpecifiedQoSAnnotations associating quality properties to pro-
vided or required service operations (identiﬁed by a referenced Role and 
Signature). While systems represent the highest level of composition, the 
corresponding meta-model concepts can also be used to express composi-
tion on lower levels through CompositeComponents, which are contained 
in a PCM Repository along with BasicComponents (see Figure 2.5). 
Figure 2.11 depicts a system deﬁnition for the audio hosting example. 
The “AudioHostingSolution” contains 7 AssemblyContexts instantiating 
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Figure 2.11: System Model for the Audio Hosting Example 
component types from the underlying repository model. The system pro-
vides the “IWebFrontend” Interface to its users. Calls to this interface 
are served by the instantiated “WebFrontend” component, which in turn 
relies on the provided services of “AudioManagement” and “UserManage-
ment”. “UserDBAccess” and “AudioDBAccess” allow for storing and re-
trieving user-related data and audio ﬁles. The “AudioProcessing” aggre-
gates encoding, watermarking and packaging functionality, and the “Au-
dioCache” enables fast audio ﬁle retrieval without accessing the database 
itself. The core encoding functionality is not provided by the system itself 
but by an external encoding engine upon which the system relies. In the 
model, this is expressed through the system’s RequiredRole referencing 
the “IEncoding” Interface. 
2.7.4 Resource Environment and Allocation Models 
The perceived quality of IT service execution typically not only depends 
on the software layer but also on the properties of the underlying IT infras-
tructure. Therefore, PCM includes modelling constructs for a physical re-
source environment and the allocation of software components to comput-
ing nodes, as shown in Figure 2.12. This information is contributed by sys-
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Figure 2.12: PCM Meta-Model Classes for Resource Environments and Allocations 
tem deployers, as discussed in Section 2.7.1. The ResourceEnvironment
contains a set of ResourceContainers (namely, computing nodes) and 
LinkingResources (network links). Each ResourceContainer hosts 
physical resources declared as ProcessingResourceSpecifications
of speciﬁc ProcessingResourceTypes. A LinkingResource contains 
a single CommunicationLinkResourceSpecification that references 
a CommunicationLinkResourceType (such as a LAN communication 
link). An Allocation maps a System to a ResourceEnvironment and 
contains AllocationContexts, each of which associates an Assembly-
Context (namely, an instantiated component within the system) to a Re-
sourceContainer (namely, a computing node). 
A resource environment and allocation speciﬁcation for the audio host-
ing solution is shown by Figure 2.13. The software components deﬁned 
in the repository model (see Figure 2.8) and instantiated in the system 
model (Figure 2.11) are distributed across two ResourceContainers
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Figure 2.13: Audio Hosting Resource Environment and Allocation 
“ApplicationServer” and “DatabaseServer”, which are connected through 
a LinkingResource “LANConnection”. The distribution is chosen such 
that the data storage and the corresponding access functionality is sepa-
rated from the rest of the application. The modelled connection allows 
for system-internal service invocations including input and return data to 
be transmitted between the servers. Each server includes a “CPU” and 
“HDD” (hard disk drive) ProcessingResourceSpecification allow-
ing for consumption of those resources by service execution. 
2.7.5 Usage Model 
The PCM offers explicit modelling constructs to express an IT system’s 
usage proﬁle and its inﬂuence on service execution. Figure 2.14 depicts the 
involved meta-model constructs, which are used by domain experts (as dis-
cussed in Section 2.7.1). A UsageModel is the topmost entry point for the 
speciﬁcation of user behaviour. It consists of a list of UsageScenarios, 
where each scenario describes a certain use case of the system. The user be-
haviour itself is captured through ScenarioBehaviours, similarly to the 
speciﬁcation of system behaviour through ResourceDemandingBehav-
iours (see Figure 2.7). Each ScenarioBehaviour contains a sequence 
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Figure 2.14: PCM Usage Meta-Model Classes 
of AbstractUserActions, referencing each other as successors and pre-
decessors. The actions represent repetition (Loop), decision (Branch), 
begin and end of behaviour (Start, Stop) and invocations of system 
service operations (EntryLevelSystemCall). Loops specify iteration 
counts through PCMRandomVariables (see Section 2.7.6); branches con-
tain BranchTransitions with individual branch probabilities. Both loops 
and branch transitions reference nested body behaviours. An Entry-
LevelSystemCall references one of the system’s ProvidedRoles and 
a Signature pointing out a certain service operation; input parameter val-
ues can be determined through VariableUsages. 
In the audio hosting example, two separate modes of usage are of inter-
est and modelled through individual ScenarioBehaviours, as shown in 
Figure 2.15. A user session with the system may be interactive or may be 
a batch request (used for automated management of stored audio contents). 
Both modes are highly similar, conducting either an audio upload or down-
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Figure 2.15: Speciﬁcation of User Behaviour in the Audio Hosting Example 
load, surrounded by login and logout commands. The Branches “Inter-
activeUploadDownloadCases” and “BatchUploadDownloadCases” model 
the decision between up- and download. Downloads are far more frequent 
than uploads, with corresponding BranchTransition probabilities of 0.9 
versus 0.1. The only difference between the interactive and batch modes 
lies in the download case, which requests a single ﬁle in interactive mode 
(invoking “IWebFrontend.Download”) and multiple ﬁles in batch mode (in-
voking “IWebFrontend.DownloadCollection”). The number of requested 
ﬁles in batch mode is given through a VariableUsage (see Section 2.7.6) 
and set to an estimated average number of 30. 
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2.7.6 PCM Variables and Parameter Solving 
An essential feature of the PCM modelling language is its ability to express 
parameter properties and their propagation throughout the component-
based architecture. While the PCM does not aim at capturing all details 
of the data ﬂow through the architecture, it enables modelling those prop-
erties of service invocation inputs which have an inﬂuence on the sub-
sequent control ﬂow and hence on the execution paths taken through the 
system. Figure 2.16 shows the involved meta-model classes. Through Va-
riableUsages, EntryLevelSystemCalls and ExternalCallActions
can specify input parameter properties, and RepositoryComponents can 
specify component parameter properties. These inputs can be used by 
Loops and LoopActions to specify iteration counts, by GuardedBranch-
Transitions to specify branch conditions, and again by ExternalCall-
Actions to specify parameter properties depending on given input parame-
ters of the current ResourceDemandingSEFF. A VariableUsage includes 
a parameter identiﬁcation through an AbstractNamedReference and a 
characterisation of a parameter property through a VariableCharacteri-
sation. The identiﬁcation may be a VariableReference (such as “ID” 
references the input parameter of the service operation “IWebFrontend.-
Download” in Figure 2.8) either on its own or combined with Namespace-
References (such as “info.name” references an inner declaration of the 
input parameter “info” of “IWebFrontend.Login”). The characterisation 
speciﬁes one out of a given set of properties (such as “Value” or “Num-
berOfElements”) and provides the value of this property through a PCM-
RandomVariable. The PCMRandomVariable may be a single number, a 
probability distribution or a mathematical expression, and it may contain 
references to any parameter that is available in the current execution con-
text. PCM provides a dedicated Stochastic Expressions (StoEx) language 
for the speciﬁcation of PCMRandomVariables [Koz08]. 
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Figure 2.16: PCM Meta-Model Classes for Variable Usages 
In the audio hosting example, the EntryLevelSystemCall to “IWeb-
Frontend.Download-Collection” (see Figure 2.15) contains a Variable-
Usage referencing the input parameter “IDs” of the invoked service op-
eration (see Figure 2.8) and characterising its property “NumberOfEle-
ments” with the value “30”. According to the system deﬁnition (Fig-
ure 2.11, the call is served by the “WebFrontend” component and its Re-
sourceDemandingSEFF “DownloadCollection” (Figure 2.9). The Exter-
nalCallAction within this behaviour employs another VariableUsage
to propagate the value of the “NumberOfElements” property of “IDs” to 
the equally named input parameter of “IAudioManagement.RetrieveFiles”. 
The call is served by the “AudioManagement” component with its “Re-
trieveFiles” ResourceDemandingSEFF. The propagated input parameter 
property guides the iteration count of the LoopAction “ProcessRequest-
edElements”, and it is further propagated to the “IPackaging.CreateZip-
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Archive” service operation through another VariableUsage of the corre-
sponding ExternalCallAction. 
Putting all information together, it is evident that the LoopAction dis-
played in Figure 2.9 has 30 iterations, and that the invocation of “IPackag-
ing.CreateZipArchive” includes a list of 30 audio ﬁles as an input param-
eter. This is due to the fact that the system user has invoked “IWebFron-
tend.DownloadCollection” with 30 requested IDs (Figure 2.15). This re-
solving of parameter dependencies to concrete values or probability dis-
tributions throughout the modelled behavioural speciﬁcations is automated 
by PCM’s tool support and a preliminary step to further model transforma-
tions and analyses. It is done by the dependency solver [Koz08], which 
transforms an original PCM instance to one without any parameter depen-
dencies. The PCM-REL Markov analysis (see Chapter 5) builds upon the 
output of the dependency solver. 
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While the preceding foundations chapter has introduced a rich set of exist-
ing methodology related to IT systems and reliability, the individual dis-
cussed aspects are not yet connected and cannot be directly used for in-
tegrated IT system reliability prediction. First, basic reliability concepts 
are established through the taxonomy of Avižienis et al. [ALRL04] (Sec-
tion 2.1.1). However, this taxonomy has a broad scope. It covers multiple 
dependability attributes, and it does not go into the details of distinguishing 
software-level and hardware-level reliability aspects. Second, the Palladio 
Component Model (PCM, Section 2.7) provides a comprehensive archi-
tectural modelling language capturing software components and their be-
haviour, hardware resources and their consumption by service execution, 
as well as the system’s usage proﬁle and its inﬂuence on the control and 
data ﬂow throughout the architecture. However, the PCM does not include 
any reliability-speciﬁc considerations. Finally, approaches to architecture-
based software reliability prediction (ASRP, Section 2.5) provide analysis 
methods for reliability based on software architecture, but do not consider 
relevant architectural factors required for supporting design decisions. 
This chapter combines the discussed methodological aspects and ﬁlls the 
remaining gaps, in order to create a uniﬁed methodology as a comprehen-
sive basis for PCM-REL reliability modelling and prediction. Section 3.1 
develops a reﬁned view on reliability concepts for integrated IT systems, 
followed by a discussion in Section 3.2 how reliability prediction can be 
embedded in a system engineering process. Section 3.3 focuses on method-
ology adoption from PCM, and Section 3.4 concludes with a discussion of 
relevant degrees of freedom during reliability modelling. 
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3.1 Reliability Concepts for Integrated IT Systems 
As the discussion of reliability analyses (see Section 2.1.2) shows, hard-
ware-oriented and software-oriented reliability communities each build 
upon their own failure models and related assumptions. This section devel-
ops an integrated view, capturing how service execution – from the user’s 
point of view – is affected by both software-level and hardware-level fail-
ure potentials. To this end, the discussion revisits the deﬁnition of the term 
“failure” and examines the interplay of the hardware and software parts 
of an IT system. 
In their taxonomy, Avižienis et al. [ALRL04] deﬁne a “service failure” – 
of a component or system service – as “the transition from correct service 
to incorrect service”, where “correct” means in accordance with the expec-
tation of the service users. The authors further state that an error becomes 
a failure when it “reaches the external state” of a component or a system, 
where “external” means “perceivable at the service interface”. This deﬁ-
nition does not necessarily imply that a failure is actually perceived by a 
user of the system or component service. The failure may be completely 
unrecognised if no invocations of the service occur. On the other hand, 
a failure may also be perceived multiple times, if the transition to incor-
rect service is permanent and multiple service invocations occur. On the 
other hand, Cheung [Che80] states in his foundational ASRP publication: 
“A failure is said to occur if, given the input values and speciﬁcations of 
the computations to be performed by the program, the output values are ei-
ther incorrect or indeﬁnitely delayed”. Hence, Cheung focuses on the user-
perceived effect of a transition to incorrect service, rather than the transition 
itself. Many subsequent publications in the software and hardware reliabil-
ity ﬁelds use the term “failure” (and related terms such as “failure rate” 
or “failure-free operation”) without clarifying these inconsistencies, which 
reduces the understandability and clarity of the presentation. This problem 
becomes particularly apparent if failure potentials of both the software and 
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hardware dimensions shall be considered in an integrated way. Therefore, 
the following discussions in this thesis distinguish between a service failure 
and a failure-on-demand (FOD). The former denotes a transition from nor-
mal service to any type of degraded service; the latter is the user-perceived 
effect of the transition in terms of an unwanted service invocation result. 
An unwanted result is any phenomenon that deviates from the expected 
course of service execution, including delivery of wrong outputs, untimely 
delivery of outputs, or inﬁnitely delayed processing. 
A second prerequisite for the integrated consideration of the software and 
hardware dimensions is an explicit identiﬁcation of the speciﬁcs of both of 
them, as well as the relations between them. Avižienis et al. introduce a 
system as an “entity that interacts with other entities, i.e. other systems, in-
cluding hardware, software, humans, and the physical world with its natural 
phenomena”. Furthermore, they see a system as being “composed of a set 
of components bound together in order to interact, where each component 
is another system, etc. The recursion stops when a component is consid-
ered to be atomic”. Hence, while providing a uniﬁed and compositional 
view on all imaginable types of components, the authors do not go into 
the speciﬁcs of software components as opposed to hardware components. 
On the other hand, Cheung and many subsequent ASRP publications focus 
purely on software components (see Section 7.1), thereby reducing the per-
spective to the software part of an IT system only. A more comprehensive 
picture is given by PCM (see Section 2.7), which models an IT system as a 
set of instantiated basic and composite software components, executed in a 
physical resource environment. The environment includes a set of resource 
containers representing computing nodes, as well as linking resources rep-
resenting network connections. Each resource container includes a set of 
modelled hardware resources, and each software component is allocated to 
one of the containers. During service execution, each visited software com-
ponent consumes hardware resources on its allocated container, depending 
on its modelled software behaviour. The PCM semantics provide a differ-
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entiated IT system perspective and hence a solid foundation for integrated 
reliability modelling. 
Based on the reﬁned terminology and the distinction of software and 
hardware speciﬁcs, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate how system users are 
affected by failure potentials on both levels. For clarity of presentation, 
the discussion initially focuses on a basic conﬁguration with a single soft-
ware component and a single supporting hardware resource only. First, 
Figure 3.1 depicts software-induced FOD occurrences, caused by existing 
faults in the software component’s implementation. The left-hand side of 
the ﬁgure shows the software component initially providing normal ser-
vice, and a ﬁrst service invocation being successfully completed. Then, the 
component exhibits a service failure, changing over to degraded service. 
The failure may be triggered by another service invocation, or it may be 
a consequence of autonomously conducted actions of the component. If 
the failure is triggered by an invocation, this invocation results in a FOD. 
In the example, the resulting state of degraded service persists, and sub-
sequent service invocations result in further FODs. Generally, states of 
degraded service may be temporary, or they may require a re-initialization 
or restart of the component. Service invocations to degraded components 
may always result in FODs, or they may just have a higher probability of 
resulting in FODs. The right-hand side of the ﬁgure shows the component 
again providing normal service, and a ﬁrst successful service invocation. A 
second invocation results in a FOD, but it does not have any consequences 
on further service execution, as indicated by a third – again successful – 
invocation. Typical examples for such situations are calculation errors that 
produce wrong outputs but do not impact any of the component’s inter-
nal state. Technically, the component can be considered as experiencing a 
service failure with a zero-time duration. 
Figure 3.2 shows an extended scenario comprising both a software com-
ponent and a hardware resource, with each of them initially providing nor-
mal service. Correspondingly, a ﬁrst service invocation is successfully 
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Figure 3.2: Hardware-induced Failures-on-Demand 
completed. Then, the hardware resource exhibits a service failure and 
changes to a state of degraded service. Following the well-established hard-
ware failure model as presented in Section 2.2, the service degradation cor-
responds to a service outage, with the resource being in availability state 
NA. In the example, the execution of the software component depends en-
tirely on the availability of the resource; hence, the resource failure instantly 
causes a corresponding software component service failure. Such a situa-
tion can occur if a central hardware resource of a computing node, such as a 
CPU, is strictly required for the operation of the node. Any further service 
invocations to the component result in hardware-induced FODs until the 
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underlying hardware resource is repaired or exchanged by a new one. The 
right-hand side of the ﬁgure depicts both the component and the resource 
providing normal service again, as well as a ﬁrst successful service invoca-
tion. Here, the execution of the component does not strictly depend on the 
resource, and an occurring resource service failure does not have an imme-
diate impact on the component. Examples include data storage devices that 
may become unavailable while the overall computing node keeps operat-
ing. Service invocations during the service outage of the resource may fail 
or may be successful, depending on the question if access to the resource 
is required by the speciﬁc service operation. If so, the invocation results in 
a hardware-induced FOD, and the component can be considered as experi-
encing a service failure with a zero-time duration. Alternatively, the com-
ponent may be able to mask the resource failure and, in spite of the resource 
being unavailable, provide service as expected (not shown in the ﬁgure). 
A further extended scenario of an IT system with multiple software com-
ponents and hardware resources can be based on the discussion of a “funda-
mental chain of dependability and security threats” introduced by Avižienis 
et al. in their survey. In short, the authors state that if a system component 
C1 receives service from another system component C2, a service failure of 
C2 constitutes a fault for C1 and can eventually result in a service failure 
of C1. Applying this principle to FOD occurrences and software compo-
nents, a service invocation to a software component S1 can result in a FOD 
if the service execution of S1 includes a service invocation of another com-
ponent S2, and if this invocation results in a FOD (alternatively, S1 may 
mask the FOD of S2 and still provide service as expected). In this sense, 
FOD occurrences can be “propagated” along a hierarchy of service invoca-
tions. Furthermore, each software component can require one or multiple 
hardware resources for its service execution, and each service failure of a 
required resource can cause FOD occurrences on the software level. 
Considering all discussed scenarios, both software components and hard-
ware resources may exhibit service failures. For software components, ser-
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vice failures may not have any impact on further execution, or they may 
lead to temporary or permanent service degradations or outages. Service 
failures of hardware resources lead to service outages, making the resources 
unavailable until repair or replacement. Service invocations can result in 
FODs as a consequence of both software-level and hardware-level service 
failures. FOD occurrences can be propagated along a service invocation 
hierarchy involving multiple software components, until they reach the sys-
tem border and are perceived as a FOD by a system user. Reliability mod-
elling as done by PCM-REL builds upon this integrated view of IT system 
reliability (see Section 4.1). 
3.2 A Reliability-Aware System Engineering Process 
While many ASRP publications claim that their presented approaches sup-
port architectural decisions during system design stages, they typically 
do not discuss how reliability predictions can be embedded in and used 
throughout a system engineering process. Yet, such a discussion is im-
portant to give evidence that software architects can actually beneﬁt from 
applying the approaches. Therefore, this section outlines how a system 
engineering process can be enriched by continuous IT system reliability 
prediction as provided by PCM-REL. 
System Provisioning
Deployment / Configuration
System
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System Development
Implementation / Test
System Design
Reliability Modelling
and Evaluation
Design
decisions
Target 
architecture
System 
parameters
De facto 
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Figure 3.3: System Engineering Process 
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Figure 3.3 gives an overview of the envisioned process. As the ﬁgure 
shows, the creation of the ﬁnal product involves two major activities, name-
ly system design and system development. Without restricting the scenario 
to any single process type or deﬁnition, the ﬁgure only assumes that both 
activities run in parallel (with the main focus shifting over time from de-
sign to development), inform each other, and are iterative each for itself. 
Design, which includes reliability modelling and evaluation activities, in-
forms development with design decisions and the deﬁnition of a target ar-
chitecture. Development includes implementation and test as its main ac-
tivities and delivers (potentially re-engineered) information about the ex-
isting or de facto architecture, as well as estimations or measurements for 
a variety of system parameters. The parameters refer to usage properties 
of the system, included failure potentials, as well as system-internal be-
haviour and state properties. Information about software and hardware fail-
ure potentials can be derived using methods such as the ones described in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
Within a single system design iteration, the provided inputs are used for 
reliability modelling, creating a set of architectural candidates for the sys-
tem under study. Multiple candidates are created to reﬂect possible de-
sign alternatives or to vary system parameter values, accounting for ex-
isting uncertainties during their estimation. Reliability evaluation analy-
ses all created candidates to determine their expected reliabilities. Based 
on the obtained prediction results, design alternatives can be ranked, sup-
porting the required design decisions and providing a recommended target 
architecture. If the results are not signiﬁcant enough to allow for decision-
making, the scope of considered design alternatives can be increased by 
creating and evaluating new candidates. If the results violate given relia-
bility requirements, new candidates can be created with the speciﬁc goal 
to improve reliability compared to the previously considered candidates. 
Reliability-improving measures include decreasing individual failure po-
tentials (for example, employing intensively tested software components or 
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high-availability hardware resources) and introducing fault tolerance mech-
anisms throughout the architecture. Other architectural changes such as ad-
justed component conﬁgurations or changed allocations of components to 
computing nodes may have reliability-improving effects as well. The pro-
cess of creating and evaluating architectural candidates continues until sat-
isfactory results are available and stable recommendations can be derived. 
Being based on PCM, the PCM-REL approach proposed in this thesis of-
fers a design-oriented modelling language, strong capabilities for reusing 
model artefacts and comprehensive tool support, thereby enabling efﬁcient 
handling of system design iterations. 
As the number of performed design and development iterations increas-
es, the amount of available information grows. The target architecture be-
comes more stable, complete and detailed. At the same time, the infor-
mation delivered by development becomes more reliable and exact. This 
fruitful exchange is only possible if reliability modelling and prediction ac-
companies the development as a continuous design activity. If reliability is 
only considered late in development, it may not be feasible or possible any 
more to apply necessary but fundamental changes to the architecture. Once 
the implementation is ﬁnalized, the system can be provisioned (i.e. de-
ployed and conﬁgured) and brought into operation. Being operating in the 
ﬁeld, the system may still undergo revisions for fault elimination and evo-
lution. These revisions again involve design and development activities. At 
this stage, existing reliability measurements and experiences regarding sys-
tem usage and behaviour in the ﬁeld may constitute a valuable additional 
input to reliability modelling and prediction. 
Apart from reliability considerations, other quality attributes such as per-
formance, safety and security also inﬂuence design decisions, and trade-
offs between the attributes may arise. Furthermore, reliability-improving 
measures are typically associated with monetary costs and have to be as-
sessed against these costs. While trade-off analyses and economical con-
siderations are not in the focus of the thesis itself, the proposed engineer-
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ing process can be augmented to take these aspects into account. To this 
end, an extended system design iteration creates not only reliability-speciﬁc 
models of architectural candidates, but also other representations suited 
for evaluating further quality attributes and associated costs. In the case 
of PCM-REL (which is based on the existing PCM modelling and eval-
uation capabilities), it is even possible to create one common model and 
evaluate this model with respect to reliability, performance [BKR09] and 
costs [Koz11]. Furthermore, automated optimization can be conducted to 
cope with a high number of possible candidates within a large design space, 
and existing trade-off relations are presented to software architects as a ba-
sis for decision-making [Koz11]. Hence, reliability prediction as done by 
PCM-REL is well suited to be embedded in an overall engineering process 
considering reliability and other system quality attributes. 
3.3 Adoption of PCM Methodology by PCM-REL 
This section explicitly discusses methodological aspects of the original 
PCM approach [BKR09] that have been developed from a performance 
point of view but are also relevant and reused in the context of this the-
sis. The discussion shows why these aspects are relevant with respect to 
reliability, and how PCM-REL beneﬁts from their adoption. The discussed 
aspects include (a) the explicit modelling of the different factors inﬂuenc-
ing service quality, (b) the separation of modelling concerns along the lines 
of multiple developer roles, (c) the representation of component behaviour 
through a high-level service effect speciﬁcation, and (d) the concept of pa-
rameter dependencies and their solving. 
Regarding the quality inﬂuence factors (a), PCM distinguishes between 
four major inﬂuences on the quality of a component service, namely its im-
plementation, usage, quality of required services, and quality of the physi-
cal execution environment. These four factors are also essential when rea-
soning about reliability. The implementation of a component service de-
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ﬁnes its behaviour, which may result in a FOD upon service execution, 
caused by software faults contained in the implementation. The service us-
age governs the execution paths taken through the component’s implemen-
tation and inﬂuences the progression of the component’s software state. 
The failure potential of required services affects the service under study, 
as it depends on the results of the external service invocations. Finally, un-
available hardware resources may prevent a successful service execution (as 
discussed in Section 3.1), which makes the execution environment a further 
inﬂuencing factor to the component’s service reliability. By explicitly tak-
ing all these factors into account, the developed PCM-REL approach allows 
for a differentiated view upon service reliability and its inﬂuencing factors, 
enabling well-informed design decisions for the system under study. 
The separation of modelling concerns (b) provided by PCM as discussed 
in Section 2.7.1 is an essential ingredient to supporting a truly distributed 
software development process. It is a feature not discussed by existing 
ASRP approaches (see Section 7.4); hence, their application is essentially 
limited to scenarios where a single role possesses or collects all required 
information for creating the entire architectural model. In contrast, the de-
veloped PCM-REL approach adheres to the separation of concerns. All 
developed meta-model extensions are included in such a way that each de-
veloper role contributes only the information that is available from its own 
speciﬁc perspective (see Chapter 4). 
The PCM behavioural speciﬁcations (c) (or ResourceDemandingSEFFs
as described in Section 2.7.2) represent high-level component behaviour, 
including control ﬂow decisions, external service invocations and the con-
sumption of hardware resources. They abstract from component-internal 
computations and state dependencies. Compared to existing ASRP ap-
proaches building upon the Cheung model (Section 2.5), these behavioural 
speciﬁcations allow for more accurate modelling of possible control ﬂow 
paths and are not affected by the Markov assumption regarding inter-
component control transfer. PCM-REL reuses the capabilities for its be-
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havioural speciﬁcations and extends them with reliability-speciﬁc con-
structs and annotations, thereby also providing highly ﬂexible modelling 
capabilities for failure potentials included in the control ﬂow (see Sec-
tion 4). 
Parameter dependencies (d) are vital to the PCM (see Section 2.7.6). 
They are a prerequisite to the separation of modelling concerns between 
component developers and domain experts. Furthermore, their automatic 
solving [Koz08] releases software architects from the burden to explicitly 
specify the usage proﬁle of each component within an architecture, and 
instead automatically deduces all component usage proﬁles from a given 
system-level usage proﬁle. The thesis takes full advantage of this concept 
and integrates the dependency solver into the prediction workﬂow as pre-
sented in Section 5.1, in order to perform the Markov analysis based on a 
PCM-REL instance with solved parameter dependencies. 
3.4 Degrees of Freedom for Reliability Modelling 
This section discusses further requirements for reliability prediction in 
terms of relevant modelling degrees of freedom. Even though a context 
for reliability prediction is given through the envisioned reliability-aware 
system engineering process (see Section 3.2), concrete use cases may vary 
signiﬁcantly in their characteristics. The system under study may vary in 
its size and complexity, and the knowledge about the system may be de-
tailed or coarse. Existing ASRP publications rarely discuss this issue. In 
order to adapt to the speciﬁcs of each use case, relevant degrees of freedom 
include (a) the modelling granularity, (b) the modelled system fragment, 
(c) the distinction of FOD types, and (d) the ﬂexible modelling of points 
of failure. The PCM-REL approach developed in this thesis offers all of 
these degrees of freedom. 
Regarding the modelling granularity (a), reliability modelling should of-
fer a hierarchical view on a software component architecture, with com-
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ponents being compositions of other components. Thus, a system can ﬁrst 
be modelled very coarse-grained, as an assembly of top-level components. 
This model can stepwise be reﬁned by adding the inner structure of higher-
level components being composed of lower-level components. Typically, 
this process also leads to a reﬁnement of the involved interfaces and be-
havioural speciﬁcations. Modellers are free to choose the level of detail 
when modelling the system under study. This level of detail may also vary 
for different parts of the architecture, or for different stages of a surrounding 
system engineering process. While a higher level of detail rises the mod-
elling effort and requires more system knowledge, it also generally yields 
a higher quality (accurateness and signiﬁcance) of the results. Through the 
concept of CompositeComponents (see Section 2.7.2), PCM-REL sup-
ports hierarchical software architecture modelling – a feature used by both 
case studies reported in the thesis (see Chapter 6). 
A further degree of freedom refers to the modelled system fragment (b). 
To keep modelling efforts within feasible bounds, modellers should be able 
to determine system cuts that are most relevant to the reliability analysis, 
and limit the modelling scope to these cuts. A vertical cut takes advantage 
of the fact that under a certain system usage, only certain parts of the system 
(such as a subset of application-level components and their services) are 
active and can contribute to the system’s failure potential. Limiting the 
model to those parts reduces its reusability with respect to usage proﬁle 
changes, but also reduces the modelling effort. A horizontal cut refrains 
from explicit modelling of supporting software layers (such as middleware 
or operating systems). However, these layers are still active and have to 
be taken into account in an implicit way (e.g. by integrating the failure 
potential of the operating system into application-level FOD probabilities). 
Such implicit modelling reduces effort, but also the reusability with respect 
to changes in supporting software layers. 
Another desirable degree of freedom is the speciﬁcation of custom FOD 
types (c). While most ASRP approaches only consider a generic “failure” 
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situation capturing any deviation from service as expected (see Section 7.4), 
failure situations may actually be categorized according to various dimen-
sions (some of which are discussed in Section 2.1.1). Modellers should be 
free to determine a use case speciﬁc set of relevant FOD types. A more 
differentiated distinction of FOD types requires more detailed knowledge 
about the system under study (such as individual FOD occurrence proba-
bilities), but also yields more differentiated prediction results (such as user-
perceived FOD probabilities per FOD type). PCM-REL allows for specify-
ing custom FOD types for each system under study (see Section 4.2). 
Finally, modellers should be free to ﬂexibly specify a relevant set of 
potential points of failure (PPOF) (d) throughout the architectural model. 
While the Cheung model (Section 2.5) and related approaches assume a 
strict 1 : 1 relationship between software components and PPOFs by anno-
tating each component with a “per-visit” failure probability, modellers may 
want to specify failure potentials of different components with different 
granularities. A more ﬁne-grained PPOF modelling requires more detailed 
knowledge about the system’s failure potentials but tends to yield more ac-
curate predictions. The modelling of component behaviour with PCM-REL 
allows for specifying a variable number of PPOFs visited during a compo-
nent’s service execution (see Section 4.1). 
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This chapter discusses how to create reliability-tailored abstractions of IT 
systems using PCM-REL. The discussion focusses on the aspects that are 
speciﬁc to system reliability, and hence on the distinguishing modelling 
features of PCM-REL compared to PCM. Section 4.1 deﬁnes the concrete 
meaning of system reliability in the context of the approach and gives an 
overview over the involved modelling concepts. The following sections 
from 4.2 to 4.7 discuss those concepts in detail. They introduce the cor-
responding meta-model constructs, along with an explanation of their se-
mantics, design rationales and examples. The examples generally refer to 
the audio hosting service as introduced in Section 1.5, and show how the 
model of the service as presented throughout Section 2.7 can be extended 
to account for all relevant reliability-speciﬁc aspects. Section 4.8 concludes 
the chapter with a short presentation of the implemented tool support. 
4.1 Overview 
Summarizing the central theme of the thesis, the proposed approach pre-
dicts the reliability of IT systems based on their component-based software 
architectures, represented through fully speciﬁed PCM-REL instances, as 
the probability of successful service execution. More concretely, the main 
output of the approach is the probability of a successful run through a given 
usage scenario, as part of a PCM-REL usage model (see Section 2.7.5). A 
usage scenario run is successful if each system service invocation during 
the run ﬁnishes without any system-level failure-on-demand (FOD). There 
may be FODs within the system during service execution, but they must be 
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handled before they reach the system border. If the usage model contains 
multiple usage scenarios, reliability prediction is conducted independently 
for each scenario. 
In the following, the concept of a successful run through a usage sce-
nario is further illustrated by taking a closer look at the speciﬁcations of 
user and system behaviour in PCM, and by describing how these speci-
ﬁcations – together with the PCM-REL-speciﬁc modelling extensions – 
form the basis of the reliability evaluation. The behavioural speciﬁca-
tions comprise the ScenarioBehaviours of the usage model and the 
ResourceDemandingSEFFs of the repository model (Sections 2.7.5 and 
2.7.2). The given assembly of BasciComponents to CompositeCompo-
nents and to the System allows for the aggregation of the behavioural 
speciﬁcations to an overall behavioural view that integrates the user be-
haviour (i.e. the user actions in the involved ScenarioBehaviours) and 
the system behaviour (i.e. the system actions in the involved Resource-
DemandingBehaviours). This view constitutes a tree of nested action 
sequences. The topmost action sequence begins with the Start of the 
ScenarioBehaviour referenced by the considered UsageScenario and 
ends with its Stop. Loops and Branches of system users contain one or 
several nested action sequences. An EntryLevelSystemCall points to a 
ResourceDemandingSEFF (i.e. the behavioural speciﬁcation that belongs 
to the corresponding Signature within the executing BasicComponent) 
as its nested action sequence. Within the system, LoopActions, Branch-
Actions, ForkActions, RecoveryBlockActions (see Section 4.7) and 
ExternalCallActions contain nested action sequences. 
As an example, Figure 4.1 depicts parts of the behavioural view of the 
audio hosting service, based on the behavioural speciﬁcations shown in 
Figures 2.9 and 2.15. The ﬁgure integrates the user behaviour in batch 
mode with the relevant system behaviour, showing not all individual ac-
tions but only the set of nested action sequences. The “BatchRequest-
Behaviour” constitutes the topmost sequence. It includes two Entry-
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«ScenarioBehaviour»
BatchRequestBehaviour
«ScenarioBehaviour»
CaseBatchUpload
«ScenarioBehaviour»
CaseBatchDownload
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
WebFrontend.Login
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
WebFrontend.Logout
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
WebFrontend.Upload
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
WebFrontend.DownloadCollection
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
AudioManagement.RetrieveFiles
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
Packaging.CreateZipArchive
«ResourceDemandingBehaviour»
ProcessRequestedElements
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
AudioDBAccess.RetrieveFile
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
Watermarking.WatermarkFile
«Res.Dem.Beh.»
PerformEncoding
«Res.Dem.Beh.»
NoEncoding
«ResourceDemandingSEFF»
Encoding.EncodeFile
Figure 4.1: Behavioural View Example (Excerpt) 
LevelSystemCalls and a Branch with two BranchTransitions (see 
Figure 2.15). Hence, it has a total of four nested sequences, namely the 
ResourceDemandingSEFFs “WebFrontend.Login” and “WebFrontend.-
Logout” and the body behaviours of the “CaseBatchUpload” and “Case-
BatchDownload” BranchTransitions. Each of these sequences has other 
nested sequences in turn. For example, the “CaseBatchDownload” be-
haviour includes an EntryLevelSystemCall referencing the “IWebFront-
end.DownloadCollection” service operation and a corresponding nested 
ResourceDemandingSEFF “WebFrontend.DownloadCollection”. In the 
example, further action sequences are included in the view by External-
CallActions (such as the call to “IAudioManagement.RetrieveFiles”), as 
well as body behaviours of LoopActions (such as the “ProcessRequest-
edElements” loop) and ProbabilisticBranchTransitions (such as the 
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transitions of the “EncodingCases” branch). The tree reaches its leaves 
when an action sequence contains no further nested sequences (such as the 
body behaviour of the “NoEncoding” transition). Notice that any action 
sequence speciﬁed in the architectural model may occur at multiple places 
in the tree, if the usage scenario execution includes invocations of the same 
component service operations at different points in the control ﬂow. For ex-
ample, if the batch mode scenario included multiple invocations of the “En-
codeFile” service operation of the “Encoding” component, the behavioural 
view would contain multiple occurrences of the corresponding action se-
quence (as well as all nested sequences)1. 
Each run through a usage scenario proceeds along the action sequences 
of its corresponding behavioural view, beginning with the Start of the top-
most ScenarioBehaviour and ending with its Stop. Within each action 
sequence, actions are visited according to their speciﬁed order. Nested ac-
tion sequences are processed according to the speciﬁed PCM behavioural 
semantics (see Section 2.7.2). For example, the invoked ResourceDe-
mandingSEFF of an ExternalCallAction is completely executed before 
the control ﬂow moves on to the successor action of the call. The body 
behaviour of a LoopAction is executed multiple times, according to the 
speciﬁcation of loop iteration counts. In case of a BranchAction, exactly 
one of the given body behaviours is executed. The nested behaviours of 
a ForkAction are all executed in parallel. Overall, the behavioural view 
speciﬁes a set of possible sequences of system service invocations and a 
set of possible execution paths for each such invocation. The occurrence 
probabilities of all invocation sequences and execution paths are implic-
itly given through probabilistic annotations to control ﬂow constructs (such 
as loop iteration counts and branch transition probabilities). Each usage 
1Multiple occurrences of an action sequence representing a certain component service op-
eration (namely, a certain ResourceDemandingSEFF) are not uniﬁed in the behavioural 
view, because each invocation of the service operation may have different characterisations 
of input parameter properties, leading to different behaviours during service execution. 
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Category Action Type Failure Cause Quantification of 
Failure Potential
Potential Point-of-
Failure (PPOF)
InternalAction
system-internal software faults FOD probabilities
unavailable system-internal hardware 
resources MTTF / MTTR values
ExternalCallAction
system-external service failures FOD probabilities
system-internal network communication faults FOD probabilities
unavailable system-internal hardware 
resources MTTF / MTTR values
Point-of-Recovery
(POR) RecoveryBlockAction (recovers from all failure types)
160 mm = 1.0
Table 4.1: PCM-REL Points of Failure and Recovery 
scenario run selects one invocation sequence and one execution path per 
invocation, according to the given occurrence probabilities. 
Along the execution paths of a service invocation, certain types of ac-
tions may exhibit local FOD occurrences (i.e. their execution may not 
ﬁnish successfully or lead to unexpected behaviour and unwanted results). 
The term “local” indicates that the FOD is initially internal to the executing 
software component and not instantly perceived at the component’s bor-
der. Instances of these action types constitute the potential points of failure 
(PPOF) of the service execution. Table 4.1 summarizes PPOFs and cor-
responding failure causes (which will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following sections). As the table shows, service execution may fail either at 
InternalActions or at ExternalCallActions. Other action types have 
their purpose in determining the control and data ﬂow, but do not represent 
PPOFs. InternalActions (as introduced in Section 2.7.2) represent the 
computations along the execution path and may fail due to software faults 
in the implementation (Section 4.3) or due to unavailable required hardware 
resources (Section 4.4). ExternalCallActions involve inter-component 
communication. If they invoke service operations provided by components 
on other ResourceContainers within the system (Section 4.5), they may 
exhibit FODs due to network transmission failures or due to unavailable 
resources required for the operation of the target containers (Section 4.4). 
79 
4 Modelling IT Systems with PCM-REL 
Component-level 
Failure-on-Demand
System-level
Failure-on-DemandComponent level 
reached?
System level
reached?
yes
yes
no
no
Propagated
Failure-on-Demand
Local
Failure-on-Demand
Component level 
reached?
yes
no
Figure 4.2: PCM-REL Failure-on-Demand Propagation 
If they represent invocations of system-external services, they may exhibit 
FODs due to failures of these (Section 4.6). 
Based on the considerations of Section 3.1, PCM-REL deﬁnes a standard 
“propagation” of FOD occurrences. In contrast to many existing ASRP 
approaches (Section 7.4), failure potentials are not associated with visits 
to software components but with individual actions that represent PPOFs 
within the behavioural view. Correspondingly, FOD occurrences are prop-
agated along nested action sequences rather than component service invo-
cations only. Figure 4.2 illustrates this principle. A local FOD occurrence 
at an action representing a PPOF leads to an FOD of the surrounding action 
sequence in the behavioural view, which is in turn a propagated FOD oc-
currence of the action pointing to this sequence (such as a BranchAction
pointing to the action sequence of a contained ProbabilisticBranch-
Transition). The FOD propagates upwards the hierarchy of nested action 
sequences, until it reaches the component-level ResourceDemandingSEFF
and becomes a component-level FOD occurrence. After that, the failure 
propagates to the calling component and further upwards, until it ﬁnally 
reaches the system border as a system-level FOD occurrence. The only 
way to interrupt this propagation chain is a RecoveryBlockAction situ-
ated within the hierarchy that handles the FOD occurrence and prevents it 
from further propagation, thereby representing a point of recovery (POR, 
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see Table 4.1 and Section 4.7). In the audio hosting example, a local FOD 
occurrence at the InternalAction “ParseWebRequest” (see Figure 2.9) 
leads to an FOD of the surrounding ResourceDemandingSEFF and thus to 
a component-level FOD of the “WebFrontend” component, which in turn 
constitutes a system-level FOD occurring at the EntryLevelSystemCall
to “IWebFrontend.DownloadCollection” within the batch mode usage sce-
nario (assuming the behavioural view as shown in Figure 4.1). In conclu-
sion, each FOD occurrence along the service execution path is either han-
dled within the hierarchy of nested action sequences or leads to a system-
level FOD and thus ultimately to a failed usage scenario run. 
As Table 4.1 shows, the failure potentials of individual PPOFs are given 
as an input to the approach in terms of software and network FOD probabil-
ities, as well as MTTF and MTTR values for hardware resources. Based on 
this information, the reliability evaluation (Chapter 5) determines the prob-
abilities of system-level FOD occurrences, and ultimately the envisioned 
success probability of a usage scenario run. The following sections discuss 
all reliability-speciﬁc modelling constructs in detail. 
4.2 Failure-on-Demand Types 
In the conception of PCM-REL, any FOD occurring during service exe-
cution is of a certain FOD type. The notion of FOD types allows for a 
differentiated reliability evaluation calculating the occurrence probability 
of each FOD type rather than the overall FOD occurrence probability only 
(see Section 5.1.1). Moreover, when specifying RecoveryBlockActions
as PORs in the control ﬂow, it is important to determine the exact types of 
FODs that can be handled by these (see Section 4.7). The differentiation 
of multiple FOD types is one of the distinguishing features of PCM-REL 
compared to many other ASRP approaches that only consider a single type 
of failure (see Section 7.4). 
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FODType
SoftwareInducedFODType HardwareInducedFODType
+id : string
+entityName : string
Entity
Repository
1
+failureTypes
*
ProcessingResourceType
*
+resourceType
1
NetworkInducedFODType
CommunicationLinkResourceType
*
+resourceType
1
Figure 4.3: Meta-Model for Failure-on-Demand Type Speciﬁcations 
The PCM-REL meta-model explicitly captures FOD types through corre-
sponding meta-model classes, as shown in Figure 4.3. On the highest level, 
an abstract class FODType inherits from the common Entity class, thereby 
gaining an entityName and an id. FODTypes are speciﬁed within and be-
long to a PCM-REL Repository. Like data types, they constitute a com-
mon ground that is shared by all component developers contributing to the 
Repository. PPOFs and PORs within behavioural speciﬁcations can only 
refer to FODTypes that have been speciﬁed in the Repository. 
The ﬁrst level of differentiation below the general FODType is given 
through the SoftwareInducedFODType, the HardwareInducedFODType
and the NetworkInducedFODType. These classes correspond to the main 
failure dimensions in IT systems, and they are used to describe FOD occur-
rences caused by software-level, hardware-level and network-level failure 
potentials, respectively. The distinction of dimensions assures that each 
PPOF can only be associated with appropriate failure causes as shown in 
Table 4.1. Moreover, prediction results show which dimension contributes 
to the overall failure potential of the system to what extend, thereby deliv-
ering valuable additional information to system designers. 
Within each of the three categories, concrete FOD types are speciﬁed 
through instantiating the meta-model classes. For SoftwareInducedFOD-
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:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = WebRequestFailure
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = CacheAccessFailure
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = DBQueryFailure
:HardwareInducedFODType
entityName = CPUFailure
:HardwareInducedFODType
entityName = HDDFailure
:NetworkInducedFODType
entityName = LANFailure
:ProcessingResourceType
entityName = CPU
:ProcessingResourceType
entityName = HDD
:Comm.LinkResourceType
entityName = LAN
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = StorageAccessFailure
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = EncodingFailure
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = WatermarkingFailure
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = PackagingFailure
:Repository
entityName = AudioHostingRepository
Figure 4.4: Failure-on-Demand Type Speciﬁcations in the Audio Hosting Example 
Types, system designers are free to decide about the level of modelling 
granularity (see Section 3.4). They may use the FOD type instantiation 
to create sub categories as they wish. Examples for possible sub cate-
gories include the failure-causing software layer (e.g. application-level, 
middleware, operating system), the failing task (e.g. wrong computation 
result, synchronisation error) and the consequence of failure (e.g. mi-
nor, critical, catastrophic). Alternatively, instantiated failure types may 
be speciﬁc to the system under study (such as an audio ﬁle encryption 
failure in the audio hosting example). HardwareInducedFODTypes are 
restricted to the ProcessingResourceTypes that have been deﬁned in 
the model; each HardwareInducedFODType describes a FOD occurrence 
caused by an unavailable hardware resource of the corresponding type. 
Similarly, a NetworkInducedFODType is used to describe network trans-
mission failures due to unreliable LinkingResources of the associated 
CommunicationLinkResourceType. 
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Figure 4.4 shows the speciﬁed FOD types for the audio hosting example. 
The model distinguishes several SoftwareInducedFODTypes according 
to the main tasks during the upload and download of audio ﬁles, namely the 
processing of user requests through the web interface (“WebRequestFail-
ure”), the audio processing (“EncodingFailure”, “WatermarkingFailure”, 
“PackagingFailure”), as well as the data storage and retrieval (“DBQuery-
Failure”, “StorageAccessFailure”, “CacheAccessFailure”). Moreover, the 
Repository contains two HardwareInducedFODTypes “CPUFailure” 
and “HDDFailure”, according to the CPU and HDD resources contained 
in the audio hosting ResourceEnvironment (see Section 2.7.4). Finally, a 
NetworkInducedFODType “LANFailure” represents communication fail-
ures of the modelled “LANConnection”. 
4.3 Software Failure Potentials 
This section describes how software-level failure potentials are speciﬁed 
within a PCM-REL architectural model. These failure potentials stem from 
faults that are included in the implementation of the software components 
involved in service execution. A fault may be a bug introduced by a pro-
gramming error, the realization of a ﬂawed requirements speciﬁcation, or a 
natural limitation of a computational procedure (such as a virus detection 
algorithm with an imperfect success rate). As software failures are sub-
ject to multiple types of uncertainty (see Section 2.3), the thesis follows 
the path of the Cheung model (Section 2.5) and many other subsequent 
ASRP approaches by using probabilistic abstractions in terms of indepen-
dent “per-visit” failure probabilities to specify software failure potentials. 
For clarity of presentation, the thesis denotes these as failure-on-demand 
(FOD) probabilities (see Section 3.1). 
While the Cheung model associates each software component in the ar-
chitecture with one FOD probability, this method may be too inﬂexible 
in practice. The speciﬁcation of potential points of failure (PPOF) during 
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service execution is associated with computational tasks rather than com-
ponent borders. Some components carry out many individual tasks; other 
components provide only thin wrappers for existing functionality. There-
fore, the thesis allows for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of PPOFs by assigning 
FOD probabilities to individual InternalActions, which represent any 
data processing or other computational steps during service execution (see 
Section 2.7.2). 
InternalAction
+FODProbability : double
FODOccurrenceDescription
SoftwareInducedFODType
0..1
+FODOccurrenceDescriptions
*
* +FODType1
AbstractActionResourceDemandingBehaviour
0..1
+steps
*
ResourceDemandingSEFF
InternalFODOccurrenceDescription
Figure 4.5: Meta-Model for Software Failure Potentials 
Figure 4.5 shows the PCM-REL meta-model constructs involved in the 
speciﬁcation of software failure potentials. Component developers specify 
such potentials through InternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions, which 
inherit from the abstract base class FODOccurrenceDescription. These 
descriptions are associated with InternalActions, which thereby be-
come PPOFs within the action sequence of a ResourceDemandingBe-
haviour, or in particular, a ResourceDemandingSEFF. Each Internal-
FODOccurrenceDescription includes a FODProbability between 0.0 
and 1.0 and references a SoftwareInducedFODType, specifying that a 
software-induced FOD of the given type may occur with the given proba-
bility upon the execution of the associated InternalAction. If an Inter-
nalAction contains multiple InternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions, 
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then each description must reference another SoftwareInducedFODType. 
The InternalAction either executes successfully or results in one of the 
speciﬁed SoftwareInducedFODTypes. The cumulated FOD probability 
of all InternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions of an InternalAction
represents its overall software failure potential and must not exceed 1.0. 
If the InternalAction does not contain any InternalFODOccurrence-
Descriptions, it may only fail due to unavailable required hardware re-
sources (see Section 4.4). 
The association of software FOD probabilities with InternalActions
allows for specifying a component service operation as a sequence of 
executed PPOFs. The sequence is structured through control ﬂow con-
structs such as BranchActions and LoopActions, with branch transition 
probabilities and loop iteration counts speciﬁed depending on properties 
of service invocation input parameters and component conﬁguration pa-
rameters. The individual InternalActions are atomic entities within 
the behavioural speciﬁcation; no details about the represented code are 
revealed, and no context information is considered when evaluating the 
associated FOD probabilities. Modellers are free to adjust the granular-
ity of the behavioural speciﬁcation such that independent estimates for all 
InternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions of each InternalAction can 
feasibly be obtained. Alternatively, if the model shall distinguish PPOFs at 
ﬁne granularity but only coarse-grained estimates are available, individual 
PPOFs can be aggregated to groups, and estimations can be done for the 
groups rather than the individual PPOFs. In all cases, existing uncertainties 
with respect to input estimations can be tackled by sensitivity analyses (as 
done for the audio hosting service in Section 6.4.2). The estimates them-
selves can be determined through methods such as the ones discussed in 
Section 2.3. In the thesis, the Astaro ASG case study (Section 6.5) includes 
the estimation of software FOD probabilities for an industrial IT system 
based on existing qualitative and statistical failure data. 
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:BasicComponent
entityName = WebFrontend
:InternalAction
entityName = ParseWebRequest
:InternalFODOccurrenceDescription
FODProbability = 1.0E-8
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = WebRequestFailure
:Signature
entityName = DownloadCollection
:ResourceDemandingSEFF
Figure 4.6: A Software Failure Potential in the Audio Hosting Example 
To illustrate the speciﬁcation of software failure potentials, Figure 4.6 
shows how the “DownloadCollection” service operation in the audio host-
ing example (see Figure 2.9) is enriched by a corresponding annotation. 
The BasicComponent “WebFrontend” references a ResourceDemand-
ingSEFF that describes the behaviour of the component when “Download-
Collection” is invoked. Within the action sequence of the ResourceDe-
mandingSEFF, there is an InternalAction “ParseWebRequest” which 
represents the initial processing of user requests. To express that this 
processing may lead to a FOD occurrence of type “WebRequestFailure” 
(see Figure 4.4), an InternalFODOccurrenceDescription is added to 
the InternalAction that references this FOD type. A FOD probabil-
ity of 10−8 indicates that a visit to “ParseWebRequest” during service 
execution is expected to result in a “WebRequestFailure” in one out of 
10−8 cases on average. Overall, the audio hosting model contains 19 
system-internal software failure potentials, each associated with an indi-
vidual InternalAction and mapped to the SoftwareInducedFODTypes
as shown in Figure 4.4. The corresponding FOD probabilities are set to 
10−8 (for InternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions referring to “WebRe-
questFailures”) or 10−6 (for other FOD types). In the example, illustrative 
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FOD probabilities are chosen as a basis for demonstrating the capabilities 
of PCM-REL in the audio hosting case study (see Section 6.4). 
4.4 Hardware Failure Potentials 
One contribution of PCM-REL is that it does not only consider FOD oc-
currences due to software faults, but also due to unavailable hardware re-
sources. Both sources of failure add to the overall risk of a system-level 
FOD occurrence, as discussed in Section 3.1. Related approaches that do 
not consider hardware unavailability effects either produce over-optimistic 
prediction results (assuming perfect hardware) or implicitly encode the im-
pact of unavailable hardware resources into software-level FOD probabil-
ities, thus strongly reducing the reusability of software component speci-
ﬁcations. PCM-REL includes the speciﬁcation of hardware resources as 
part of its resource environment model (see Section 2.7.4) and allows for 
associating an independent failure potential with each hardware resource. 
A corresponding speciﬁcation of hardware usage during service execution 
allows for determining the likeliness that hardware unavailability actually 
leads to user-perceived FOD occurrences. 
+MTTF : double
+MTTR : double
+requiredByContainer : bool
ProcessingResourceSpecification
ResourceContainer
ResourceEnvironment
ProcessingResourceType
HardwareInducedFODType
1 +resourceContainers
*
1
+resourceSpecifications*
*
+resourceType 1
*
+resourceType1
Figure 4.7: Meta-Model for Hardware Failure Potentials 
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Figure 4.7 depicts the part of the PCM-REL meta-model that allows for 
the speciﬁcation of hardware resources and their failure potentials. Sys-
tem deployers specify the ResourceEnvironment including a set of Re-
sourceContainers. A ResourceContainer represents a computing 
node and contains several hardware resources, whose characteristics are 
captured through ProcessingResourceSpecifications. Each Pro-
cessingResourceSpecification references a ProcessingResource-
Type and includes an MTTF and MTTR value. Hence, PCM-REL follows 
the well-established failure model as presented in Section 2.2 for each in-
dividual hardware resource. The MTTF and MTTR values are speciﬁed 
in abstract time units, which implicitly translate to concrete time units 
(such as seconds, hours or days) in the context of a concrete PCM in-
stance. Generally, the values must be positive. As an exception to this rule, 
system deployers may set both the MTTF and MTTR values of a certain 
resource to zero, in order to express that this resource never fails. The ref-
erenced ProcessingResourceType can be selected from a list of prede-
ﬁned types. Currently, PCM-REL supports “CPU” and “HDD” (hard disk 
drive) as the two main types of hardware resources. Alternatively, mod-
ellers can deﬁne custom ProcessingResourceTypes for a speciﬁc PCM-
REL instance. A further boolean attribute requiredByContainer of the 
ProcessingResourceSpecification expresses how the operation of 
the surrounding ResourceContainer depends on the resource, according 
to the possible cases discussed in Section 3.1. If requiredByContainer =
true, the resource is central to the container, and the container cannot op-
erate while the resource is unavailable. A value requiredByContainer =
f alse indicates that the overall container keeps operating even if the re-
source is unavailable. 
Beyond capturing the hardware failure potentials themselves, the se-
mantics of PCM-REL must clearly specify the impact of hardware un-
availability on the control and data ﬂow during service execution. Fig-
ure 4.8 shows the involved meta-model classes. The impact of hardware 
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*
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ProcessingResourceSpecification
*
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*
Figure 4.8: Meta-Model for Impacts of Hardware Failure Potentials on Service Ex-
ecution 
failure potentials depends on the question if a hardware resource is re-
quired for the operation of the surrounding ResourceContainer as spec-
iﬁed through the requiredByContainer attribute of the corresponding 
ProcessingResourceSpecification. If this attribute is set to true, any 
BasicComponent instantiated in the system through an AssemblyCon-
text and allocated to the container through an AllocationContext is 
only operational when the resource is available. Hence, the unavailability 
of the resource leads to a hardware-induced FOD occurrence of the corre-
sponding HardwareInducedFODType for any ExternalCallAction in-
voking a service operation of the non-operational component. If the re-
source is not strictly required for the operation of the container, an FOD oc-
curs only if the resource is speciﬁcally requested by an InternalAction
while being unavailable. To this end, InternalActions may specify a 
list of ProcessingResourceTypes which they require for their execu-
tion, each embedded into a corresponding ParametricResourceDemand. 
The connection of the abstract ProcessingResurceType to a concrete 
ProcessingResourceSpecification is given through the allocation of 
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the executing BasicComponent to the ResourceContainer. The un-
availability of a resource requested by an InternalAction leads to a 
hardware-induced FOD of the corresponding HardwareInducedFODType. 
Hence, InternalActions may fail either due to software faults (as dis-
cussed in Section 4.3) or due to unavailable hardware resources. If an 
InternalAction requires multiple unavailable resources, it fails with a 
HardwareInducedFODType that corresponds to one of the unavailable re-
sources. 
:BasicComponent
entityName = WebFrontend
:InternalAction
entityName = ParseWebRequest
:ProcessingResourceSpecification
:ProcessingResourceType
entityName = CPU
:AllocationContext
entityName = AL_WebFrontend
:AssemblyContext
entityName = AS_WebFrontend
:ParametricResourceDemand
:ResourceContainer
entityName = ApplictionServer
:HardwareInducedFODType
entityName = CPUFailure
MTTF = 105120.0
MTTR = 2.0
requiredByContainer = true
:Signature
entityName = DownloadCollection
:ResourceDemandingSEFF
Figure 4.9: A Hardware Failure Potential in the Audio Hosting Example 
In the audio hosting example, the “WebFrontend” BasicComponent is in-
stantiated through the “AS_WebFrontend” AssemblyContext and allo-
cated through the “AL_WebFrontend” AllocationContext to the “Ap-
plicationServer” ResourceContainer (see Figure 2.13). As Figure 4.9 
shows, the container includes a ProcessingResourceSpecification
for the “CPU” ProcessingResourceType. The CPU is required by the 
container and has a MTTF of 105120 hours or 12 years and a MTTR of 
2 hours. Overall, both the “ApplicationServer” and the “DatabaseServer” 
have a CPU and a HDD with MTTF values of 12 years (for the CPUs) and 
4 years (for the HDDs). Each server strictly requires its CPU to operate but 
can tolerate the HDD (which holds user data only) being unavailable. As 
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the ﬁgure shows, the unavailability of the “ApplicationServer” CPU leads 
to a “CPUFailure” whenever the “WebFrontend.DownloadCollection” ser-
vice operation is invoked because the “WebFrontend” is allocated to the 
“ApplicationServer”. In the example, the operation would fail even if the 
CPU was not strictly required by the container, because it includes the 
InternalAction “ParseRequest”, which is always executed as part of the 
operation (see Figure 2.9), and which explicitly requires the “CPU” Pro-
cessingResourceType through its included ParametricResourceDe-
mand. Considering both Figures 4.6 and 4.9, there are three possible out-
comes of the execution of “ParseRequest”: the execution either succeeds, 
or it fails with a SoftwareInducedFODType (“WebRequestFailure”), or 
with a HardwareInducedFODType (“CPUFailure”). 
4.5 Network Failure Potentials 
Beyond software and hardware failure potentials, PCM-REL also considers 
the possibility of network transmission failures, which may have signiﬁcant 
impact on the system’s reliability, depending on the degree of distribution of 
the application, as well as the amount of required remote communication. 
PCM-REL does not aim to provide a comprehensive network simulation, 
nor does it consider the speciﬁcs of network devices and protocols. In-
stead, the approach considers the overall probabilities that communication 
messages sent over network links get lost or corrupted, thereby preventing 
service execution from being successful. 
Figure 4.10 shows the involved meta-model constructs. LinkingRe-
sources represent network links over which service invocation and return 
messages travel between the software components of the system. Each 
LinkingResource contains a CommunicationLinkResourceSpecifi-
cation with a FODProbability attribute. The FODProbability is a 
value between 0.0 and 1.0 and represents the probability that a message sent 
over this link is corrupted or lost, which may happen due to a number of 
92 
4.5 Network Failure Potentials 
ResourceEnvironment
ProcessingResourceType
CommunicationLinkResourceType
+FODProbability : double
CommunicationLinkResourceSpecification
LinkingResource
1
+linkingResources
*
*
+resourceType1
1
+resourceSpecification1
NetworkInducedFODType
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Figure 4.10: Meta-Model for Network Failure Potentials 
reasons including communication overload, transmission protocol errors, 
physical interference of transmission lines, or unavailability of transmis-
sion devices. The speciﬁed FODProbability is evaluated independently 
for each message transport. The CommunicationLinkResourceSpeci-
fication references a CommunicationLinkResourceType. By default, 
PCM-REL supports one CommunicationLinkResourceType “LAN”. In 
the PCM-REL behavioural speciﬁcation, ExternalCallActions repre-
sent invocations of other component services. A network-induced FOD 
occurs if an ExternalCallAction refers to a component that is allocated 
to a remote ResourceContainer, and if either the invocation message 
or the return message is not correctly transported over the corresponding 
LinkingResource. Hence, ExternalCallActions are the PPOFs with 
respect to network failure potentials. 
To illustrate the speciﬁcation of network failures potentials, Figure 4.11 
shows an ExternalCallAction “RetrieveFileCall” that is part of the “Re-
trieveFiles” service operation of the “AudioManagement” component. “Re-
trieveFileCall” refers to the “RetrieveFile” operation provided by the “Au-
dioDBAccess” component. Both components are allocated on different 
ResourceContainers “ApplicationServer” and “DatabaseServer”, as in-
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:ResourceDemandingSEFF
:BasicComponent
entityName = AudioDBAccess
:AssemblyContext
entityName = AS_AudioDBAccess
entityName = LanConnection
entityName = RetrieveFileCall
:BasicComponent
entityName = AudioManagement
:AssemblyContext
entityName = AS_AudioManagement
:ResourceContainer
entityName = ApplicationServer
:ResourceContainer
entityName = DatabaseServer
:Comm.LinkRes.Specification
FODProbability = 1.0E-7
:Comm.LinkRes.Type
entityName = LAN
entityName = RetrieveFile
:LinkingResource
:Signature
:ExternalCallAction
entityName = RetrieveFiles
:Signature
:AssemblyConnector
:AllocationContext
entityName = AL_AudioDBAccess
:AllocationContext
entityName = AL_AudioManagement
:ResourceDemandingSEFF
Figure 4.11: Network Reliability Speciﬁcations in the Audio Hosting Example 
dicated by the corresponding AssemblyContexts and AllocationCon-
texts. The two ResourceContainers are connected through a Lin-
kingResource “LANConnection”, which includes a Communication-
LinkResourceSpecification with a failure probability of 10−7 and 
a reference to the CommunicationLinkResourceType “LAN”. Over-
all, the speciﬁcation indicates that the message transports over “LanCon-
nection” required for the invocation of (and return from) “AudioDBAc-
cess.RetrieveFile” through “RetrieveFileCall” may fail with a probability 
of 10−7, leading to a network-induced FOD occurrence at “RetrieveFile-
Call”. 
4.6 System-External Failure Potentials 
Although an IT system can be completely represented through a PCM-REL 
instance, the approach also takes into account interdependencies between 
multiple systems. Such interdependencies are increasingly common in the 
94 
4.6 System-External Failure Potentials 
sense that systems act as users of other systems and invoke their services. 
However, integrating all systems into a common architectural model may 
not be feasible due to several reasons. First, the complexity of the overall 
system landscape may be very high. Second, the individual systems may be 
provided by different parties, with each party having architectural knowl-
edge only of their own system (in particular, service-oriented architectures 
may span across multiple providers and organizational boundaries). There-
fore, PCM-REL principally focusses on individual systems and their ar-
chitectures, but includes the possibility of system-external calls, invoking 
services that have to be provided by other systems at run-time. 
System
1 +annotations*
SpecifiedQoSAnnotation
Signature
Role
*
+role
1
*
+signature1
SpecifiedReliabilityAnnotation
+FODProbability : double
FODOccurrenceDescription
1
1..*
ExternalFODOccurrenceDescription
FODType
*
+failureType1
Figure 4.12: Meta-Model for System-External Failure Potentials 
The system’s reliability is inﬂuenced by the reliability of its system-external 
services, as a FOD occurrence resulting from an external invocation can 
lead to a FOD of the target service invoked by the system users. A system-
external service invocation is represented by an ExternalCallAction
that does not refer to a service operation provided by another component 
in the system, but instead references a RequiredRole of the modelled 
System (see Section 2.7.3). As Figure 4.12 shows, the System references 
a set of SpecifiedQoSAnnotations. Each SpecifiedQoSAnnotation
refers to an external service operation through a system-required Role
and a Signature. The SpecifiedReliabilityAnnotation inherits 
from SpecifiedQoSAnnotation and adds a list of ExternalFODOccur-
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renceDescriptions, expressing the possibility that certain FODTypes
may occur with given FODProbabilies when the external service oper-
ation is invoked. The list of ExternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions
must adhere to the same rules as the InternalFODOccurrenceDescrip-
tions speciﬁed for an InternalAction (see Section 4.3): Each descrip-
tion must reference another FOD type, and the cumulated FOD probability 
of all descriptions must not exceed 1.0. In contrast to InternalActions, 
system-external calls may exhibit all FOD types including Hardware-
InducedFODTypes and NetworkInducedFODTypes, because a FOD of 
an external service invocation may have arbitrary reasons. If an external 
service operation does not have a corresponding SpecifiedReliabili-
tyAnnotation, the reliability prediction assumes that invocations of this 
service operation always succeed. 
It is the task of system architects to determine SpecifiedReliabili-
tyAnnotations for the external services of their systems. As these exter-
nal services may be under the control of third party service providers, there 
may be no direct possibilities to change their FOD probabilities, or to esti-
mate the probabilities based on internal knowledge of the providing system 
architecture. Rather, the FOD probabilities may be contractually speciﬁed 
between the providers, or they may be collected from historical data of the 
target service provider using the external service. 
The System deﬁnition of the audio hosting example contains one Re-
quiredRole for using external audio encoding engines rather than built-
in functionality (see Figure 2.11). Figure 4.13 shows how the System is 
annotated to account for the involved failure potential. To this end, the 
System containes a SpecifiedReliabilityAnnotation that references 
its RequiredRole, as well as the “EncodeFile” Signature. Addition-
ally, the annotation speciﬁes an ExternalFODOccurrenceDescription
denoting that any invocation of the external service operation “IEncod-
ing.EncodeFile” may lead to a software-induced FOD occurrence of type 
“EncodingFailure” with a probability of 10−6. The speciﬁed failure po-
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:System
entityName = AudioHostingSolution
:RequiredRole
:Signature
entityName = EncodeFile
:ExternalFODOccurrenceDescription
FODProbability = 1.0E-6
:SoftwareInducedFODType
entityName = EncodingFailure
:SpecifiedReliabilityAnnotation
:Interface
entityName = IEncoding
Figure 4.13: System-External Failure Potentials in the Audio Hosting Example 
tential is taken into consideration by the reliability evaluation whenever an 
ExternalCallAction during service execution performs an invocation of 
the system-external service operation. 
4.7 Failure Recovery 
All modelling constructs for reliability discussed so far deal with the spec-
iﬁcation of the various failure potentials and PPOFs of an IT system (see 
Section 4.1). Thereby, the general assumption is that any FOD occurrence 
eventually “propagates” to the system border and constitutes a system-level 
FOD occurrence (as shown in Figure 4.2). In practice, however, IT systems 
exhibit capabilities for fault tolerance (FT). In PCM-REL terminology, FT 
is the ability to recover from FOD occurrences so that they do not propa-
gate to the system border. Ideally, the user perceives the system as operating 
failure-free despite local FODs occurring during service execution. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.6, a wide variety of FT mechanisms exist that introduce 
different types of redundancy in the system under study. FT mechanisms 
may be tailored towards tolerating all kinds of FOD occurrences, including 
software-induced, hardware-induced and network-induced FODs. 
Existing ASRP approaches typically do not provide explicit modelling 
constructs to consider FT mechanisms (see Section 7.2). Depending on the 
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system under study, an implicit consideration of FT capabilities may be 
possible through adaptation of certain model annotations such as software 
FOD probabilities. For example, the FOD probability of the InternalAc-
tion “ParseWebRequest” in Figure 4.6 could be changed from 10−8 to 0 
under the assumption that “ParseWebRequest” has internal FT mechanisms 
in place to recover from FOD occurrences of type “WebRequestFailure”. 
However, architecture-level FT mechanisms cannot be represented in this 
implicit way. Rather, they need an explicit representation in the architec-
ture. This is especially true if recovery activities change the high-level con-
trol and data ﬂow throughout the architecture, or if components have capa-
bilities to recover from FOD occurrences that have been propagated to them 
from other components. In such cases, the system’s behaviour in the pres-
ence of FOD occurrences can only be accurately represented through model 
constructs that explicitly reﬂect the activities related to failure recovery. 
RecoveryAction RecoveryActionBehaviour
1
+recoveryActionBehaviours
1..* 1
+FODHandlingAlternatives*
FODHandlingEntity
ResourceDemandingBehaviour
Entity
AbstractAction
0..1
+steps *
FODType
*
+handledFODTypes *
1 +primaryBehaviour 1
Figure 4.14: Meta-Model for Failure Recovery Speciﬁcations 
PCM-REL accounts for the need for explicit FT modelling through the 
RecoveryAction, which is a general construct for recovery from FOD 
occurrences during service execution. The semantics of this construct in-
clude three fundamental aspects of the recovery process, namely (i) stop-
ping the FOD occurrence from its further propagation (according to Fig-
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ure 4.2), (ii) handling the failure situation through the execution of one 
or multiple alternative behaviours, and (iii) returning back to normal ser-
vice execution. Thus, RecoveryActions constitute the points of recovery 
(POR) in the control and data ﬂow (as listed in Table 4.1). Figure 4.14 
shows the involved meta-model constructs. The RecoveryAction in-
herits from the AbstractAction and includes a list of one or multiple 
RecoveryActionBehaviours. Being a ResourceDemandingBehav-
iour, each RecoveryActionBehaviour represents an action sequence 
within the overall behavioural view as introduced in Section 4.1. More-
over, each behaviour constitutes a FODHandlingEntity, deﬁning a set of 
handled FODTypes. Within a RecoveryAction, each RecoveryAction-
Behaviour may reference other behaviours through the “FODHandlingAl-
ternatives” property. Exactly one of the behaviours is pointed out by the 
RecoveryAction as its “primaryBehaviour”. 
Did a failure-on-demand 
occur during the execution 
of the behaviour?
Is one of the FOD 
handling alternatives of 
the behaviour 
applicable to the 
occurred failure type?
NO
START
Execute primary RecoveryActionBehaviour
Execute Identified RecoveryActionBehaviour
SUCCESS
FOD
NO
YES
YESExecute RecoveryActionBehaviour identified 
as applicable FOD handling alternative
Figure 4.15: Execution Flow through Recovery Actions 
Figure 4.15 illustrates the general ﬂow of execution through a Recovery-
Action. Upon entering the action, the control ﬂow proceeds to the primary 
behaviour and executes it. If a FOD occurs, the control ﬂow searches 
through the “FODHandlingAlternatives” of the primary behaviour. If one 
of the alternatives is speciﬁed to handle the occurred FODType, the exe-
cution proceeds with this alternative. If not, the RecoveryAction fails 
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by the occurred FODType. If the primary behaviour executes failure-free, 
the RecoveryAction is deemed successful and the control ﬂow proceeds 
to its successor action. As the ﬁgure indicates, RecoveryActions may 
specify multiple stages of recovery so that FOD occurrences during re-
covery procedures may be handled in turn by other recovery procedures. 
The RecoveryActionBehaviours within a RecoveryAction constitute 
a tree with each behaviour referencing a list of successor behaviours by 
its “FODHandlingAlternatives” property. To ensure a consistent tree struc-
ture, none of the behaviours may reference itself as a successor, and no 
behaviour may be a successor of multiple other behaviours. Furthermore, 
all successors of a certain behaviour must differ in the FODTypes that 
they handle. Hence, upon a FOD occurring during the execution of a 
RecoveryActionBehaviour, its list of “FODHandlingAlternatives” con-
tains at most one applicable successor, which – if existent – will be executed 
next. The process of moving through the tree of RecoveryActionBehav-
iours continues until either one behaviour completes failure-free or no 
more applicable successors exist. In the ﬁrst case, the RecoveryAction is 
successful; in the second case, it fails by its last FOD occurrence. 
Figures 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 illustrate typical examples of modelling 
FT capabilities through RecoveryActions (the audio hosting example 
does not contains any modelled RecoveryActions by default, but fur-
ther design alternatives including FT capabilities are introduced in Sec-
tion 6.4.1). First, Figure 4.16 shows how a recovery block (as introduced 
in Section 2.6) can be represented in the model. The RecoveryActionBe-
haviours “Main” and “Alternative_i” (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of the RecoveryAction
denote the primary behaviour and the alternative behaviours of the recov-
ery block. Each “Alternative_i” handles the same “fodType” to which the 
whole recovery block is designated, and it references a single successor 
“Alternative_i+1”. The recovery block is left upon either the ﬁrst success-
ful execution of an “Alternative_i” or a FOD of the last “Alternative_n”. 
Upon any FOD occurrence other than “fodType”, the execution directly 
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«InternalAction»
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«InternalAction»
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«InternalAction»
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«InternalAction»
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Alternative_n
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«handles» fodType
«InternalAction»
PerformRollback
Figure 4.16: Recovery Block Example 
leaves the recovery block as it is only designated to handle “fodType” oc-
currences. As shown in the ﬁgure, modellers can add typical activities 
of a recovery block such as establishing checkpoints, acceptance testing 
and roll-backs as InternalActions to the model. This may help to un-
derstand the modelled recovery block pattern. Furthermore, the activities 
can be annotated with resource demands and failure probabilities to reﬂect 
additional failure potentials during recovery or performance impacts intro-
duced by the recovery block (when used in combination with performance 
prediction for trade-off analyses, see Section 3.1). 
Fig. 4.17 shows an example of multiple stages of recovery, where each 
stage handles a speciﬁc FOD type that occurs at the previous stage. In the 
example, three RecoveryActionBehaviours represent a fault-tolerant 
data retrieval process. The ﬁrst behaviour accesses a primary data source 
for data retrieval. Corruption of the data may lead to a software-induced 
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Figure 4.17: Multi-Stage Recovery Example 
FOD type “ChecksumFailure” (with probability p_1), upon which a second 
behaviour tries to repair the retrieved data. The repair requires parsing the 
data contents and may lead to a “ParsingFailure” (with probability p_2), 
which is in turn handled by the third behaviour through switching to a sec-
ondary data source. If the data cannot be successfully retrieved from the 
secondary source, no further alternative is available and the whole retrieval 
process fails. While in the example, the action sequences of each behaviour 
consist of a single InternalAction, they could also be more complex, 
comprising ExternalCallActions, BranchActions, LoopActions and 
other action types as presented in Section 2.7.2. 
The third example shown in Fig. 4.18 models a case in which multiple 
different types of recovery are available depending on the type of FOD oc-
currence. The example again represents a data retrieval process (the ﬁgure 
omits the action sequences within the behaviours for brevity). The pri-
mary behaviour accesses a remote data source to retrieve the data. Multiple 
FOD types may occur in this scenario, and each one requires a speciﬁc 
handling. First, a network connection problem may prevent successful data 
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«RecoveryAction»
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«RecoveryActionBehaviour» RepairReceivedData
«handles» ChecksumFailure
«RecoveryActionBehaviour» WaitAndRetry
«handles» NetworkConnectionFailure
Figure 4.18: Multi-Type Recovery Example 
transport; a handling alternative behaviour performs a wait-and-retry strat-
egy to obtain the data. Second, the remote host itself may be unavailable; 
a corresponding alternative handles this case by switching to a secondary 
host. Finally, data corruption may be indicated by a “ChecksumFailure” 
and is handled by a data-repairing alternative. A second FOD occurrence 
within any of the alternative behaviours leads to a FOD of the whole re-
trieval process. 
While each of the discussed examples illustrates certain possibilities of 
modelling FT capabilities through RecoveryActions, they can be freely 
adapted to reﬂect individual FT mechanisms of an IT system under study. 
An adaptation can be achieved by combining the demonstrated possibili-
ties (for example, combining multiple recovery types and stages), but also 
by integrating RecoveryActions with other PCM-REL behavioural con-
structs. In the context of PMC-REL modelling, RecoveryActions allow 
for a highly ﬂexible and expressive modelling of FT capabilities, consid-
ering the following aspects: 
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Interplay of software and hardware layers: PCM-REL considers the var-
ious interdependencies that may exist between software components and 
hardware resources when evaluating FT capabilities. A software FT mech-
anism may be designed to tolerate hardware faults (for example, the Re-
coveryActionBehaviours in Figure 4.16 may send requests to different 
replicated servers, and each alternative may test one of the replicas for its 
availability). Even a “pure” software FT mechanism is affected by the un-
availability of the underlying resources. PCM-REL accurately models the 
boundaries of this impact through the well-deﬁned PPOFs within the con-
trol ﬂow (see Section 4.1). For example, if exactly one out of the differ-
ent recovery stages in Figure 4.17 required a certain hardware resource, 
only this recovery stage would be affected by the unavailability of the re-
source. 
System usage: The system’s usage proﬁle inﬂuences the execution and 
effect of an FT mechanism in various ways. The usage modelling and 
input parameter propagation of PCM-REL allows for considering the us-
age dependencies of FT execution, namely the number of executions of a 
RecoveryAction during a usage scenario run, the control and data ﬂow 
within each RecoveryActionBehaviour, as well as the success and FOD 
probabilities of each included invocation of other component service op-
erations. 
Limited FT coverage: Considering the coverage of an FT mechanism, 
namely the fraction of failure situations handled by the mechanism, is an 
important ingredient to realistic FT modelling, as virtually no FT mech-
anism can handle all potential kinds of FOD occurrences [DT89]. PCM-
REL expresses limited FT coverage through the differentiation of multi-
ple FODTypes (see Section 4.2) and a speciﬁcation of the types that each 
RecoveryActionBehaviour handles. In the presence of a FOD occur-
rence, a RecoveryAction cannot be successfully completed if it does 
not contain a RecoveryActionBehaviour that handles the correspond-
ing FODType. 
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Imperfect recovery and multiple recovery stages: Any activity that a sys-
tem performs to recover from a FOD occurrence is itself subject to fail-
ure. PCM-REL allows for considering imperfect recovery and its inﬂuence 
on the FT effectiveness. For example, the checkpoint establishing, accep-
tance testing and roll-back activities in Figure 4.16 can be annotated with 
InternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions to express their included fail-
ure potentials. Furthermore, FOD occurrences during recovery may again 
be handled by further recovery stages or levels [VPMM05], as illustrated 
by Figure 4.17. 
Multiple recovery types: In many practical cases, a FT mechanism offers 
multiple recovery procedures, and a concrete procedure is selected based 
on the characteristics of a concrete failure situation to be handled. This 
is due to the fact that different failure situations may require completely 
different strategies for recovery. PCM-REL allows for explicit modelling of 
the different recovery procedures and their selection based on the occurred 
FODType, as illustrated by Figure 4.18. 
Failure correlation: The effectiveness of a FT mechanism may be se-
verely affected by failure correlation between its different recovery alter-
natives [AKL90, EL85, LM89, PSMK03]. For example, different versions 
of a software algorithm tend to fail for the same inputs, even if they are 
created by different developer teams. PCM-REL allows for a consideration 
of failure correlation between multiple RecoveryActionBehaviours, as 
in each behaviour the history of already executed behaviours and occurred 
FODs is known. For instance, when specifying each “p_i” in Figure 4.17, 
one can take into account the fact that recovery stages 1 to i − 1 have al-
ready failed2. Moreover, multiple RecoveryActionBehaviours that de-
pend on the same hardware resources (either directly or indirectly via ex-
2Notice that the capabilities of PCM-REL to account for failure correlation are limited due 
to its included state abstractions. For example, it is not possible to consider stochastic 
dependencies due to failure correlation between two external service invocations within a 
RecoveryAction. 
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ternal component service invocations) are all equally affected by resource 
unavailability and thus automatically correlated. 
Interplay of multiple FT mechanisms: While the great majority of ex-
isting work evaluating FT reliability and availability impacts targets indi-
vidual FT mechanisms and structures (see Section 7.2.2), PCM-REL al-
lows for an integrated consideration of multiple FT mechanisms employed 
within a component-based software architecture. If multiple components 
in the architecture exhibit different FT capabilities, they can mutually in-
ﬂuence each other’s effectiveness in positive or negative ways. For ex-
ample, a component may propagate internal FOD occurrences through a 
speciﬁc failure mode (modelled as a custom FODType in PCM-REL) to its 
callers. FT capabilities of the callers are only effective if they are prepared 
to handle the received failure mode. If multiple components are designed to 
work together, their FT capabilities can complement each other, or multiple 
components can join a co-operative effort to handle a certain failure situ-
ation. Such joint FT capabilities can be expressed in PCM-REL through 
multiple RecoveryActions in different components and through custom 
FODTypes propagated between the components. 
4.8 Implementation 
This section brieﬂy describes the implemented tool environment for relia-
bility modelling with PCM-REL. The implementation is based on the ex-
isting PCM Workbench [FZI12] for PCM architectural modelling and anal-
ysis. The Workbench is an Eclipse Rich Client Platform application (RCP, 
see [Ecl12b]); Figure 4.19 shows a screenshot of the environment. The 
PCM meta-model, as well as the PCM-REL extensions, have been created 
using the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF, see [Ecl12a]). Thanks to 
this technological base, the user can create PCM-REL instances through 
tree-structured model editors, with each of the PCM’s sub models (see Sec-
tion 2.7) being represented by a speciﬁc EMF editor. Moreover, graph-
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Figure 4.19: PCM-REL Modelling Environment 
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ical editors for various model parts have been realized using the Eclipse 
Graphical Modeling Framework (GMF, see [Ecl12c]), allowing for com-
fortable model creation and editing. The ﬁgure shows different views on 
a PCM-REL instance and its parts, including a listing of model ﬁles and 
directories (left-hand side), a graphical system model editor (upper part), a 
tree-structured repository model editor (lower middle part) and a graphical 
editor for ResourceDemandingSEFFs (lower right part). The separation 
of the PCM-REL instance in multiple model ﬁles allows for reusing model 
parts for multiple architectural variations of a system under study (for ex-
ample, multiple PCM-REL System deﬁnitions can reuse the same PCM-
REL Repository deﬁnition). Advanced modelling features include auto-
mated consistency checks for created models, as well as integrated brows-
ing of model contents across individual model parts in the provided EMF 
editors. In conclusion, the PCM Workbench with integrated PCM-REL 
extensions provides a comprehensive graphical tool environment for reli-
ability modelling of IT systems. For further details about the reliability 
evaluation of the created models, see Section 5.5. 
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Once a complete PCM-REL instance has been created specifying the com-
ponent-based architecture of a system under study and its included failure 
potentials (see Section 4), PCM-REL provides the capabilities for auto-
mated evaluation of the model and delivers the prediction of the system’s 
reliability as a result. The main outcome of the evaluation is the probability 
of a successful (in other words, failure-free) progression through a speci-
ﬁed PCM-REL usage scenario. In analogy to related work, PCM-REL uses 
discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) in order to represent the system un-
der study and to predict its reliability. DTMCs have been introduced in 
Section 2.4 and are a well-established means for architecture-based soft-
ware reliability prediction (ASRP). However, while other approaches use 
DMTCs to represent software components and the transfer of control be-
tween them (see Section 2.5), PCM-REL additionally reﬂects the user be-
haviour, the intra-component (high-level) control ﬂow, the state of the sys-
tem’s hardware resources and multiple failure modes through DTMCs. This 
representation allows for a much more differentiated analysis, but it may 
also lead to signiﬁcantly larger DTMC models. To assure the feasibility 
of DTMC creation and evaluation, PCM-REL takes three measures. First, 
system engineers don’t need to go through the laborious and error-prone 
process of manually creating DTMCs according to a given set of rules. 
Instead, the DTMCs are automatically derived through a model-to-model 
transformation from the design-oriented PCM-REL meta-model, which is 
called Markov transformation in the following. Second, the approach re-
alizes the transformation through a time- and space-efﬁcient transforma-
tion algorithm. This algorithm exploits speciﬁc structural properties of a 
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given PCM-REL instance and produces a very compact DTMC as its result. 
Third, the approach offers conﬁguration options which speed up the evalua-
tion on the cost of prediction accuracy or granularity of results, allowing for 
a ﬂexible adaptation to the requirements of a speciﬁc application scenario 
and the complexity of the underlying PCM-REL instance. In conclusion, 
PCM-REL provides a ﬁne-grained reliability evaluation that is fully auto-
mated and employs an efﬁcient algorithm to realize the underlying Markov 
transformation in a ﬂexibly conﬁgurable manner. 
This chapter discusses the process of predicting a system’s reliability 
through evaluation of a PCM-REL instance. First, Section 5.1 gives an 
overview of the process and discusses methodological aspects. Sections 5.2 
and 5.3 then present the two major building blocks of the Markov trans-
formation, namely the evaluation of system hardware states and system 
behaviour. Section 5.4 investigates the complexity of the evaluation proce-
dures, before Section 5.5 brieﬂy introduces the corresponding implemen-
tation. 
5.1 PCM-REL Evaluation Overview 
This section provides an overview of the concepts and methodology of the 
reliability evaluation as done by PCM-REL. The evaluation uses DTMCs to 
represent IT systems and their failure potentials. Hence, it is called Markov 
analysis in the following. Although basic semantics and solution meth-
ods of DTMCs are well established (see Section 2.4), the representation 
of an IT system architecture and its failure potentials through a DTMC, 
as well as an efﬁcient handling of this DTMC, are highly context-speciﬁc 
problems, and the PCM-REL Markov analysis provides unique solutions 
to these problems. 
The discussion starts with an overview of the Markov analysis steps, 
results and conﬁguration options in Section 5.1.1, followed by an introduc-
tion to the employed DTMC meta-model and structural properties of cre-
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Figure 5.1: PCM-REL Markov Analysis Overview 
ated DTMCs in Section 5.1.2. Finally, Section 5.1.3 outlines the Markov 
transformation algorithm and speciﬁes its basic operations. 
5.1.1 PCM-REL Markov Analysis 
Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the PCM-REL Markov analysis and its 
most important conﬁguration options. This analysis is carried out for relia-
bility evaluation during system design iterations (see Section 3.2). It builds 
upon the work of the dependency solver, which resolves all parameter de-
pendencies contained in the model to concrete values or probability distri-
butions (see Section 2.7.6). At the core of the analysis is the Markov trans-
formation, generating an absorbing DTMC from a PCM-REL instance. The 
transformation uses a proprietary DTMC meta-model as its target, which 
accounts for the speciﬁc PCM-REL context (see Section 5.1.2). After-
wards, a solving procedure determines the system’s reliability metrics from 
the DTMC. The ﬁgure shows two alternative ways to conduct the analysis. 
In the default case (shown in grey), the Markov transformation includes 
inherent state reduction operations (see Section 5.1.3). A state reduction 
decreases the number of states in the DTMC without changing the results 
of the analysis. The transformation ﬁnally produces a basic DTMC, namely 
a DTMC with a basic structure (see Figure 5.3b). The basic DTMC allows 
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for direct solving without the need for further calculation – the results of 
the analysis are equal to the transition probabilities of the DTMC. As an 
alternative, the Markov transformation can be performed without any state 
reductions. In this case, it produces a full (and potentially large) DTMC, 
which can be tackled through matrix solving as discussed in Section 2.4 
(calculating the absorption probabilities of the DTMC). This second alter-
native is far less efﬁcient than the ﬁrst one, but it can be used to learn 
about the structure of the resulting DTMC for debugging purposes and for 
comparison with other DTMC-based reliability prediction approaches. The 
PCM-REL user decides between the two alternatives through a conﬁgura-
tion option named “Markov State Reduction”. 
Regarding the analysis results, PCM-REL predicts the probability of a 
successful run through a speciﬁed usage scenario, as denoted in Section 4.1. 
More concretely, the analysis results comprise the occurrence probabilities 
of all possible outcomes of the random experiment constituted by a usage 
scenario run. The two main outcomes of the random experiment are Suc-
cess – namely, completion of the scenario run without any system-level 
failure-on-demand (FOD) occurrence – and Failure (meaning that at least 
one system-level FOD occurs). The analysis further differentiates the Fail-
ure outcome into multiple failure modes (meaning possible categories or 
types of failure) and evaluates the occurrence probability of each failure 
mode. The set of considered failure modes follows from the FODTypes that 
have been speciﬁed for the PCM-REL instance (see Section 4.2), as well 
as a user-selected evaluation level (as indicated through the conﬁguration 
option “Markov Evaluation Level” in Figure 5.1), which balances the time 
needed for the analysis and the granularity of its results. 
Table 5.1 shows the available evaluation levels. At the fastest and most 
basic level 0 (or Single), the analysis only considers a single failure mode. 
This level is suited for cases in which only the probability of success ver-
sus the general probability of failure-on-demand is of interest. Level 1 (or 
Category) distinguishes between FOD occurrences induced by software, 
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Evaluation 
Level
Distinguished Failure Modes Markov
Analysis
0
(Single)
• FOD Simplified 
(no failure 
recovery)
1
(Category)
• Software-induced FOD
• Hardware-induced FOD
• Network-induced FOD
Simplified 
(no failure 
recovery)
2
(Type)
• Software-induced FOD per SoftwareInducedFODType
• Hardware-induced FOD per ProcessingResourceType
• Network-induced FOD per CommunicationLinkResourceType
Full
3
(PointOf-
Failure)
• Internal software-induced FOD
per SoftwareInducedFODType per InternalAction
• Internal hardware-induced FOD
per ProcessingResourceType per ResourceContainer
• Internal network-induced FOD
per CommunicationLinkResourceType per LinkingResource
• External software-induced FOD
per SoftwareInducedFODType per Role per Signature
• External hardware-induced FOD
per ProcessingResourceType per Role per Signature
• External network-induced FOD
per CommunicationLinkResourceType per Role per Signature
Full
160 mm = 1.0
Table 5.1: Markov Evaluation Levels 
hardware and network, thereby indicating the individual failure potential 
of each of these dimensions. Level 2 (or Type) further distinguishes the in-
dividual user-deﬁned SoftwareInducedFODTypes, as well as the failure-
inducing ProcessingResourceTypes as well as CommunicationLink-
ResourceTypes. Finally, level 3 (or PointOfFailure) provides the most 
detailed analysis, differentiating all failing InternalActions, failure-
causing ResourceContainers and LinkingResources, as well as the 
individual Roles and Signatures that cause system-external service fail-
ures. As a general distinction, levels 0 and 1 use a predeﬁned set of failure 
modes, while levels 2 and 3 use an instance-speciﬁc set of failure modes. 
The different granularities of the evaluation levels inﬂuence the rela-
tionship between FODTypes and failure modes. At level 2, each FODType
of a PCM-REL instance corresponds to one distinguished failure mode 
in the Markov analysis. At levels 0 and 1, multiple FODTypes are ag-
gregated to one failure mode. In contrast, each FODType may be re-
lated to multiple failure modes at level 3, if the PCM-REL instance con-
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tains multiple potential points of failure (PPOF) where this FODType can 
occur. As a consequence, RecoveryBlockActions (see Section 4.7) 
are fully evaluated at levels 2 and 3 only. At the other levels 0 and 1, 
the distinguished failure modes are too coarse-grained to determine if a 
RecoveryBlockAlternativeBehaviour handles a certain FOD occur-
rence (see Section 5.3.8). Hence, levels 0 and 1 do not consider failure 
recovery and introduce inaccuracies for PCM-REL instances that include 
RecoveryBlockActions. 
Given a PCM-REL instance with a set of speciﬁed usage scenarios U :=
{U1, . . . ,Um} and a selected evaluation level, the Markov analysis deter-
mines the corresponding set of failure modes F := {F1, . . . ,Fn} and pre-
dicts the occurrence probabilities of each possible outcome per scenario, 
as shown in Table 5.2. Each scenario is evaluated independently, and the 
probabilities of all possible outcomes per scenario sum up to 1. As a further 
illustration, Table 5.3 depicts all distinguished outcomes for the batch mode 
usage scenario of the audio hosting example (see Section 1.5) under all pos-
sible evaluation levels. As for all PCM-REL instances, the analysis predicts 
the overall success and failure probabilities at level 0 and distinguishes the 
main FOD dimensions at level 1. At level 2, all speciﬁed FODTypes (see 
Figure 4.4) are individually considered, leading to 7 software-induced and 
2 hardware-induced failure modes, as well as 1 network-induced failure 
mode. Finally, level 3 distinguishes 13 InternalActions where indi-
vidual software-induced FODs may occur, 4 speciﬁed hardware resources 
which may become unavailable (see Figure 2.13), 1 speciﬁed network link 
and 1 system-external service operation which may result in an “Encod-
ingFailure”. 
Another element shown in Figure 5.1 is the “System Hardware States 
Handling” conﬁguration option, which refers to different evaluation vari-
ants for the hardware failure potential of the system under study. Sec-
tion 5.2 discusses these variants in detail. 
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PCM-REL 
UsageScenario
Markov Analysis Results Ʃ
U1 P(Success|U1) P(F1|U1) P(F2|U1) … P(Fn|U1) 1.0
U2 P(Success|U2) P(F1|U2) P(F2|U2) … P(Fn|U2) 1.0
… … …
Um P(Success|Um) P(F1|Um) P(F2|Um) … P(Fn|Um) 1.0
139.5 mm = 0.872
Table 5.2: Markov Analysis Results 
Evaluation 
Level
Markov Analysis Results (“batch mode” Usage Scenario)
0
(Single)
• [1] P(Success)
• [1] P(Failure)
1
(Category)
• [1] P(Success)
• [1] P(Software-induced FOD),
• [1] P(Hardware-induced FOD)
• [1] P(Network-induced FOD)
2
(Type)
• [1] P(Success)
• [7] P(WebRequestFailure), P(CacheAccessFailure), P(DBQueryFailure), …
• [2] P(CPUFailure), P(HDDFailure)
• [1] P(LANFailure)
3
(PointOf-
Failure)
• [1] P(Success)
• [13] P(ParseWebRequest-WebRequestFailure), P(CreateWebResponse-WebRequestFailure), …
• [4] P(ApplicationServer-CPUFailure), P(DatabaseServer-CPUFailure), …
• [1] P(LANConnection-LANFailure)
• [1] P(IEncoding-Encode-EncodingFailure)
160 mm = 1.0
Table 5.3: Distinguished Analysis Results for the Audio Hosting Example 
5.1.2 Markov Chain Structure 
Figure 5.2 shows the DTMC meta-model used by PCM-REL as the tar-
get of the Markov transformation. This meta-model follows a standard 
DTMC deﬁnition as presented in Section 2.4), but it adds a few addi-
tional concepts required by PCM-REL. A MarkovChain contains a set of 
States and Transitions. All three classes inherit a name attribute from 
Entity. Each transition is directed and connects exactly two states, deter-
mined by its fromState and toState attributes, with a given transition 
probability. Each state has a StateType, which allows certain states 
to be marked as “Initial”, “Success” or “Failure”. Additionally, states can 
contain further information in terms of Labels, each with a key and value
attribute. The labels are used to distinguish the individual failure modes 
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Figure 5.2: DTMC Meta-Model 
that are considered by the Markov analysis. Additionally, states can con-
tain traces. This feature is used by the Markov transformation to equip 
each created state with a unique identiﬁcation, enabling comparisons be-
tween multiple created DTMCs. Additional constraints limit the set of valid 
MarkovChain instances: The probabilities of all outgoing transitions of a 
state must sum up to 1. Each MarkovChain has exactly one initial and one 
success state. The initial state has no incoming transitions. The success 
and failure states each have exactly one outgoing transition leading back 
to the same state. Hence, these states are absorbing. They are the only 
absorbing states of the MarkovChain. The DTMC states and transitions 
are used to represent different aspects of the system under study such as its 
hardware states, its usage and its behaviour; a detailed discussion is given 
by Sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
All DTMCs generated by the Markov transformation, during intermedi-
ate steps or as a ﬁnal result, exhibit speciﬁc structural properties as shown 
in Figure 5.3. In the general case, a created DTMC corresponds to a generic 
structure (Figure 5.3a). This structure includes an initial state I, a success 
state S, a set of failure states {F1, . . . ,Fn} and an inner region with addi-
tional states and transitions. The generic structure constitutes an absorbing 
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Figure 5.3: Markov Chain Structure 
DTMC (see Section 2.4) with S and all Fi as its absorbing states (the self-
transitions of the absorbing states with probability 1 are omitted from the 
ﬁgure). Moreover, the structure is free of cycles – starting from I, each 
state can be visited at most once. The Markov transformation creates the 
DTMCs in a way such that the wanted success and failure mode probabili-
ties are equal to the probabilities of reaching S and Fi starting from I. 
Through the application of state reduction operations (Section 5.1.3), 
each generic DTMC structure can be converted to a basic structure (Fig-
ure 5.3b). The basic structure (which is itself a special case of the generic 
structure) contains no inner states and transitions; the only transitions are 
the ones leading from I to S and all Fi. Hence, the success and failure mode 
probabilities are equal to the transition probabilities {p1, . . . , pn+1}. 
5.1.3 Markov Transformation Algorithm 
One factor determining the feasibility of reliability prediction with PCM-
REL is the efﬁciency of the Markov transformation as the central part of 
the Markov analysis (see Section 5.1.1). To this end, the thesis does not de-
ﬁne a pure mapping from the PCM-REL meta-model to the DTMC meta-
model, but it describes a time- and space-efﬁcient algorithm that realizes 
the transformation. The description is given as a set of pseudo-code proce-
dures throughout Sections 5.2 and 5.3, together with corresponding DTMC 
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illustrations. As a foundation, this section speciﬁes basic operations that 
are repeatedly executed throughout the transformation, and it introduces 
the general pattern followed by the transformation algorithm. Section 5.4 
completes the discussion by examining the transformation’s computational 
complexity. 
p1q1 (+ r11) Y1
YmXn
X1
pnqm (+ rnm)
Y1
YmXn
X1
Z
p1
pn
q1
qm
(r11)
(rnm)
Figure 5.4: Markov State Reduction 
1 / / DTMC: c o n s i d e r e d DTMC
2 / / Z : i n n e r s t a t e o f c o n s i d e r e d DTMC
3
4 r e d u c e (DTMC, Z ) {
5 X := g e t S e t O f P r e d e c e s s o r S t a t e s (DTMC, Z ) ;
6 Y := g e t S e t O f S u c c e s s o r S t a t e s (DTMC, Z ) ;
7 n := ge tNumberOfElements (X ) ;
8 m := ge tNumberOfElements (Y ) ;
9 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= n ; i ++) {
10 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
11 p _ i := g e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y (DTMC, X( i ) , Z ) ; 
12 q _ j := g e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y (DTMC, Z , Y( j ) ) ; 
13 i f ( t r a n s i t i o n E x i s t s (DTMC, X( i ) , Y( j ) ) { 
14 r _ i j := g e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y (DTMC, X( i ) , Y( j ) ) ; 
15 s e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y (DTMC, X( i ) , Y( j ) , 
16 p _ i ∗ q _ j + r _ i j ) ; 
17 } e l s e { 
18 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, X( i ) , Y( j ) , p _ i ∗ q _ j ) ; 
19 } 
20 d e l e t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, X( i ) , Z ) ; 
21 d e l e t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, Z , Y( j ) ) ; 
22 } 
23 } 
24 d e l e t e N o d e (DTMC, Z ) ; 
25 } 
Listing 5.1: State Reduction Procedure 
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The repeatedly performed basic operations of the transformation algorithm 
are state reduction, state substitution and state resolution. Figure 5.4 shows 
the state reduction, which may be conducted on each inner state of a generic 
DTMC structure as shown in Figure 5.3a. The state Z that shall be re-
moved has n incoming transitions from a set of states X := {X1, . . . ,Xn}
with probabilities {p1, . . . , pn} and m outgoing transitions to a set of states 
Y := {Y1, . . . ,Ym} with probabilities {q1, . . . ,qm}. As the DTMC contains 
no cycles, the sets X and Y are disjoint, and there are no backward tran-
sitions from a state in Y to a state in X . However, there may be direct 
transitions from X to Y (as suggested in the ﬁgure). Moreover, the ini-
tial, success and failure states may be contained in the two sets. The state 
reduction removes Z from the chain without changing the probabilities of 
reaching the success and failure states from the initial state. To this end, Z 
and its incoming and outgoing transitions are replaced by direct transitions 
from X to Y according to the procedure shown in Listing 5.1. After the 
reduction, the overall DTMC still conforms to the generic structure. 
Y1
Ym
Xn
X1
I’
p1
pn F1
Fn
S’
F’1
F’n
q1
qm
1
1
r1
r2
rn+1
F1 Fn
Y1
YmXn
X1
Z
p1
pn
q1
qm
I’
r1
S’ F’1 F’n
r2
rn+1
Figure 5.5: Markov State Substitution 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the state substitution, which is done for an inner state
Z of a generic DTMC. In analogy with the presentation in Figure 5.4, the
119 
5 PCM-REL Reliability Evaluation 
sets X and Y denote the states with incoming and outgoing transitions to 
and from Z. Additionally, the ﬁgure shows the failure states of the DTMC 
(although not depicted in the ﬁgure, the set of failure states can overlap 
with Y ). The substitution replaces Z with an existing intermediate DTMC 
that conforms to the basic structure (see Figure 5.3b), according to the pro-
cedure depicted in Listing 5.2. The intermediate DTMC provides a reﬁned 
view on a certain activity or step that was formerly aggregated by Z. The 
incoming transitions of Z now lead to the intermediate initial state I'. From 
the intermediate success state S', further states are reachable as they were 
from Z. However, the failure potential of the intermediate DTMC is di-
rectly propagated to a failure of the surrounding DTMC. Hence, a transi-
tion with probability 1 is added from each intermediate failure state F 'k to 
its outer counterpart Fk. The state substitution adds to the overall failure 
potential and thus changes the success and failure probabilities of the sur-
rounding DTMC, but it does not break its generic structure. The newly 
introduced states I', S' and F ' become part of the inner structure of the k 
surrounding DTMC. 
The state resolution operation is a combination of the substitution and 
reduction operations. Given a generic DTMC structure with an inner state Z 
to replace and an intermediate basic DTMC, the resolution ﬁrst substitutes 
Z with the intermediate DTMC as shown in Figure 5.5 and then reduces 
all intermediate states, namely the initial state I', the success state S' and 
the failure states F 'k . As a result, the state Z and all intermediate states are 
completely removed from the surrounding DTMC, which still conforms to 
its generic structure. Listing 5.3 shows the corresponding procedure. 
With the basic transformation operations in place, the transformation al-
gorithm can be described as following a hierarchical DTMC creation pat-
tern, which is outlined by Figure 5.6. As the ﬁgure shows, DTMC creation 
takes place at multiple levels within a hierarchy. At the top level, the trans-
formation considers the possible hardware states of the system. All other 
levels are devoted to the evaluation of user and system behaviour. The 
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1 / / DTMC: c o n s i d e r e d DTMC
2 / / Z : i n n e r s t a t e o f c o n s i d e r e d DTMC
3 / / DTMC_inter : i n t e r m e d i a t e DTMC
4
5 s u b s t i t u t e (DTMC, Z , DTMC_inter ) {
6 X := g e t S e t O f P r e d e c e s s o r S t a t e s (DTMC, Z ) ;
7 Y := g e t S e t O f S u c c e s s o r S t a t e s (DTMC, Z ) ;
8 n := getNumberOfElements (X ) ;
9 m := ge tNumberOfElements (Y ) ;
10 F := g e t S e t O f F a i l u r e S t a t e s (DTMC) ; 
11 n_f := getNumberOfElements ( F ) ; 
12 I _ i n t e r := g e t I n i t i a l S t a t e ( DTMC_inter ) ; 
13 S _ i n t e r := g e t S u c c e s s S t a t e ( DTMC_inter ) ; 
14 F _ i n t e r := g e t S e t O f F a i l u r e S t a t e s ( DTMC_inter ) ; 
15 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= n ; i ++) { 
16 p _ i := g e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y (DTMC, X( i ) , Z ) ; 
17 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, X( i ) , I _ i n t e r , p _ i ) ; 
18 d e l e t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, X( i ) , Z ) ; 
19 } 
20 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
21 q _ j := g e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y (DTMC, Z , Y( j ) ) ; 
22 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, S _ i n t e r , Y( j ) , q _ j ) ; 
23 d e l e t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, Z , Y( j ) ) ; 
24 } 
25 f o r ( k = 1 ; k <= n_f ; k ++) { 
26 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, F _ i n t e r ( k ) , F ( k ) , 1 ) ; 
27 } 
28 d e l e t e N o d e (DTMC, Z ) ; 
29 } 
Listing 5.2: State Substitution Procedure 
1 / / DTMC: c o n s i d e r e d DTMC
2 / / Z : i n n e r s t a t e o f c o n s i d e r e d DTMC
3 / / DTMC_inter : i n t e r m e d i a t e DTMC
4
5 r e s o l v e (DTMC, Z , DTMC_inter ) {
6 I _ i n t e r := g e t I n i t i a l S t a t e ( DTMC_inter ) ;
7 S _ i n t e r := g e t S u c c e s s S t a t e ( DTMC_inter ) ;
8 F _ i n t e r := g e t S e t O f F a i l u r e S t a t e s ( DTMC_inter ) ;
9 n := getNumberOfElements ( F _ i n t e r ) ;
10 s u b s t i t u t e (DTMC, Z , DTMC_inter ) ;
11 r e d u c e (DTMC, I _ i n t e r ) ;
12 r e d u c e (DTMC, S _ i n t e r ) ;
13 f o r ( k = 1 ; k <= n ; k ++) {
14 r e d u c e (DTMC, F _ i n t e r ( k ) ) ;
15 }
16 }
Listing 5.3: State Resolution Procedure 
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Figure 5.6: Hierarchical DTMC Creation Pattern 
DTMC creation procedures at all levels are similar in that they include 
two generic steps: 
1. DTMC Initialization: At level l, an initial generic DT MCl is cre-
ated that reﬂects a certain aspect of the original PCM-REL instance. 
DT MCl contains a set of inner states S := {S1, . . . ,Sn} that aggregate 
other aspects and need to be resolved. 
2. Repeated State Resolution: For each Si, the transformation creates a 
corresponding lower-level DT MCl+1(i), converts it to its basic struc-
ture and resolves Si with DT MCl+1(i). After all Si have been re-
solved, DT MCl conforms to the basic structure. 
At the lowest level of the DTMC creation hierarchy, DTMCs are initialized 
directly with a basic structure (which means that S = /0). Hence, there is no 
need for further state resolution. The overall result of the transformation 
is the top-level DTMC, converted to its basic structure. The alternative 
transformation with Markov state reductions switched off (as introduced 
in Section 5.1.1) is equal to the one described here, apart from the fact 
that only state substitutions are done instead of state resolutions. With this 
alternative, the transformation results in a top-level DTMC that explicitly 
incorporates all lower-level DTMCs and reﬂects the whole original PCM-
REL instance at once. 
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The following Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss the transformation algorithm 
in detail. The description refers to a transformation with state reduction 
switched on. However, the alternative transformation can be directly de-
duced from this description by replacing all state resolution operations in 
the provided listings with state substitutions. 
5.2 Hardware States Evaluation 
A major distinguishing feature of PCM-REL compared to related approach-
es is the explicit consideration of hardware failure potentials and their im-
pact on the system’s reliability (see Section 4.4). In PCM-REL, these fail-
ure potentials are associated with individual hardware resources such as 
CPUs and hard disks, and they are annotated to these resources in terms 
of MTTF and MTTR values. An unavailable hardware resource in an IT 
system causes hardware-induced FOD occurrences whenever the service 
execution tries to access the resource (see Section 3.1). By the principles 
of FOD propagation, a system-level FOD occurrence may be the ultimate 
consequence of the unsuccessful resource request (see Section 4.1). Hence, 
unavailable hardware resources impact the system’s reliability and are con-
sidered as a possible source of failure by PCM-REL’s Markov analysis. 
In the following, the consideration of a system’s hardware failure poten-
tial by the Markov transformation is discussed in detail. To this end, Sec-
tion 5.2.1 introduces system hardware states as combinations of individual 
resource availability states. The following Sections 5.2.2 to 5.2.4 discuss 
different alternatives of how the Markov transformation can account for the 
different possible hardware states of a system under study. 
5.2.1 System Hardware States 
The consideration of hardware failure potentials constitutes a challenge for 
the PCM-REL Markov analysis. On the one hand, the approach generally 
expresses failure potentials through failure probabilities, thereby abstract-
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ing from the system’s state and its progression over time. On the other hand, 
the typical hardware failure model introduced in Section 2.2 is a stateful 
one. At each point in system execution time t > 0, each hardware resource 
r in the system is in one out of two resource availability states OK and NA 
(not available). The probability of a request to r at time t being success-
ful depends on the whole state progression history of r since the system’s 
start at t0 = 0 and is a function of the initial state of r at t0 and its TTF and 
TTR distributions. To derive a more generic expression of r’s failure poten-
tial, the Markov transformation condenses the speciﬁed MTTF and MTTR 
values of r to its steady-state availability (as introduced below), and it uses 
this value as the probability that r is available when requested at an arbitrary 
point in time. While this strategy may seem to be a strong simpliﬁcation in 
the light of the potentially complex TTF and TTR distributions of r, it helps 
to keep the complexity of the analysis within feasible bounds. Furthermore, 
it releases the modeller from the burden of specifying complete TTF and 
TTR distributions for each hardware resource. 
The following describes how the Markov transformation expresses the 
possible hardware states of the system and calculates their occurrence prob-
abilities. Let R := {r1, . . . ,rn} denote the set of resources in the system, and 
let S(t) := {s1(t), . . . ,sm(t)} denote all possible system hardware states at 
time t > 0, where each s j(t) ∈ S(t) is a unique combination of possible 
states of all n resources at time t: 
s j(t) := (s j(r1, t), . . . ,s j(rn, t)) ∈ {OK,NA}n 
∀t > 0, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (5.1) 
Furthermore, let MT T Fi and MT T Ri be the given reliability annotations 
of resource ri. The steady-state availability Av(ri) of resource ri is cal-
culated as follows: 
MT T FiAv(ri) := ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} (5.2)MT T Fi +MT T Ri 
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In compliance with the hardware failure model presented in Section 2.2, 
Av(ri) denotes the expected fraction of time in which ri is in the state OK. 
PCM-REL interprets Av(ri) as the probability that resource ri, requested at 
an arbitrary point in time during system execution, is available and can 
serve the request: 
P(s(ri, t) = OK) = Av(ri), P(s(ri, t) = NA) = 1 −Av(ri)
∀t > 0, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} (5.3) 
where s(ri, t) denotes the state of resource ri at time t. From the state proba-
bilities of the individual resources, the probability of each system hardware 
state can be deduced: 
n 
P(s j(t)) =∏P(s(ri, t) = s j(ri, t)) ∀t > 0, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (5.4) 
i=1 
This calculation assumes that the state distributions of the individual re-
sources are independent, which means that resources fail and are repaired 
independently. Because of the time-independent evaluation of resource 
state probabilities, P(s j(t)) constitutes a constant value P(s j) := P(s j(t)), 
regardless of the time t. 
5.2.2 Standard Evaluation 
The Markov transformation offers multiple alternatives to account for the 
possible hardware states of the system under study, as suggested by the 
conﬁguration option “System Hardware States Handling” in Figure 5.1. 
In the standard case, the hardware states consideration is situated at the 
highest level of the DTMC creation hierarchy (see Figure 5.6). The trans-
formation initializes a top-level DT MCtop(Ui) for each PCM-REL usage 
scenario Ui as shown in Figure 5.7, which conforms to the generic struc-
ture (Figure 5.3a). Starting from the initial state I(Ui), transitions lead to 
a set of states {E(Ui,s1), . . . ,E(Ui,sm)}, where each E(Ui,s j) represents 
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Figure 5.7: Standard Evaluation of System Hardware States 
1 / / U_i : c o n s i d e r e d usage s c e n a r i o
2 / / R : s e t o f hardware r e s o u r c e s
3 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
4 / / r e t u r n s : top − l e v e l DTMC w i t h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e
5 / / f o r t h e c o n s i d e r e d usage s c e n a r i o
6
7 e v a l u a t e S c e n a r i o ( U_i , R , F ) {
8 S := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e s (R ) ;
9 P := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e P r o b a b i l i t i e s (R ) ;
10 DTMC_top_i := initTopLevelDTMC ( U_i , S , P , F ) ; 
11 m := S . ge tNumberOfElements ( ) ; 
12 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
13 DTMC_scen_ij := e v a l u a t e S c e n a r i o E x e c u t i o n ( U_i , F , S ( j ) ) ; 
14 E _ i j := g e t S c e n a r i o E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_top_i , S ( j ) ) ; 
15 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_top_i , E_ i j , DTMC_scen_ij ) ; 
16 } 
17 re turn DTMC_top_i ; 
18 } 
Listing 5.4: System Hardware States Evaluation Procedure (Standard) 
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the scenario execution under the precondition of the system hardware state 
being equal to s j. The transition probabilities are the occurrence probabil-
ities P(s j) of each hardware state. From each E(Ui,s j), a transition to the 
success state S(Ui) is initialized with probability 1. Transitions to the fail-
ure states are initially set to probability 0. During the transformation, an 
intermediate DT MCscen(Ui,s j) is created for the scenario execution under 
each hardware state s j (as described in Section 5.3), and each E(Ui,s j) is 
resolved accordingly. The resulting DTMC conforms to the basic structure, 
directly showing the success and failure mode probabilities of scenario Ui 
(Figure 5.7). Hence, direct solving as discussed in Section 5.1.1 can be ap-
plied to retrieve the wanted Markov analysis results (Table 5.2). Listing 5.4 
depicts the corresponding procedure. 
Numerically, the overall success probability P(Success|Ui) of scenario Ui 
can be derived from the success probabilities P(Success|Ui,s j) of Ui under 
the precondition of the hardware state s j: 
m 
P(Success|Ui) = ∑ (P(Success|Ui,s j)×P(s j)) (5.5) 
j=1 
Similarly, the probabilities of each failure mode Fk resulting from the ex-
ecution of Ui are: 
m 
P(Fk|Ui) = ∑ (P(Fk|Ui,s j)×P(s j)) (5.6) 
j=1 
The described standard evaluation of system hardware states has two fun-
damental consequences. First, the evaluation assumes that the hardware 
resources do not change their availability states during the scenario execu-
tion; each resource keeps the state it has when the execution begins. Being 
in line with the time-independent evaluation of state occurrence probabil-
ities (see Section 5.2.1), this assumption allows for abstracting from the 
duration of the scenario execution itself or individual actions within the ex-
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ecution, as well as the concrete TTF and TTR distributions of the involved 
hardware resources. The assumption is feasible based on the observation 
that typical TTF and TTR values are signiﬁcantly longer than a single sce-
nario execution. The former are in the range of years (for TTF) or hours 
and days (for TTR), the latter mostly in the range of seconds or minutes. 
Hence, most scenario executions will not experience a changing system 
hardware state. 
As a second consequence, the evaluation needs to explicitly consider 
each possible system hardware state and evaluate the scenario execution un-
der this state. Hence, the evaluation exhibits exponential complexity with 
respect to the number of hardware resources in the system – for n hardware 
resources, there are m = 2n system hardware states to consider, as each re-
source can take one out of two possible availability states OK and NA. As 
this issue constitutes the most severe limitation to the scalability of the ap-
proach, PCM-REL takes several measures to tackle it. First, the approach 
provides an efﬁcient evaluation of the scenario execution under each indi-
vidual state (Section 5.3). Second, the user-selected evaluation levels allow 
for speeding up the analysis if the required level of detail of the analysis 
results is low (Section 5.1.1). Third, the transformation offers two further 
alternatives for the consideration of system hardware states (Sections 5.2.3 
and 5.2.4). Each of these alternatives is signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient than the 
standard evaluation, on the cost of prediction accuracy. 
5.2.3 Single-State Evaluation 
The single-state evaluation constitutes an alternative way to consider a 
system’s hardware failure potential, compared to the standard evaluation 
(see Section 5.2.2). Without distinguishing different system hardware 
states at the top-level, the transformation creates a DT MCtop(Ui) with 
only one generic Markov state E(Ui) representing the execution of the 
scenario Ui. Correspondingly, a single intermediate DT MCscen(Ui) repre-
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Figure 5.8: Single-State Evaluation of System Hardware States 
1 / / U_i : c o n s i d e r e d usage s c e n a r i o
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
3 / / r e t u r n s : top − l e v e l DTMC w i t h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e
4 / / f o r t h e c o n s i d e r e d usage s c e n a r i o
5
6 e v a l u a t e S c e n a r i o ( U_i , F ) {
7 DTMC_top_i := i n i t S i n g l e S t a t e T o p L e v e l D T M C ( U_i , F ) ;
8 DTMC_scen := e v a l u a t e S c e n a r i o E x e c u t i o n ( U_i , F ) ;
9 E_i := g e t S c e n a r i o E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_top_i ) ;
10 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_top_i , E_i , DTMC_scen ) ;
11 re turn DTMC_top_i ;
12 }
Listing 5.5: System Hardware States Evaluation Procedure (Single-State) 
sents the scenario execution. The consideration of hardware failure po-
tentials is effectively delayed to the processing of the InternalActions
that request the hardware resources (see Section 5.3.7), as well as the 
ExternalCallActions and EntryLevelSystemCalls pointing to po-
tentially non-operational ResourceContainers (Section 5.3.6). List-
ing 5.5 shows the adapted procedure. 
With respect to the numerical solution, no summation across individual 
hardware states as shown in equations 5.5 and 5.6 is necessary. Instead, the 
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results follow directly from the intermediate DT MCscen(Ui): 
P(Success|Ui) = P '(Success|Ui) (5.7) 
P(Fk|Ui) = P '(Fk|Ui) (5.8) 
The single-state evaluation is highly efﬁcient because the scenario execu-
tion is evaluated only once, rather than repeatedly for all possible system 
hardware states. Although the effort for evaluating pointer and compu-
tation actions slightly increases compared to the standard evaluation (see 
Sections 5.3.6 and 5.3.7), this additional overhead is small compared to the 
savings at the top-level DTMC. On the other hand, the single-state evalu-
ation may exhibit poor prediction accuracy. Although it does not assume 
ﬁxed resource availability states during the scenario execution (as assumed 
by the standard evaluation), it introduces a signiﬁcantly harder assumption 
by ignoring the stochastic dependencies between subsequent accesses to 
the same resource. Each access to a resource r is evaluated independently 
from earlier accesses to r within the same scenario execution. To further 
illustrate the consequences of this assumption by an example, let P be a 
PCM-REL instance and U a speciﬁed usage scenario of P. Let r be a hard-
ware resource that is requested exactly n ≥ 1 times during the execution of 
U . Let Fk be the failure mode expressing a FOD occurrence due to r being 
unavailable. Furthermore, let the unavailability of r be the only potential 
source of failure (meaning that the execution of U is either successful or 
results in failure mode Fk), and let there be no recovery actions speciﬁed 
in P (Section 5.3.8). Denoting the probabilities of FOD occurrences ac-
cording to the standard and single-state evaluation by Pstandard (Fk|U) and 
Psingle(Fk|U), the following relationship holds: 
Pstandard (Fk|U) = 1 −Av(r)≤ 1 −Av(r)n = Psingle(Fk|U) (5.9) 
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In the standard evaluation variant, the decision about the availability of r 
is made once, at the beginning of the execution. The probability of r be-
ing available (which is equal to Av(r) according to Equation 5.3) directly 
decides about success or failure of the execution. In contrast, the single-
state evaluation decides about the availability of r independently for each 
request. Accordingly, there are n chances for r to be unavailable, leading to 
a higher overall failure mode probability. Based on the observation that the 
standard evaluation of system hardware states is fairly accurate (as shown 
for the audio hosting case study, see Section 6.4), the single-state evalu-
ation exhibits a potentially high over-estimation of the system’s hardware 
failure potential. This is also true if P includes other sources of failure and 
recovery actions, which makes the calculation signiﬁcantly more complex. 
Hence, the applicability of the single-state evaluation remains limited to 
cases with few resource requests during service execution only, or to cases 
where the hardware failure potential turns out to be very low, without sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence on architectural decisions. 
5.2.4 Approximated Evaluation 
In addition to the single-state evaluation (Section 5.2.3), the Markov trans-
formation provides another means to ﬁght the exponential complexity of 
the standard evaluation (Section 5.2.2), namely the approximated evalua-
tion. This evaluation method generally provides a very good trade-off be-
tween analysis effort and prediction accuracy. The analysis effort is at most 
as high as that of the standard evaluation. The PCM-REL user can specify 
stop conditions to freely conﬁgure the analysis towards being faster or more 
accurate. Using these stop conditions, the user can force the approximated 
evaluation to deliver a result arbitrarily close to that of the standard evalua-
tion. Due to these characteristics, the approximated evaluation is generally 
the preferred choice if the number of modelled hardware resources in a 
PCM-REL instance is too high to perform a standard evaluation. 
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The approximated evaluation takes advantage of two general aspects of the 
Markov transformation. First, the standard evaluation procedure of sys-
tem hardware states as shown in Listing 5.4 is incremental through its for
loop. An increasing amount of information is available with each executed 
increment, even though the procedure is not yet ﬁnished. Second, a normal 
hardware resource r can be assumed to be available with high probability: 
0 « Av(r)≈ 1. The following discusses the details of the approximation. 
In its initial form, the DT MCtop(Ui) created for the standard evalua-
tion (Figure 5.7) has a success probability of 1. With each increment 
j of Listing 5.4, the failure potential of hardware state s j(t) is added to 
DT MCtop(Ui), thereby reducing its resulting success probability. After 
x ∈ {1, . . . ,m} increments, the failure potential of states s1(t) to sx(t) has 
been subtracted from the original success probability 1, weighted by their 
occurrence probabilities P(s j). The result is an upper bound of the over-
all P(Success|Ui): 
x n 
P(Success|Ui)≤ Bx := 1 −∑ (∑
j=1 k=1 
P(Fk|Ui,s j)×P(s j))
m x 
∑ P(s j)−∑ ((1 −P(Success|Ui,s j))×P(s j))=
j=1 j=1 
x x 
∑ ∑(P(Success|Ui,s j)×P(s j))+1 − P(s j)=
j=1 j=1 
(5.10) 
On the other hand, P(Success|Ui) is at least as high as the success prob-
abilities of s1(t) to sx(t), again weighted by their occurrence probabilities 
(see also Equation 5.5): 
x 
P(Success|Ui)≥ Ax := ∑
j=1 
(P(Success|Ui,s j)×P(s j)) (5.11) 
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Together, both equations yield P(Success|Ui) ∈ [Ax,Bx] ∀x ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
with Ax and Bx being calculated from the well-known P(s j) and the already 
evaluated P(Success|Ui,s1) to P(Success|Ui,sx). Hence, P(Success|Ui) can 
be approximated through [Ax,Bx] after x increments with a maximal inac-
curacy Ix depending only on the state occurrence probabilities P(s j) and 
decreasing with each calculated increment: 
x 
Ix := Bx −Ax = 1 −∑ P(s j) (5.12) 
j=1 
The failure probabilities P(Fk|Ui) can be approximated in the same way: 
x x 
P(Fk|Ui)≤ ∑
j=1 
(P(Fk|Ui,s j)×P(s j))+1 −∑ P(s j) (5.13) 
j=1 
x 
P(Fk|Ui)≥ ∑
j=1 
(P(Fk|Ui,s j)×P(s j)) (5.14) 
With these results, it is not necessary to calculate all increments of List-
ing 5.4. Instead, stop criteria such as a minimal required accuracy, a max-
imal evaluation time or a maximal number of increments can be deﬁned. 
Then, the Markov evaluation approximates P(Success|Ui) and P(Fk|Ui) ac-
cordingly. 
The proposed approximation strategy is only effective if the order of sys-
tem hardware states s j(t) to evaluate is well-chosen, so that the remaining 
inaccuracy Ix is reduced as fast as possible. Ideally, the states should be 
sorted according to their occurrence probabilities P(s j), and the state with 
the highest occurrence probability should be evaluated ﬁrst. However, this 
sorting would already imply evaluating P(s j) for all m = 2n states, and 
the sorting algorithm would have exponential complexity O(m logm) =
O(n · 2n) with respect to the number n of resources in the system. In-
stead, the Markov transformation follows a heuristic that generally eval-
uates probable states ﬁrst, based on the known availabilities Av(ri) of the 
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individual resources. To this end, a dominant availability state D(ri) is 
deﬁned for each resource ri as follows:  
OK i f Av(ri)≥ 0.5D(ri) := (5.15)
NA i f Av(ri)< 0.5 
Let p(i, t) := P(s(ri, t) = D(ri)) be the probability that ri is in its domi-
nant availability state at time t. Because of the timeless availability eval-
uation (see Section 5.2.1), p(i, t) is constant over time and can be ab-
breviated as p(i) := p(i, t). From the deﬁnition of D(ri), it follows that 
p(i)∈ [0.5,1] ∀i ∈{1, . . . ,n}. In most practical cases, we have D(ri)=OK 
and 0.5 « p(i)≈ 1. Next, let Num :=R×{OK,NA}→{0,1} be a function 
that maps resources and availability states to numerical values:  
0 i f s = D(ri)Num(ri,s) := (5.16)
1 i f �s = D(ri)
Then, the set of system hardware states S(t) can be partitioned into a set 
of n + 1 classes Ck(t) as follows:  
Ck(t) := s j(t) ∈ S(t)
     ∑n i=1 Num(ri,s j(ri, t)) = k ∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}
(5.17) 
Thus, each class Ck(t) comprises all system hardware states with k re-
sources being not in their dominant state. The classes are disjoint, and 
their union results in S(t). The number of elements in Ck(t) corresponds to 
the binomial coefﬁcient for selecting k out of n elements:   
n n! |Ck(t)|= = (5.18)k k!(n − k)! 
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With these deﬁnitions, the heuristic to evaluate probable system hardware 
states ﬁrst can be formulated as follows: 
1. Sort the set R of resources according to their dominant state proba-
bilities, namely ∀ri1 ,ri2 ∈ {r1, . . . ,rn} : i1 > i2 ⇒ p(i1)≥ p(i2). 
2. Evaluate each class Ck(t) separately, starting from C0(t) up to Cn(t). 
Within each class, prioritize the evaluation of resources with low in-
dices being not in their dominant states. In particular, the ﬁrst eval-
uated system hardware state of class Ck(t) is the one with resources 
r1 to rk being not in their dominant availability states; the last eval-
uation refers to rn−k+1 to rn being not in their dominant availability 
states. 
If D(ri) = OK for all resources ri, the heuristic can be reformulated as 
follows: First, sort all resources ri according to their availabilities Av(ri). 
Then, evaluate the classes from C0(t) up to Cn(t); in each class, let the 
resources with the lowest availabilities fail ﬁrst. Intuitively, this heuris-
tic evaluates probable system hardware states ﬁrst because states in higher 
classes are generally less likely to occur than states in lower classes, and 
because resources with low availabilities are more likely to be unavailable. 
Moreover, the heuristic avoids the exponential complexity for the sorting of 
the m = 2n states – it only sorts n resources with complexity O(n logn). 
The following example further illustrates how the discussed heuristic can 
improve the efﬁciency of the evaluation. Let Av(ri) = p ≥ 0.5 ∀ri ∈ R. 
Then, each system hardware state s j(t) of each class Ck(t) has an occur-
rence probability of P(s j) = (1 − p)k pn−k (see Equation 5.4). Furthermore, 
let fn,p : {0, . . . ,m}→ [0,1] be the function indicating the maximal remain-
ing inaccuracy of the approximation after x evaluation increments, depend-
ing on the number of resources n and their common availability p: 
1 i f x = 0 
fn,p(x) := (5.19)
Ix i f x > 0 
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Figure 5.9: Relationship Between Evaluation Increments and Inaccuracy 
Figure 5.9 shows the values from fn,p(0) to fn,p(100) for varying n and p. 
The function values are shown on a logarithmic scale from 1 to 10−6. The 
function progresses in segments, and each segment marks the full evalua-
tion of a certain class Ck(t). For example, for n = 10, the ﬁrst classes C0(t)
to C2(t) have 1, 10 and 45 elements. Hence, segment boundaries occur at 
x = 1, x = 11 and x = 56. Within each segment, the function progresses 
linearly (due to the logarithmic scale, the ﬁgure shows curve segments in-
stead of linear segments). For resources with high availability p = 0.9999, 
the approximation reaches a very low inaccuracy of 10−6 within the ﬁrst 
100 increments for systems with up to 20 modelled hardware resources. 
For p = 0.999, an inaccuracy of 10−4 or lower is reached, depending on 
n. For low or very low availabilities p = 0.99 and p = 0.9, the remaining 
inaccuracy may require more than 100 evaluation increments, at least for 
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systems with more than 5 (or 10) modelled resources. In the theoretical 
worst case p = 0.5, all states s j(t) ∈ S(t) have the same occurrence proba-
bility P(s j) = 1/m, and the application of the heuristic has no beneﬁt. 
1 / / U_i : c o n s i d e r e d usage s c e n a r i o
2 / / R : s e t o f hardware r e s o u r c e s
3 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
4 / / C: s e t o f s t o p c o n d i t i o n s
5 / / r e t u r n s : e v a l u a t i o n r e s u l t f o r t h e c o n s i d e r e d
6 / / usage s c e n a r i o
7
8 e v a l u a t e S c e n a r i o ( U_i , R , F , C) { 
9 r e s u l t := i n i t E v a l u a t i o n R e s u l t ( F ) ; 
10 i t e r a t o r := c r e a t e H a r d w a r e S t a t e I t e r a t o r (R ) ; 
11 whi le ( ( h a s M o re H a r d w a r e S t a t e s ( i t e r a t o r ) == t rue ) && 
12 ( i s S t o p C o n d i t i o n R e a c h e d (C , i t e r a t o r , r e s u l t ) == f a l s e ) ) { 
13 S := g e t N e x t H a r d w a r e S t a t e ( i t e r a t o r ) ; 
14 P := g e t H a r d w a r e S t a t e P r o b a b i l i t y ( S ) ; 
15 DTMC_scen_ij := e v a l u a t e S c e n a r i o E x e c u t i o n ( U_i , F , S ) ; 
16 u p d a t e E v a l u a t i o n R e s u l t ( r e s u l t , DTMC_scen_ij , P ) ; 
17 } 
18 re turn r e s u l t ; 
19 } 
Listing 5.6: System Hardware States Evaluation Procedure (Approximated) 
Listing 5.6 shows the procedure to evaluate a usage scenario through the 
approximation method. With this method, the resulting success and failure 
mode probabilities are approximation intervals rather than single values. 
Hence, the return value of the procedure cannot be a single basic Markov 
chain. Instead, the procedure returns a data structure EvaluationResult, 
which contains the cumulated occurrence probability of all evaluated sys-
tem hardware states P(s1) + · · ·+P(sx), as well as the lower bounds for 
success and failure, calculated as shown in Equations 5.11 and 5.14. With 
these data, it is possible to also determine the upper bounds (Equations 5.10 
and 5.13) and the remaining maximal inaccuracy (Equation 5.12). The 
logic to select states for evaluation according to the described heuris-
tic is encoded into the call getNextHardwareState, which relies on a 
HardwareStateIterator data structure capturing information about the 
states visited so far. Additionally, a set of stop conditions (such as a sat-
isfying upper bound for the inaccuracy) is given as an input to the pro-
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cedure, and the call isStopConditionReached performs a correspond-
ing test after each increment. As with the standard evaluation procedure 
(Listing 5.4), each increment requires creating and evaluating an interme-
diate DT MCscen(Ui,s j). However, this DTMC is not used to resolve an-
other Markov state, but as an input for the updateEvaluationResult
call. The call includes a straightforward calculation adding the occur-
rence probability of the currently evaluated hardware state, as well as its 
success and failure probabilities, to the existing cumulated values of the 
EvaluationResult. In general, this procedure substantially improves 
the scalability of the approach compared to the standard evaluation (Sec-
tion 5.2.2). 
5.3 Compact Behavioural Evaluation 
This section discusses how the Markov transformation accounts for the fail-
ure potential that arises from the execution of a speciﬁed PCM-REL usage 
scenario. The provided analysis is very comprehensive considering system-
internal as well as system-external failure potentials related to software, 
hardware or network that may lead to FOD occurrences during the scenario 
execution. The DTMCs generated by the transformation reﬂect the inter-
component and intra-component control and data ﬂow including its poten-
tial points of failure (PPOF) and points of recovery (POR, see Table 4.1). 
Such a level of detail comes at a cost – the resulting DTMCs are potentially 
large, and the transformation procedures to generate them may be very 
time-consuming. Moreover, it may be necessary to repeat the behavioural 
evaluation multiple times during the transformation, if the consideration 
of system hardware states follows the standard evaluation method (Sec-
tion 5.2.2) or the approximated evaluation method (Section 5.2.4). There-
fore, a special focus lies on a compact behavioural evaluation, realized 
through a time- and space-efﬁcient transformation algorithm. 
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In the following, Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 introduce the general pattern of 
the behavioural evaluation being aligned to the action sequences of the con-
sidered PCM-REL usage scenario and the contained action types. After-
wards, Sections 5.3.3 to 5.3.8 discuss the evaluation of the different action 
types, along with the measures taken for compactness and the accompa-
nying assumptions. 
5.3.1 Action Sequences 
The behavioural evaluation of a PCM-REL usage scenario execution is 
triggered as part of the top-level DTMC creation procedure through the 
evaluateScenarioExecution call in Listings 5.4, 5.5 or 5.6 (depend-
ing on the evaluation of system hardware states). The evaluation is itself 
hierarchical and comprises the second and all further DTMC creation lev-
els as shown in Figure 5.6. It proceeds along the action sequences of 
the behavioural view that unfolds from the speciﬁed usage scenario (see 
Section 4.1). The evaluation is carried out in a time- and space-efﬁcient 
way. Time efﬁciency is achieved because each action sequence in the be-
havioural view is evaluated exactly once (more precisely, each action se-
quence occurrence is evaluated exactly once – there may be multiple oc-
currences of a speciﬁed action sequence in the behavioural view). Where a 
repeated evaluation of any part of the behavioural view would be necessary 
in order to reﬂect different possible preconditions or execution iterations, 
the Markov transformation makes corresponding assumptions to avoid the 
repeated evaluation. Space efﬁciency is achieved through the hierarchical 
DTMC creation as discussed in Section 5.1.3, which includes Markov state 
reduction operations on the ﬂy. Thanks to these operations, the DTMCs 
are never hold in memory as a whole. Instead, created DTMCs at each 
level are reduced to their most basic form before being incorporated into 
the next-higher level DTMCs. 
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The Markov transformation algorithm traverses the behavioural view by 
processing all of its action sequences AS = {AS1, . . . ,ASn} hierarchically, 
such that the evaluation of each sequence includes evaluating all nested se-
quences. Referring to the behavioural view depicted in Figure 4.1, evaluat-
ing the topmost “BatchRequestBehaviour” includes the evaluation of the 
“WebFrontend.Login” ResourceDemandingSEFF (and all its nested se-
quences), followed by the “CaseBatchUpload” and “CaseBatchDownload” 
ScenarioBehaviours, as well as the “WebFrontend.Logout” Resource-
DemandingSEFF. Evaluating “CaseBatchDownload” includes “WebFron-
tend.DownloadCollection”, which in turn includes “AudioManagement.-
RetrieveFiles”, and so on. Each visited action sequence belongs either to 
a speciﬁed ScenarioBehaviour specifying user actions or a Resource-
DemandingBehaviour (with the ResourceDemandingSEFF as its special 
case) specifying system actions in the PCM-REL instance. 
I(ASi)
F1(ASi) Fn(ASi)S(ASi)
1
1 (0) (0)
Pij(Success)
Pij(F1)
Pij(Fn)
I(ASi)
F1(ASi) Fn(ASi)S(ASi)
Pi(Success) Pi(F1) Pi(Fn)
A1)
E(ASi,
(ASi,Aj)
F1
DTMCseq(ASi)
DTMCact(ASi,Aj)
(ASi,Aj)
S
(ASi,Aj)
Fn
(ASi,Aj)
I
11
Am)
E(ASi,
Figure 5.10: Evaluation of Action Sequences 
To evaluate an action sequence ASi with m actions, the Markov transfor-
mation creates an intermediate DT MCseq(ASi) as shown in Figure 5.10, 
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1 / / AS_i : c o n s i d e r e d a c t i o n s e q u e n c e 
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes 
3 / / s : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e ( o p t i o n a l parameter , 
4 / / n o t used f o r s i n g l e −s t a t e e v a l u a t i o n ) 
5 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e c o n s i d e r e d a c t i o n s e q u e n c e 
6 
7 e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_i , F , s ) {
8 DTMC_seq_i := in i tAct ionSequenceDTMC ( AS_i , F ) ;
9 m := ge tNumberOfAct ions ( AS_i ) ;
10 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
11 A_j := g e t A c t i o n ( AS_i , j ) ; 
12 E _ i j : = g e t A c t i o n E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_seq_i , A_j ) ; 
13 DTMC_act_ij : = e v a l u a t e A c t i o n ( A_j , F , s ) ; 
14 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_seq_i , E _ i j , DTMC_act_ij ) ; 
15 }
16 re turn DTMC_seq_i ;
17 }
Listing 5.7: Action Sequence Evaluation Procedure 
1 / / U_i : c o n s i d e r e d usage s c e n a r i o 
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes 
3 / / s : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e ( o p t i o n a l parameter , 
4 / / n o t used f o r s i n g l e −s t a t e e v a l u a t i o n ) 
5 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e 
6 / / c o n s i d e r e d usage s c e n a r i o 
7 
8 e v a l u a t e S c e n a r i o E x e c u t i o n ( U_i , F , s ) { 
9 AS_top := ge tTopmos tAc t ionSequence ( U_i ) ; 
10 DTMC_seq_top := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_top , F , s ) ; 
11 re turn DTMC_seq_top ; 
12 } 
Listing 5.8: Scenario Execution Evaluation Procedure 
where each action of the sequence (speciﬁed through a subclass of Ab-
stractAction in the PCM-REL instance) is represented by a correspond-
ing state E(ASi,A j). Transitions starting from the initial I(ASi) across the 
E(ASi,A j) with probabilities 1 express the sequential control ﬂow through 
the actions of the behaviour; the last transition leads from E(ASi,Am) to 
S(ASi). For each action, the transformation creates a DT MCact (ASi,A j)
and resolves the state E(ASi,A j) accordingly, eventually transforming the 
DT MCseq(ASi) to its basic structure. Listing 5.7 shows the action sequence 
evaluation procedure. 
For the topmost action sequence (which is the “BatchRequestBehaviour” 
in the example of Figure 4.1), the result can be used to resolve the corre-
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sponding scenario execution state in the top-level DT MCtop(Ui) (see Fig-
ures 5.7 and 5.8). Listing 5.8 depicts the relevant scenario evaluation pro-
cedure. 
Numerically, the success and failure mode probabilities of each action 
sequence can be determined as: 
m 
Pi(Success) =∏Pi j(Success) (5.20) 
j=1 
m l−1 
Pi(Fk) =∑(∏Pi j(Success)×Pil (Fk)) (5.21) 
l=1 j=1 
Equation 5.20 expresses the assumption that the whole action sequence ASi 
is only successful if each action A j is successfully executed. Equation 5.21 
evaluates the probability Pi(Fk) of failure mode Fk as the probability of Fk 
occurring in action Al after successful execution of the ﬁrst l − 1 actions, 
for l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. 
The evaluation of an action sequence ASi as conducted by the Markov 
transformation assumes that the ﬁrst failing action A j of ASi determines 
the failure mode Fk of the whole sequence. There is no chance that a suc-
cess or a second FOD occurring at a later action ‘overwrites’ Fk. Neither 
can multiple unhandled FOD occurrences add up to an ‘aggregated’ failure 
mode as the result of the sequence. Effectively, the transformation ignores 
cases where two or more unhandled FODs occur within a single action se-
quence. An explicit consideration of such cases would require extra effort 
in terms of modelling as well as analysis. Modellers would need to specify 
the inﬂuence of FOD occurrences on the subsequent control and data ﬂow 
(which may be arbitrary in theory), and the Markov transformation would 
need to evaluate individual actions (together with their associated subse-
quences) multiple times, to account for different preconditions in terms of 
already occurred FODs. Taken to the extreme, the transformation would 
need (n +1) j−1 evaluations of action A j in order to account for all possible 
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execution histories of actions A1 to A j−1 in the sequence, each with n + 1 
possible outcomes. Hence, the evaluation of each sequence would have 
exponential complexity with respect to the number of required evaluations 
of the contained actions. 
In contrast, the above-described assumption enables a compact evalua-
tion of an action sequence ASi, where each contained action A j is evaluated 
exactly once. The inaccuracy introduced by this assumption is generally 
low, provided that FOD occurrences are rare events and occur indepen-
dently from each other. As an example, consider an action sequence ASi 
with three actions A1, A2 and A3 which may fail independently, each with 
one speciﬁc FOD type F1, F2 and F3 and non-zero FOD probability. In the 
example, a FOD occurrence during the execution of any individual action 
does not prevent the subsequent actions from being executed. Hence, the 
probabilities of success and failure are: 
Pi(Success) = Pi1(Success)×Pi2(Success)×Pi3(Success) (5.22) 
Pi(Fk) = Pik(Fk)> 0 ∀k ∈ {1,2,3} (5.23) 
As multiple FODs of different types Fk may occur during the execution of 
the sequence, the individual outcomes of ASi are not mutually exclusive: 
3 
Pi(Success)+∑ Pi(Fk)> 1 (5.24) 
k=1 
Table 5.4 shows how the PCM-REL Markov analysis evaluates ASi. PCM-
REL distinguishes only four out of the eight possible execution results. 
In all cases, the approach considers the ﬁrst occurred FOD type as being 
the overall failure mode of ASi. For PCM-REL, all possible outcomes are 
mutually exclusive. Regarding prediction accuracy, the approach correctly 
evaluates Pi(Success) and Pi(F1), but introduces a numerical error when 
evaluating Pi(F2) and Pi(F3). However, if the probabilities of FOD occur-
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Execution Results PCM-REL Evaluation
A1 A2 A3 Result of ASi Occurrence Probability
Success Success Success Success Pi(Success) = Pi1(Success) x Pi2(Success) x Pi3(Success)
Success Success F3 F3 Pi (F3) = Pi1(Success) x Pi2(Success) x Pi3(F3)  Pi3(F3)
Success F2 Success
F2 Pi (F2) = Pi1(Success) x Pi2(F2)  Pi2(F2)
Success F2 F3
F1 Success Success
F1 Pi (F1) = Pi1(F1)
F1 Success F3
F1 F2 Success
F1 F2 F3
160 mm = 1.0
Table 5.4: Action Sequence Evaluation Example 
rences are small, then the introduced error is also small, as Pi1(Success)≈ 1 
and Pi2(Success) ≈ 1. 
5.3.2 Action Types 
Each action sequence (see Section 5.3.1) includes a set of individual ac-
tions, which belong to the corresponding PCM-REL ScenarioBehaviour
or ResourceDemandingBehaviour. The evaluation of the sequence in-
volves evaluating all of its actions (see Listing 5.7). The Markov trans-
formation distinguishes multiple action types and evaluates each action ac-
cording to its type. Table 5.5 shows the considered action types, as well 
as the mapping of PCM-REL actions to the action types. Branches, loops, 
forks and pointer actions specify the ﬂow of user behaviour and system 
execution in the failure-free case. Sections 5.3.3 to 5.3.6 discuss their 
evaluation. Computation actions represent all data processing and com-
putational steps in the system execution (see Section 5.3.7), and recovery 
actions specify the control ﬂow of the system execution when FODs oc-
cur (see Section 5.3.8). Default actions are all actions that do not exhibit 
an own potential for failure. This last category includes actions that de-
note the start and the end of behavioural speciﬁcations (namely, the Start, 
Stop, StartAction and StopAction), actions that inﬂuence the data 
ﬂow of the system execution (namely, the SetVariableAction), and ac-
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tions that are part of the PCM behavioural speciﬁcation language but do 
not impact system reliability (namely, the Delay, ReleaseAction, and 
AcquireAction). Listing 5.9 shows how each action in a sequence is 
evaluated according to its type. 
Action Type User Actions System Actions
Branch Branch BranchAction
Loop Loop LoopAction, CollectionIteratorAction
Fork --- ForkAction
Pointer EntryLevelSystemCall ExternalCallAction
Computation --- InternalAction
Recovery --- RecoveryBlockAction
Default Start, Stop, Delay StartAction, StopAction,
SetVariableAction, ReleaseAction,
AcquireAction
109 mm = 0.681
Table 5.5: Markov Action Types 
1 / / A : c o n s i d e r e d a c t i o n 
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes 
3 / / s : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e ( o p t i o n a l parameter , 
4 / / n o t used f o r s i n g l e −s t a t e e v a l u a t i o n ) 
5 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e 
6 / / c o n s i d e r e d a c t i o n 
7 
8 e v a l u a t e A c t i o n (A, F , s ) { 
9 t y p e := g e t A c t i o n T y p e (A ) ; 
10 i f ( t y p e == BRANCH) { 
11 re turn e v a l u a t e B r a n c h A c t i o n (A, F , s ) ; 
12 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == LOOP) { 
13 re turn e v a l u a t e L o o p A c t i o n (A, F , s ) ; 
14 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == FORK) { 
15 re turn e v a l u a t e F o r k A c t i o n (A, F , s ) ; 
16 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == POINTER ) { 
17 re turn e v a l u a t e P o i n t e r A c t i o n (A, F , s ) ; 
18 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == COMPUTATION) { 
19 re turn e v a l u a t e C o m p u t a t i o n A c t i o n (A, F , s ) ; 
20 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == RECOVERY) { 
21 re turn e v a l u a t e R e c o v e r y A c t i o n (A, F , s ) ; 
22 } e l s e { 
23 re turn e v a l u a t e D e f a u l t A c t i o n (A, F ) ; 
24 } 
Listing 5.9: Action Evaluation Procedure 
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Figure 5.11: Evaluation of Default Actions 
1 / / A_def : c o n s i d e r e d d e f a u l t a c t i o n 
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes 
3 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e 
4 / / c o n s i d e r e d d e f a u l t a c t i o n 
5 
6 e v a l u a t e D e f a u l t A c t i o n ( A_def , F ) {
7 DTMC_def := in i tDefau l tDTMC ( A_def , F ) ;
8 re turn DTMC_def ;
9 }
Listing 5.10: Default Action Evaluation Procedure 
For default actions, the evaluation is trivial, as shown in Figure 5.11. The 
corresponding DT MCde f is directly created in its basic form, and a transi-
tion from the start I to the success S with probability 1 indicates that the 
action never fails. Listing 5.10 shows the corresponding procedure. The 
success and failure mode probabilities of the default action execution are: 
Pde f ault (Success) = 1, Pde f ault (Fk) = 0 (5.25) 
5.3.3 Branch Actions 
A branch action Abranch is speciﬁed through a PCM-REL Branch (Sec-
tion 2.7.5) or BranchAction (Section 2.7.2). It contains a set of one ore 
more branch transitions T := {t1, . . . , tm}, where each transition ti has an oc-
currence probability P(ti) and an associated behaviour, expressed through 
an action sequence ASi (the dependency solver resolves any more complex 
conditional expressions for transitions in the original PCM-REL instance 
to simple probabilities, see Section 2.7.6). When executing Abranch, exactly 
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Figure 5.12: Evaluation of Branch Actions 
1 / / A_branch : c o n s i d e r e d branch a c t i o n
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
3 / / s : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e ( o p t i o n a l parameter ,
4 / / n o t used f o r s i n g l e −s t a t e e v a l u a t i o n )
5 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e
6 / / c o n s i d e r e d branch a c t i o n
7
8 e v a l u a t e B r a n c h A c t i o n ( A_branch , F , s ) { 
9 DTMC_branch := initBranchDTMC ( A_branch , F ) ; 
10 T := g e t S e t O f B r a n c h T r a n s i t i o n s ( A_branch ) ; 
11 m := ge tNumberOfElements ( T ) ; 
12 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= m; i ++) { 
13 AS_i := g e t A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( T ( i ) ) ; 
14 E_i := g e t A c t i o n S e q u e n c e E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_branch , AS_i ) ; 
15 DTMC_seq_i := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_i , F , s ) ; 
16 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_branch , E_i , DTMC_seq_i ) ; 
17 } 
18 re turn DTMC_branch ; 
19 } 
Listing 5.11: Branch Action Evaluation Procedure 
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one transition is taken; the transition probabilities sum up to 1: 
m 
∑P(ti) = 1 (5.26) 
i=1 
The Markov transformation evaluates branch actions as shown in Fig-
ure 5.12. Each branch transition ti and associated action sequence ASi is 
represented through a state E(ASi), and a Markov transition from the initial 
state I to E(ASi) with probability P(ti) denotes the possibility that ASi is 
executed. The transformation creates an intermediate DT MCseq(ASi) for 
each ASi and resolves each E(ASi) accordingly, as shown in Listing 5.11. 
Hence, each branch transition and associated action sequence is evaluated 
exactly once by the transformation. The success and failure mode probabil-
ities of Abranch can be determined as the weighted sum over each individual 
branch transition: 
m 
Pbranch(Success) =∑(Pi(Success) ·P(ti)) (5.27) 
i=1 
m 
Pbranch(Fk) =∑(Pi(Fk) ·P(ti)) (5.28) 
i=1 
5.3.4 Loop Actions 
Loop actions Aloop are speciﬁed through PCM-REL Loops (Section 2.7.5), 
LoopActions or CollectionIteratorActions (Section 2.7.2). A loop 
contains a body behaviour with a corresponding action sequence ASb, and 
– after resolving stochastic expressions and parameter dependencies (Sec-
tion 2.7.6) – a speciﬁcation of loop iteration counts C := {c1, . . . ,cm} ⊂ N
with occurrence probabilities P(ci) that sum up to 1: 
m 
∑P(ci) = 1 (5.29) 
i=1 
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Figure 5.13: Evaluation of Loop Actions 
1 / / A_loop : c o n s i d e r e d l oop a c t i o n 
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes 
3 / / s : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e ( o p t i o n a l parameter , 
4 / / n o t used f o r s i n g l e −s t a t e e v a l u a t i o n ) 
5 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e 
6 / / c o n s i d e r e d l oop a c t i o n 
7 
8 e v a l u a t e L o o p A c t i o n ( A_loop , F , s ) { 
9 DTMC_loop := initLoopDTMC ( A_loop , F ) ; 
10 C := g e t S e t O f L o o p I t e r a t i o n C o u n t s ( A_loop ) ; 
11 m := ge tNumberOfElements (C ) ; 
12 AS_b := ge tBodyAct ionSequence ( A_loop ) ; 
13 DTMC_seq_b := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_b , F , s ) ; 
14 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= m; i ++) { 
15 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= C( i ) ; j ++) { 
16 E _ i j := g e t B o d y E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_loop , i , j ) ; 
17 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_loop , E_ i j , DTMC_seq_b ) ; 
18 } 
19 } 
20 re turn DTMC_loop ; 
21 } 
Listing 5.12: Loop Action Evaluation Procedure 
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Each P(ci) expresses the probability that the loop body ASb is executed ci 
times before the control ﬂow moves on to the successor action of the loop. 
The Markov transformation must account for the failure potential of each 
individual execution of ASb, but evaluates ASb only once. As Figure 5.13 
shows, the initial DT MCloop structure reﬂects all possible iteration counts 
ci by a path leading from the initial state I to a sequence of states Ei(1)
to Ei(ci), where each Ei( j) reﬂects one execution of ASb. The transitions 
starting from I represent the different possible loop iteration counts and 
have the probabilities P(ci) attached. From the last body execution states 
Ei(ci), transitions lead to the success state S with probability 1. The trans-
formation generates an intermediate DT MCseq(ASb) and uses it to resolve 
all of the states Ei( j). Listing 5.12 shows the procedure. 
The success and failure mode probabilities of the loop action are: 
m 
Ploop(Success) =∑(Pb(Success)ci ·P(ci)) (5.30) 
i=1 
m ci 
Ploop(Fk) =∑((∑ Pb(Success) j−1 ·Pb(Fk)) ·P(ci)) (5.31) 
i=1 j=1 
These two equations express the probabilities that, for any loop iteration 
count ci, either all ci executions of the loop body ASb succeed (Equa-
tion 5.30), or that a FOD of type Fk occurs in any of the body executions 
(Equation 5.31). 
The evaluation of loop actions as described here is based on an assump-
tion similar to the evaluation of action sequences (see Section 5.3.1): the 
ﬁrst failing execution of the loop body ASb determines the overall failure 
mode Fk of the loop. This assumption is necessary to avoid the need for 
evaluating ASb multiple times accounting for all possible execution histo-
ries. See Section 5.3.1 for a more detailed discussion. Even though – thanks 
to the described assumption – the Markov transformation evaluates ASb 
only once, loop actions can still constitute a scalability issue for the anal-
ysis. The DT MCloop which needs to be constructed during the evaluation 
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procedure contains a potentially large number of c1 + ...+cm inner Markov 
states, corresponding to the speciﬁed loop iteration counts ci. However, 
most modelled loop actions have only a small number of iteration counts, 
as PCM-REL speciﬁes control ﬂow on a high abstraction level. 
5.3.5 Fork Actions 
A fork action A f ork, speciﬁed by a PCM-REL ForkAction (see Sec-
tion 2.7.2), denotes the parallel execution of m forked behaviours with 
corresponding action sequences AS1 to ASm. After the execution of all 
ASi has started, the control ﬂow either moves on to the successor ac-
tion of A f ork immediately, or it waits until the completion of all ASi, if 
a SynchronizationPoint has been speciﬁed. The Markov transforma-
tion abstracts from the involved parallelism and instead evaluates the ASi as 
if they were executed sequentially. Figure 5.14 shows the DT MCf ork struc-
ture initialized with m states E(ASi) representing the execution of each 
ASi, starting from the initial I and ﬁnally reaching the success state S. 
An intermediate DT MCseq(ASi) evaluates each individual sequence and is 
used to resolve the corresponding E(ASi). Hence, the Markov transforma-
tion evaluates each forked behaviour exactly once. Listing 5.13 shows 
the procedure. 
The execution of A f ork is successful if all ASi complete without a FOD 
occurrence. In contrast, a FOD Fk of A f ork is the result of Fk occurring 
within any of the forked behaviours ASi, leading to the following success 
and failure mode probabilities of A f ork: 
m 
Pf ork(Success) =∏Pi(Success) (5.32) 
i=1 
m i−1 
Pf ork(Fk) =∑(∏Pj(Success)×Pi(Fk)) (5.33) 
i=1 j=1 
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Figure 5.14: Evaluation of Fork Actions 
1 / / A_ fo rk : c o n s i d e r e d f o r k a c t i o n
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
3 / / s : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e ( o p t i o n a l parameter ,
4 / / n o t used f o r s i n g l e −s t a t e e v a l u a t i o n )
5 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e
6 / / c o n s i d e r e d f o r k a c t i o n
7
8 e v a l u a t e F o r k A c t i o n ( A_fork , F , s ) { 
9 DTMC_fork := initForkDTMC ( A_fork , F ) ; 
10 B := g e t S e t O f F o r k e d B e h a v i o u r s ( A_fork ) ; 
11 m := ge tNumberOfElements (B ) ; 
12 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= m; i ++) { 
13 AS_i := g e t A c t i o n S e q u e n c e (B( i ) ) ; 
14 E_i := g e t A c t i o n S e q u e n c e E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_fork , AS_i ) ; 
15 DTMC_seq_i := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_i , F , s ) ; 
16 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_fork , E_i , DTMC_seq_i ) ; 
17 } 
18 re turn DTMC_fork ; 
19 } 
Listing 5.13: Fork Action Evaluation Procedure 
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Due to the involved parallelism, a FOD while executing a forked behaviour 
ASi may occur after the surrounding action sequence – or even the whole 
UsageScenario control ﬂow – has already come to its end. Still, from the 
reliability prediction point of view, a failing ASi means a failed A f ork and 
ultimately a failed scenario execution, unless recovery mechanisms are in 
place (also see the FOD propagation principle described in Section 4.1). 
Treating forked behaviours as if they were sequential is possible because 
the Markov transformation considers all FOD occurrences as being stochas-
tically independent. The success and failure mode probabilities of any 
forked behaviour ASi do not depend on the other behaviours or on the rel-
ative timing of their execution. While the modeller can generally express 
a potential for concurrency-related FODs through deﬁning corresponding 
SoftwareInducedFODTypes and annotating the computation with FOD 
probabilities, PCM-REL does not explicitly capture how synchronization 
issues and other problems arise as a result of concurrent system execution. 
Doing so would shift the focus of the approach towards fault identiﬁcation 
and system veriﬁcation and would require different types of analyses (using 
time-based synchronisation-aware analysis models). 
Based on the sequential treatment of forked behaviours, the transforma-
tion assumes that the ﬁrst failing behaviour ASi determines the overall fail-
ure mode Fk of A f ork. This assumption corresponds to the one taken for 
action sequences (Section 5.3.1) and loop actions (Section 5.3.4). See Sec-
tion 5.3.1 for a more detailed discussion of the assumption. For fork ac-
tions, the additional question arises in which order to consider the forked 
behaviours (as the behaviours are executed concurrently, there is no nat-
ural order given). The Markov transformation chooses an arbitrary or-
der, assuming that the order of executed actions or behaviours does not 
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the success and failure mode probabilities resulting 
from the analysis. This assumption is valid as long as the individual FOD 
probabilities are not too high. As an example, consider a re-ordering of 
actions A1, A2 and A3 in Table 5.4 – any such re-ordering leads to very 
153 
5 PCM-REL Reliability Evaluation 
similar prediction results, provided that the individual FOD probabilities 
Pik(Fk) ∀k ∈ {1,2,3} are low. 
5.3.6 Pointer Actions 
A pointer action Apointer represents an invocation of a service operation. 
The invocation is triggered by a system user (speciﬁed through a PCM-REL 
EntryLevelSystemCall, see Section 2.7.5) or by a service call as part of 
the system’s behaviour (speciﬁed through an ExternalCallAction, see 
Section 2.7.2). The invoked service operation may be provided by a soft-
ware component in the system, or it may be routed to the system’s bor-
der and provided by a system-external service. In the ﬁrst case, the called 
component provides a behavioural speciﬁcation in terms of a Resource-
DemandingSEFF for the service operation, and Apointer references the top-
most action sequence ASb representing the ResourceDemandingSEFF. In 
the latter case, the system-external behaviour is regarded as a black-box. A 
SpecifiedReliabilityAnnotation may exist for the system-external 
call (see Section 4.6) indicating its success and failure mode probabilities1. 
If Apointer represents a service call between two software components that 
are deployed on different ResourceContainers, the invocation involves 
communication via the LinkingResource that connects both containers 
(see Section 2.7.4). 
The Markov transformation classiﬁes pointer actions according to their 
different targets as local, entry-level, remote and system-external pointers, 
and it applies an individual transformation scheme to each of these classes. 
Local pointers are invocations between software components deployed on 
the same ResourceContainer. They reference a system-internal be-
haviour, represented by ASb, and they do not involve remote communi-
1More concretely, the target of Apointer is determined depending on the executed compo-
nent instance, which is uniquely identiﬁed by the surrounding set of nested AssemblyCon-
texts. To avoid overloading the presentation, the passing of AssemblyContext hierar-
chies as parameters is omitted from the presented listings. 
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Figure 5.15: Evaluation of Local Pointer Actions 
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Figure 5.16: Evaluation of Entry-Level Pointer Actions 
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cation. As shown in Figure 5.15, the initial DT MCpointer contains only one 
inner state E(ASb), which is resolved by the intermediate DT MCseq(ASb)
representing ASb. The success and failure mode probabilities are: 
Ppointer(Success) = Pb(Success), Ppointer(Fk) = Pb(Fk) (5.34) 
Entry-level pointers represent invocations that are triggered by system us-
ers through EntryLevelSystemCalls. As an additional required step 
compared to the evaluation of local pointers, the ResourceContainer
that hosts the service-providing component must be checked for being op-
erational. The operability check is done before evaluating the invoked 
service behaviour, as the operability of the container is a precondition for 
any service execution to take place. The container is operational if all in-
cluded hardware resources that are strictly required for its operation (as 
indicated by the requiredByContainer attribute of the corresponding 
ProcessingResourceSpecification, see Section 4.4) are available. 
The evaluation of Apointer varies depending on the way of handling sys-
tem hardware states, namely through standard or approximated evaluation 
(see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4) or through single-state evaluation (see Sec-
tion 5.2.3). With standard or approximated evaluation, Apointer is always 
evaluated under the precondition of a certain system hardware state s j. The 
Markov transformation creates a DT MCpointer as shown in Figure 5.16 with 
an additional state R(s j), compared to the local pointer case. 
To evaluate the operability of the target container, the transformation 
creates an intermediate DT MCres(s j) and resolves R(s j) accordingly. To 
this end, the transformation ﬁrst determines the set of hardware resources 
Rpointer ⊆ R included in the container and strictly required for its opera-
tion. If all resources in Rpointer are OK under the precondition s j, a tran-
sition from I(s j) to S(s j) with probability 1 marks the assured success of 
the operability check. If one resource ri ∈ Rpointer is NA, the check fails 
with the corresponding failure mode Fk (which depends on the selected 
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evaluation level, see Section 5.1.1), denoted by a transition from I(s j) to 
Fk(s j) with probability 1. If there are multiple unavailable resources, it is 
not predetermined which one causes Apointer to fail. In this situation, the 
Markov transformation divides the failure potential equally between all un-
available resources. As an example, consider a ResourceContainer with 
two ProcessingResourceSpecifications of type “CPU” and “HDD”, 
both with their requiredByContainer attributes set to true. If both re-
sources are NA under a certain state s j, and if Type is selected as an eval-
uation level, the corresponding DT MCres(s j) contains two transitions from 
I(s j) to two failure states representing a CPU failure and a HDD failure, 
each with probability 0.5. Overall, the success and failure mode probabil-
ities for entry-level pointers are as follows: 
Ppointer(Success) = Pj(Success)×Pb(Success) (5.35) 
Ppointer(Fk) = Pj(Fk)+Pj(Success)×Pb(Fk) (5.36) 
Equation 5.35 reﬂects the fact that a successful completion of Apointer re-
quires a successful operability check of the target container, as well as a 
successful execution of the invoked service operation. If either of these two 
factors results in a failure mode Fk, so does Apointer (see Equation 5.36). 
Remote pointers are invocations between two physically separated soft-
ware components. Figure 5.17 shows their evaluation (under standard or 
approximated evaluation of system hardware states). The evaluation differs 
from entry-level pointers in that two additional states E1(N) and E2(N)
represent the transfer of the invocation and return messages over the cor-
responding network LinkingResource. An additional DT MCcomm(N) is 
used to resolve these two states. It represents the message transfer itself, 
which may either be successful or result in a transmission failure. The cor-
responding failure mode Fi depends on the selected evaluation level (see 
Section 5.1.1). For example, at level 1 (or Category), Fi is the “network-
induced FOD”. 
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For remote pointers, the success and failure mode probabilities are: 
Ppointer(Success) = Pj(Success)×Pcomm(Success)2 
×Pb(Success) (5.37) 
⎧ 
Pcomm(Success)×Pj(Fk)
+ Pcomm(Success)×Pj(Success)×Pb(Fk) i f �k = i 
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨ Pcomm(Fk)Ppointer(Fk) =
+ Pcomm(Success)×Pj(Fk)
+ Pcomm(Success)×Pj(Success)×Pb(Fk)
+ Pcomm(Success)×Pj(Success)
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩ × Pb(Success)×Pcomm(Fk) i f k = i 
(5.38) 
Equation 5.37 expresses that the remote pointer action is only successful 
if both involved transmissions as well as the referenced behaviour ASb 
are successfully executed, and if the target ResourceContainer is oper-
ational. Equation 5.38 states that failure modes Fk may result from failing 
transmissions, a failed operability check of the target container, or failing 
execution of ASb. If a failure mode does not represent a transmission fail-
ure (k �= i), it can only be the result of a failed operability check or failing 
execution of ASb after a successful transmission of the service invocation 
to the target container. 
System-external pointers invoke an operation of a system-external ser-
vice. The corresponding initial DT MCpointer as shown in Figure 5.18 con-
tains a single inner state E(EC) representing the execution of the external 
call. An intermediate DT MCext (EC) is directly instantiated with success 
and failure mode probabilities Pext (Success) and Pext (Fk) determined from 
the given PCM-REL instance. If a SpecifiedReliabilityAnnotation
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Figure 5.18: Evaluation of System-External Pointer Actions 
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exists for the call, the probabilities are taken from the annotation. If not, 
the call is assumed to be fully reliable, namely, Pext (Success) = 1 and 
Pext (Fk) = 0. The success and failure mode probabilities of the pointer 
action are: 
Ppointer(Success) = Pext (Success), Ppointer(Fk) = Pext (Fk) (5.39) 
Listing 5.14 shows the evaluation procedure covering all types of pointer 
actions under standard or approximated evaluation of system hardware 
states. 
1 / / A _ p o i n t e r : c o n s i d e r e d p o i n t e r a c t i o n
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
3 / / s _ j : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e
4 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e
5 / / c o n s i d e r e d p o i n t e r a c t i o n
6
7 e v a l u a t e P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F , s _ j ) {
8 t y p e := g e t P o i n t e r T y p e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ;
9 i f ( t y p e == LOCAL) {
10 re turn e v a l u a t e L o c a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F , s _ j ) ;
11 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == ENTRY) {
12 re turn e v a l u a t e E n t r y P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F , s _ j ) ;
13 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == REMOTE) {
14 re turn e v a l u a t e R e m o t e P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F , s _ j ) ;
15 } e l s e {
16 re turn e v a l u a t e E x t e r n a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) ;
17 }
18 }
19
20 e v a l u a t e L o c a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F , s _ j ) {
21 DTMC_pointer := i n i tLoca lPo in t e rDTMC ( A _po in t e r , F ) ;
22 AS_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ;
23 E_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ;
24 DTMC_seq_b := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_b , F , s _ j ) ;
25 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E_b , DTMC_seq_b ) ;
26 re turn DTMC_pointer ;
27 }
28
29 e v a l u a t e E n t r y P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F , s _ j ) {
30 DTMC_pointer := i n i t E n t r y P o i n t e r D T M C ( A _po in t e r , F ) ;
31 RC := g e t T a r g e t R e s o u r c e C o n t a i n e r ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ;
32 AS_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ;
33 R_j := g e t O p e r a b i l i t y C h e c k S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ;
34 E_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ;
35 DTMC_res_j := c rea teOperab i l i t yCheckDTMC (RC, F , s _ j ) ;
36 DTMC_seq_b := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_b , F , s _ j ) ;
37 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , R_j , DTMC_res_j ) ;
38 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E_b , DTMC_seq_b ) ;
39 re turn DTMC_pointer ;
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40 } 
41 
42 e v a l u a t e R e m o t e P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F , s _ j ) { 
43 DTMC_pointer := in i tRemotePointerDTMC ( A _po in t e r , F ) ; 
44 LR := g e t R e q u i r e d L i n k i n g R e s o u r c e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
45 RC := g e t T a r g e t R e s o u r c e C o n t a i n e r ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
46 AS_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
47 R_j := g e t O p e r a b i l i t y C h e c k S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ; 
48 E_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ; 
49 DTMC_comm_N := crea teTransmiss ionDTMC (LR ) ; 
50 DTMC_res_j := c rea teOperab i l i t yCheckDTMC (RC, F , s _ j ) ; 
51 DTMC_seq_b := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_b , F , s _ j ) ; 
52 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= 2 ; i ++) { 
53 E_i := g e t T r a n s m i s s i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer , i ) ; 
54 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E_i , DTMC_comm_N ) ; 
55 } 
56 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , R_j , DTMC_res_j ) ; 
57 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E_b , DTMC_seq_b ) ; 
58 re turn DTMC_pointer ; 
59 } 
60 
61 e v a l u a t e E x t e r n a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) { 
62 DTMC_pointer := i n i t E x t e r n a l P o i n t e r D T M C ( A _po in t e r , F ) ; 
63 EC := g e t R e f e r e n c e d E x t e r n a l C a l l ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
64 E := g e t R e f e r e n c e d E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ; 
65 DTMC_ext := c r ea t eEx te rna lCa l lDTMC (EC ) ; 
66 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E , DTMC_ext ) ; 
67 re turn DTMC_pointer ; 
68 } 
Listing 5.14: Pointer Action Evaluation Procedures 
The single-state evaluation as introduced in Section 5.2.3 allows for a 
signiﬁcantly faster top-level usage scenario evaluation (Figure 5.8) com-
pared to the standard evaluation (Figure 5.7). On the other hand, it re-
quires slightly more effort with respect to entry-level and remote pointer 
actions. As illustrated by Figures 5.19 and 5.20, the Markov transfor-
mation must take into account all possible hardware states Spointer(t) :=
{s¯1(t), . . . , s¯m¯(t)} at time t arising from the reduced set of hardware re-
sources Rpointer = {r1, . . . ,rn¯} ⊆ R required by the target ResourceCon-
tainer of Apointer: 
ns¯ j(t) := (s¯ j(r1, t), . . . , s¯ j(rn¯, t)) ∈ {OK,NA} ¯
∀t > 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , m¯} (5.40) 
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Figure 5.19: Evaluation of Entry-Level Pointer Actions (Single-State) 
The probability P(s¯ j) := P(s¯ j(t)) of the system being in state s¯ j is deter-
mined in analogy to the probabilities of the overall system hardware states 
(see Equation 5.4), taking into account only the state probabilities of the 
resources in Rcompute: 
n¯
P(s¯ j(t)) =∏P(s(ri, t) = s¯ j(ri, t)) ∀t > 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , m¯} (5.41) 
i=1 
The size m¯ of Scompute(t) is exponential with respect to the size n¯ of Rcompute 
(namely, m¯ = 2n¯), but Scompute(t) is signiﬁcantly smaller than S(t): n¯ «
n ⇒ m¯ « m. In practice, n¯ ≤ 2 often holds. For example, the case study 
models used for validation (see Chapter 6) contain at most 2 modelled in-
dividual hardware resources per container. This is due to the fact that a 
resource environment is modelled from a high-level perspective in PCM-
REL, following the two-state availability model for hardware resources (see 
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Figure 5.20: Evaluation of Remote Pointer Actions (Single-State) 
Section 2.2) rather than focusing on the details of individual hardware ele-
ments and their failure behaviour. Hence, the single-state evaluation is gen-
erally signiﬁcantly faster than the standard evaluation, even though some 
additional effort arises for the evaluation of entry-level and remote pointer 
actions (as well as computation actions, see Section 5.3.7). 
Figure 5.19 illustrates the single-state evaluation of entry-level pointer 
actions. In contrast to the standard and approximated evaluations, the 
DT MCpointer contains m¯ states R(s¯1) to R(s¯m¯) representing the operabil-
ity check of the target ResourceContainer of Apointer under the differ-
ent possible hardware states s¯1 to s¯m¯. Each R(s¯ j) is reached from the 
initial state I with probability P(s¯ j), and it is resolved through an inter-
mediate DT MCres(s¯ j), which is created according to the same rules as 
the DT MCres(s j) in the standard and approximated evaluation cases (see 
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Figure 5.16). A further state E(ASb) representing the invoked service be-
haviour is resolved through a corresponding DT MCseq(ASb) as in the stan-
dard and approximated cases. The success and failure mode probabilities 
of the entry-level Apointer determined through single-state evaluation are: 
m¯
Ppointer(Success) = ∑ (Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))×Pb(Success) (5.42) 
j=1 
m¯ m¯
Ppointer(Fk) = ∑ (Pj(Fk)×P(s¯ j))+∑
j 1=
(Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))×Pb(Fk)
j=1 
(5.43) 
The calculation is similar to that of Equations 5.35 and 5.36, but it takes 
into account the different possible hardware states s¯ j that occur each with 
its speciﬁc probability P(s¯ j). 
Figure 5.20 depicts the single-state evaluation of remote pointer actions, 
which is extended compared to the standard and approximated cases (Fig-
ure 5.17) in the same way as the single-state evaluation of entry-level point-
ers (Figure 5.19) compared to their standard or approximated evaluation 
(Figure 5.16). Instead of a single state R(s j) for the operability check of the 
target container, m¯ states R(s¯1) to R(s¯m¯) account for the different possible 
hardware states s¯1 to s¯m¯ and are resolved each by its speciﬁc DT MCres(s¯ j). 
Correspondingly, the success and failure mode probabilities of the remote 
Apointer determined through single-state evaluation are the extended ver-
sions of equations 5.37 and 5.38: 
m¯
Ppointer(Success) =∑ (Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))
j=1 
×Pcomm(Success)2 ×Pb(Success) (5.44) 
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m¯
Pcomm(Success)× ∑ (Pj(Fk)×P(s¯ j))
j=1 
m¯
+ Pcomm(Success)× ∑
j=1 
(Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨ 
× Pb(Fk) i f �k = i 
Pcomm(Fk)Ppointer(Fk) = m¯
+ Pcomm(Success)× ∑
j=1 
m¯
(Pj(Fk)×P(s¯ j))
+ Pcomm(Success)× ∑
j=1 
× Pb(Fk)
m¯
(Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))
+ Pcomm(Success)× ∑ (Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩ j=1 × Pb(Success)×Pcomm(Fk) i f k = i 
(5.45) 
To complete the consideration of pointer actions, Listing 5.15 shows the 
evaluation procedure covering all types of pointer actions under the single-
state evaluation of system hardware states. For local and system-external 
pointers, there are no changes compared to the standard and approximated 
cases, and the details of the corresponding procedures are omitted from 
the listing. 
1 / / A _ p o i n t e r : c o n s i d e r e d p o i n t e r a c t i o n
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
3 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e
4 / / c o n s i d e r e d p o i n t e r a c t i o n
5
6 e v a l u a t e P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) {
7 t y p e := g e t P o i n t e r T y p e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ;
8 i f ( t y p e == LOCAL) {
9 re turn e v a l u a t e L o c a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) ;
10 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == ENTRY) { 
11 re turn e v a l u a t e E n t r y P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) ; 
12 } e l s e i f ( t y p e == REMOTE) { 
13 re turn e v a l u a t e R e m o t e P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) ; 
14 } e l s e { 
15 re turn e v a l u a t e E x t e r n a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) ; 
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16 } 
17 } 
18 
19 e v a l u a t e L o c a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) { 
20 . . . / / ana logous t o s t a n d a r d or a p p r o x i m a t e d e v a l u a t i o n 
21 } 
22 
23 e v a l u a t e E n t r y P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) { 
24 RC := g e t T a r g e t R e s o u r c e C o n t a i n e r ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
25 R := g e t S e t O f R e q u i r e d H a r d w a r e R e s o u r c e s (RC ) ; 
26 S := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e s (R ) ; 
27 P := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e P r o b a b i l i t i e s (R ) ; 
28 DTMC_pointer := i n i t E n t r y P o i n t e r D T M C ( A _po in t e r , S , P , F ) ; 
29 AS_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
30 E_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ; 
31 m := ge tNumberOfElements ( S ) ; 
32 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
33 R_j := g e t O p e r a b i l i t y C h e c k S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer , S ( j ) ) ; 
34 DTMC_res_j := c rea teOperab i l i t yCheckDTMC (RC, F , S ( j ) ) ; 
35 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , R_j , DTMC_res_j ) ; 
36 } 
37 DTMC_seq_b := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_b , F , s _ j ) ; 
38 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E_b , DTMC_seq_b ) ; 
39 re turn DTMC_pointer ; 
40 } 
41 
42 e v a l u a t e R e m o t e P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) { 
43 LR := g e t R e q u i r e d L i n k i n g R e s o u r c e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
44 RC := g e t T a r g e t R e s o u r c e C o n t a i n e r ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
45 R := g e t S e t O f R e q u i r e d H a r d w a r e R e s o u r c e s (RC ) ; 
46 S := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e s (R ) ; 
47 P := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e P r o b a b i l i t i e s (R ) ; 
48 DTMC_pointer := in i tRemotePointerDTMC ( A _po in t e r , S , P , F ) ; 
49 AS_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( A _ p o i n t e r ) ; 
50 E_b := g e t R e f e r e n c e d E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer ) ; 
51 m := ge tNumberOfElements ( S ) ; 
52 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
53 R_j := g e t O p e r a b i l i t y C h e c k S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer , S ( j ) ) ; 
54 DTMC_res_j := c rea teOperab i l i t yCheckDTMC (RC, F , S ( j ) ) ; 
55 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , R_j , DTMC_res_j ) ; 
56 } 
57 DTMC_comm_N := crea teTransmiss ionDTMC (LR ) ; 
58 DTMC_seq_b := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e ( AS_b , F , s _ j ) ; 
59 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= 2 ; i ++) { 
60 E_i := g e t T r a n s m i s s i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_pointer , i ) ; 
61 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E_i , DTMC_comm_N ) ; 
62 } 
63 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_pointer , E_b , DTMC_seq_b ) ; 
64 re turn DTMC_pointer ; 
65 } 
66 
67 e v a l u a t e E x t e r n a l P o i n t e r A c t i o n ( A _po in t e r , F ) { 
68 . . . / / ana logous t o s t a n d a r d or a p p r o x i m a t e d e v a l u a t i o n 
69 } 
Listing 5.15: Pointer Action Evaluation Procedures (Single-State) 
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5.3.7 Computation Actions 
Computation actions Acompute represent the execution of algorithms, data 
processing steps and other computations in the system. They are speciﬁed 
through PCM-REL InternalActions (see Section 2.7.2) containing both 
a set of InternalFODOccurrenceDescriptions (Section 4.3) and a set 
of required ProcessingResourceTypes. While the former expresses the 
software failure potentials of the represented computation, the latter indi-
cates the dependencies to hardware resources and the associated failure po-
tentials. As with entry-level and remote pointer actions (see Section 5.3.6), 
the evaluation of Acompute depends on the way the Markov transformation 
handles system hardware states. With standard or approximated evalua-
tion, Acompute is always evaluated under the precondition of a certain system 
hardware state s j, and the transformation creates a DT MCcompute structure 
as shown in Figure 5.21. The DT MCcompute contains a state R(s j) express-
ing the consumption of hardware resources by Acompute under the precondi-
tion s j, as well as a state E expressing the computation itself. The consump-
tion of hardware resources is evaluated ﬁrst, assuming that the computation 
cannot even start if a required hardware resource is unavailable. 
The transformation creates an intermediate DT MCres(s j) to account for 
hardware resource consumption and resolves R(s j) accordingly. The cre-
ated DT MCres(s j) considers the set of hardware resources Rcompute ⊆ R 
required by Acompute through mapping the ParametricResourceDemands
of the speciﬁed InternalAction to the ProcessingResourceSpeci-
fications of the allocated ResourceContainer2. The construction of 
DT MCres(s j) based on Rcompute follows the same rules as with entry-level 
and remote pointer actions (Figures 5.16 and 5.17) based on Rpointer: if 
all required resources are available, Pj(Success) is set to 1; else, an over-
2As with the invocation target of a pointer action, the mapping of the required resource types 
of Acompute to allocated hardware resources depends on the executed component instance. 
Hence, knowledge about the set of nested AssemblyContexts is again required. 
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all FOD probability of 1 is equally divided between all unavailable re-
sources. 
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Figure 5.21: Evaluation of Computation Actions 
For the computation itself, the Markov transformation resolves the state E 
with an intermediate DT MCso f t (E) which reﬂects the InternalFODOc-
currenceDescriptions of the speciﬁed InternalAction. The struc-
ture of DT MCso f t (E) depends on the FODProbability and the Soft-
wareInducedFODType of each InternalFODOccurrenceDescription, 
as well as the selected evaluation level. If no InternalFODOccurrence-
Descriptions have been speciﬁed, a single transition from I(E) to S(E)
with probability 1 denotes the assured success of the computation. In 
the audio hosting example (Section 1.5), the InternalAction “ParseWe-
bRequest” of the “WebFrontend.DownloadCollection” operation (see Fig-
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1 / / A_compute : c o n s i d e r e d c o m p u t a t i o n a c t i o n 
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes 
3 / / s _ j : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e 
4 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e 
5 / / c o n s i d e r e d c o m p u t a t i o n a c t i o n 
6 
7 e v a l u a t e C o m p u t a t i o n A c t i o n ( A_compute , F , s _ j ) { 
8 DTMC_compute : = ini tComputat ionDTMC ( A_compute , F ) ; 
9 R_j : = g e t R e s o u r c e C o n s u m p t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_compute ) ; 
10 E : = g e t C o m p u t a t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_compute ) ; 
11 DTMC_res_j : = createResourceConsumptionDTMC ( A_compute , F , s _ j ) ; 
12 DTMC_soft_E := c rea te InnerComputa t ionDTMC ( A_compute , F ) ;
13 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_compute , R_j , DTMC_res_j ) ;
14 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_compute , E , DTMC_soft_E ) ;
15 re turn DTMC_compute ;
16 }
Listing 5.16: Computation Action Evaluation Procedure 
ure 2.9) speciﬁes a single InternalFODOccurrenceDescription of type 
“WebRequestFailure” with a probability of 10−8 (Figure 4.6). Assuming 
evaluation level 2 (or Type), the corresponding DT MCso f t (E) contains two 
transitions – one from I(E) to S(E) with probability 1 −10−8 denoting the 
success, and one from I(E) to a failure state Fk(E) representing the “We-
bRequestFailure”, with probability 10−8. 
According to this description, the success and failure mode probabilities 
of Acompute are as follows: 
Pcompute(Success) = Pj(Success)×Pso f t (Success) (5.46) 
Pcompute(Fk) = Pj(Fk)+Pj(Success)×Pso f t (Fk) (5.47) 
A successful completion of Acompute requires a successful hardware re-
source consumption and a successful computation; a failure mode Fk in 
either of the two aspects leads to failure mode Fk as a result of Acompute. 
Listing 5.16 shows the evaluation procedure for computation actions under 
standard and approximated hardware states evaluation. 
In the case of a single-state evaluation of system hardware states, a 
slightly extended evaluation of Acompute is required, as Figure 5.22 shows. 
As with entry-level and remote pointer actions, the extended version takes 
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Figure 5.22: Evaluation of Computation Actions (Single-State) 
into account a set Scompute(t) := {s¯1(t), . . . , s¯m¯(t)} of possible hardware 
states at time t, based on the required resources Rcompute of Acompute. The 
correspondingly extended DT MCcompute includes m¯ states R(s¯1) to R(s¯m¯)
instead of a single state R(s j) only. Each R(s¯ j) is resolved through its spe-
ciﬁc intermediate DT MCres(s¯ j). The success and failure mode probabilities 
of Acompute determined through single-state evaluation are: 
m¯
Pcompute(Success) = ∑ (Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))×Pso f t (Success) (5.48) 
j=1 
m¯ m¯
Pcompute(Fk) = ∑ (Pj(Fk)×P(s¯ j))+∑ (Pj(Success)×P(s¯ j))×Pso f t (Fk)
j=1 j=1 
(5.49) 
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1 / / A_compute : c o n s i d e r e d c o m p u t a t i o n a c t i o n
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes
3 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e
4 / / c o n s i d e r e d c o m p u t a t i o n a c t i o n
5
6 e v a l u a t e C o m p u t a t i o n A c t i o n ( A_compute , F ) {
7 R := g e t S e t O f R e q u i r e d H a r d w a r e R e s o u r c e s ( A_compute ) ;
8 S := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e s (R ) ;
9 P := d e t e r m i n e S e t O f H a r d w a r e S t a t e P r o b a b i l i t i e s (R ) ;
10 DTMC_compute := i n i t S i n g l e S t a t e C o m p u t a t i o n D T M C ( A_compute ,
11 S , P , F ) ;
12 m := ge tNumberOfElements ( S ) ;
13 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) {
14 R_j := g e t R e s o u r c e C o n s u m p t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_compute , S ( j ) ) ;
15 DTMC_res_j := createResourceConsumptionDTMC ( A_compute ,
16 F , S ( j ) ) ;
17 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_compute , R_j , DTMC_res_j ) ;
18 }
19 E := g e t C o m p u t a t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_compute ) ;
20 DTMC_soft_E := c rea te InnerComputa t ionDTMC ( A_compute , F ) ;
21 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_compute , E , DTMC_soft_E ) ;
22 re turn DTMC_compute ;
23 }
Listing 5.17: Computation Action Evaluation Procedure (Single-State) 
In contrast to Equations 5.46 and 5.47, the calculation takes into account 
the different possible hardware states s¯ j, each occurring with its speciﬁc 
probability P(s¯ j). Listing 5.17 shows the evaluation procedure. 
5.3.8 Recovery Actions 
Recovery actions Arecover are speciﬁed through PCM-REL RecoveryAc-
tions (see Section 4.7). They express the system’s ability to recover from 
FOD occurrences during service execution by switching to alternative be-
haviours. More concretely, Arecover contains a set of RecoveryAction-
Behaviours B := {b1, . . . ,bm} with each bi being represented through a 
corresponding action sequence ASi. For i > 1, each bi is associated with 
a set of handled FODTypes, which are mapped to a set of handled failure 
modes Fhandled (bi) ⊆ F for reliability prediction3. Moreover, each bi ref-
3For evaluation levels 0 and 1, the considered failure modes are more coarse-grained than 
the individual FODTypes (see Section 5.1.1). Hence, Fhandled (bi) cannot be unambiguously 
determined and is assumed to be empty. As a consequence, alternative behaviours for failure 
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Figure 5.23: Markov Chain Appending (Single DTMC) 
erences a set of FODHandlingAlternatives, such that a tree structure 
arises with each bi having its FODHandlingAlternatives as its child 
nodes. The execution of Arecover starts with its primaryBehaviour b1 
and proceeds through the tree of recovery behaviours until one bi either 
completes successfully or results in a failure mode that is not handled by 
any of its child nodes. 
Recovery actions represent the only actions that can be successfully com-
pleted in spite of FODs occurring during their execution. Due to this spe-
cial ability, the Markov transformation needs two basic operations chain-
appending and failure-handling in addition to the ones described in Sec-
tion 5.1.3. Figure 5.23 shows the chain-appending operation, which aug-
ments an existing DT MC with an intermediate DT MCinter by attaching the 
latter to a subset Fhandled ⊆ {F1, . . . Fn} of its failure states. DT MCinter con-
forms to the basic structure (see Section 5.1.2), and DT MC to the generic 
structure (although the ﬁgure shows DT MC conforming to the basic struc-
ture, this is not a necessary precondition). Without loss of generality, let 
Fhandled consist of the ﬁrst k failure states of DT MC, namely Fhandled :=
recovery are effectively ignored by the Markov analysis if the evaluation level is switched 
to 0 or 1. 
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1 / / DTMC: c o n s i d e r e d DTMC
2 / / SUCC: s e t o f s u c c e s s o r s o f c o n s i d e r e d DTMC;
3 / / each s u c c e s s o r c o n s i s t s o f an i n t e r m e d i a t e
4 / / b a s i c DTMC and a s e t o f hand led f a i l u r e modes ;
/ / t h e s e t s o f hand led f a i l u r e modes o f a l l
6 / / s u c c e s s o r s are d i s j o i n t
7
8 append (DTMC, SUCC) {
9 S := g e t S u c c e s s S t a t e (DTMC) ;
F := g e t S e t O f F a i l u r e S t a t e s (DTMC) ; 
11 n := getNumberOfElements ( F ) ; 
12 S _ f i n a l := c r e a t e F i n a l S u c c e s s S t a t e (DTMC) ; 
13 F _ f i n a l := c r e a t e S e t O f F i n a l F a i l u r e S t a t e s (DTMC) ; 
14 m := ge tNumberOfElements (SUCC ) ; 
f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
16 DTMC_inter := ge t In te rmedia teDTMC (SUCC( j ) ) ; 
17 F_hand led := g e t S e t O f H a n d l e d F a i l u r e M o d e s (SUCC( j ) ) ; 
18 I _ i n t e r := g e t I n i t i a l S t a t e ( DTMC_inter ) ; 
19 S _ i n t e r := g e t S u c c e s s S t a t e ( DTMC_inter ) ; 
F _ i n t e r := g e t S e t O f F a i l u r e S t a t e s ( DTMC_inter ) ; 
21 F_h := g e t S e t O f H a n d l e d F a i l u r e S t a t e s (DTMC, F_hand led ) ; 
22 q := ge tNumberOfElements ( F_h ) ; 
23 f o r ( k = 1 ; k <= q ; k ++) { 
24 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, F_h ( k ) , I _ i n t e r , 1 ) ; 
} 
26 r _ s := g e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y ( DTMC_inter , I _ i n t e r , 
27 S _ i n t e r ) ; 
28 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, I _ i n t e r , S _ f i n a l , r _ s ) ; 
29 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= n ; i ++) { 
r _ f := g e t T r a n s i t i o n P r o b a b i l i t y ( DTMC_inter , I _ i n t e r , 
31 F _ i n t e r ( i ) ) ; 
32 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, I _ i n t e r , F _ f i n a l ( i ) , r _ f ) ; 
33 } 
34 } 
c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, S , S _ f i n a l , 1 ) ; 
36 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <=n ; i ++) { 
37 i f ( i s U n h a n d l e d ( F ( i ) ) == t rue ) { 
38 c r e a t e T r a n s i t i o n (DTMC, F ( i ) , F _ f i n a l ( i ) , 1 ) ; 
39 } 
} 
41 } 
Listing 5.18: Chain-Appending Procedure 
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{F1, . . . Fk} , k ≤ n. The append operation includes four individual steps: 
First, it adds a new set of ﬁnal success and failure states S∗ and F∗ :=
{F1 ∗, . . . F∗} to DT MC. Second, it adds transitions with probability 1 from n 
all failure states in Fhandled to the initial state I' of DT MCinter. Third, it 
adds transitions from I' to all ﬁnal states S∗ and F∗ with probabilities cor-
responding to the original transitions of DT MCinter. Finally, it adds transi-
tions with probability 1 from the success state S and the unhandled failure 
states Funhandled := {Fk+1, . . . Fn} of DT MC to their ﬁnal counterparts. Af-
ter the operation, the original success and failure states of DT MC are not 
longer absorbing. Instead, they either lead on to their ﬁnal counterparts or 
to further execution as represented through DT MCinter. After the operation 
has been conducted, DT MC has altered success and failure mode probabil-
ities, but it still conforms to the generic structure. 
While Figure 5.23 depicts the chain-appending operation with a single 
intermediate DTMC, the operation more generally copes with a ﬁnite set of 
intermediate DTMCs by repeating the second and third step for each of the 
DTMCs, based on the precondition that the sets of handled failure modes of 
all DTMCs are disjoint. Listing 5.18 shows the corresponding procedure. 
The failure-handling operation builds upon the chain-appending opera-
tion and additionally reduces the intermediate states I', as well as the orig-
inal success and failure states S and {F1, . . . Fn} of DT MC. In summary, 
the operation expresses that certain failure modes resulting from a certain 
part of the execution (represented by the original DTMC) are handled by 
other execution parts (represented by the set of intermediate DTMCs). List-
ing 5.19 shows the procedure. 
To evaluate Arecover, the Markov transformation creates a DT MCrecover as 
shown by Figure 5.24. A state E(AS1) represents the execution of the pri-
mary behaviour. Following a recursive procedure, the transformation evalu-
ates the whole tree of recovery behaviours, creating a basic DT MCseq(ASi)
from each behaviour bi. The evaluation of each bi involves considering 
all of its child nodes and using the failure-handling operation for the in-
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1 / / DTMC: c o n s i d e r e d DTMC 
2 / / SUCC: s e t o f s u c c e s s o r s o f c o n s i d e r e d DTMC; 
3 / / each s u c c e s s o r c o n s i s t s o f an i n t e r m e d i a t e 
4 / / b a s i c DTMC and a s e t o f hand led f a i l u r e modes ; 
5 / / t h e s e t s o f hand led f a i l u r e modes o f a l l 
6 / / s u c c e s s o r s are d i s j o i n t 
7 
8 h a n d l e (DTMC, SUCC) { 
9 S := g e t S u c c e s s S t a t e (DTMC) ; 
10 F := g e t S e t O f F a i l u r e S t a t e s (DTMC) ; 
11 n := getNumberOfElements ( F ) ; 
12 append (DTMC, SUCC ) ; 
13 m := ge tNumberOfElements (SUCC ) ; 
14 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
15 DTMC_inter := ge t In te rmedia teDTMC (SUCC( j ) ) ; 
16 I _ i n t e r := g e t I n i t i a l S t a t e ( DTMC_inter ) ; 
17 r e d u c e (DTMC, I _ i n t e r ) ; 
18 } 
19 r e d u c e (DTMC, S ) ; 
20 f o r ( i = 1 ; i <= n ; i ++) { 
21 r e d u c e (DTMC, F ( i ) ) ; 
22 } 
23 } 
Listing 5.19: Failure-Handling Procedure 
I
F1 FnS
Precover(Success)
Precover(F1)
Precover(Fn)
I(ASi)
Pi(Success)
Pi(F1)
Pi(Fn)
DTMCseq(ASi)
S(ASi) F1(ASi) Fn(ASi)
I
F1 FnS
1
(0)
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Figure 5.24: Evaluation of Recovery Actions 
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1 / / A_recover : c o n s i d e r e d r e c o v e r y a c t i o n 
2 / / F : s e t o f c o n s i d e r e d f a i l u r e modes 
3 / / s : c o n s i d e r e d hardware s t a t e ( o p t i o n a l parameter , 
4 / / n o t used f o r s i n g l e −s t a t e e v a l u a t i o n ) 
5 / / r e t u r n s : b a s i c DTMC f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e 
6 / / c o n s i d e r e d r e c o v e r y a c t i o n 
7 
8 e v a l u a t e R e c o v e r y A c t i o n ( A _recover , F , s ) { 
9 DTMC_recover := initRecoveryDTMC ( A_recover , F ) ; 
10 E_r := g e t R e c o v e r y E x e c u t i o n S t a t e ( DTMC_recover ) ; 
11 B := g e t P r i m a r y R e c o v e r y B e h a v i o u r ( A _ recover ) ; 
12 DTMC_beh := e v a l u a t e R e c o v e r y B e h a v i o u r (B , F , s ) ; 
13 r e s o l v e ( DTMC_recover , E_r , DTMC_beh ) ; 
14 re turn DTMC_recover ; 
15 } 
16 
17 e v a l u a t e R e c o v e r y B e h a v i o u r (B , F , s ) { 
18 AS := g e t A c t i o n S e q u e n c e (B ) ; 
19 DTMC_seq := e v a l u a t e A c t i o n S e q u e n c e (AS , F , s ) ; 
20 ALT := g e t S e t O f A l t e r n a t i v e B e h a v i o u r s (B ) ; 
21 m := ge tNumberOfElements (ALT ) ; 
22 i f (m > 0) { 
23 SUCC := c r e a t e E m p t y S e t O f S u c c e s s o r s ( ) ; 
24 f o r ( j = 1 ; j <= m; j ++) { 
25 F_hand led = g e t S e t O f H a n d l e d F a i l u r e M o d e s (ALT( j ) ) ; 
26 DTMC_alt_j = e v a l u a t e R e c o v e r y B e h a v i o u r (ALT( j ) , F , s ) ; 
27 a d d S u c c e s s o r (SUCC, DTMC_alt_j , F_hand led ) ; 
28 }
29 h a n d l e ( DTMC_seq , SUCC ) ;
30 }
31 re turn DTMC_seq ;
32 }
Listing 5.20: Recovery Action Evaluation Procedures 
tegration of the corresponding failure-handling behaviours. The topmost 
DT MCseq(AS1) is then used to resolve E(AS1). Listing 5.20 shows the in-
volved procedures, which result in DT MCrecover conforming to the basic 
structure. An alternative transformation without Markov state reductions 
(as introduced in Section 5.1.1) is achieved by replacing failure-handling 
operations in the listing through chain-appending operations (in analogy to 
replacing state resolutions through state substitutions in the other trans-
formation listings). 
To describe the success and failure probabilities of Arecover mathemati-
cally, several additional deﬁnitions are necessary. To begin with, let O :=
{Success,F1, . . . ,Fn} be the set of possible outcomes of each recovery be-
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haviour bi. A step represents the execution of a certain behaviour with a 
certain outcome: 
  
ST EP := (bi,o j) | bi ∈ B, o j ∈ O (5.50) 
A function Beh : ST EP → B; Beh((bi,o j)) = bi maps each step to its 
associated behaviour, and Res := ST EP → O; Res((bi,o j)) = o j maps 
each step to its outcome. Furthermore, the semantics of the speciﬁed 
RecoveryActionBehaviours, each with its list of handledFODTypes, 
allow for a unique deﬁnition of the function Next : ST EP → B ∪{x}. This 
function maps any step s = (bi,o j) to its next executed behaviour bk, or to 
an artiﬁcially introduced x, if no other behaviour is executed after s. The 
overall execution of Arecover involves proceeding through its behaviours in 
a sequence of steps. A sequence represents a possible ﬂow of execution, 
starting with the primary behaviour b1, proceeding to the next behaviour 
depending on the outcome of each step, and ending when no more be-
haviour can be executed: ⎫⎧ ⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨ l ∈ N,Beh(s1) = b1, ⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬ 
SEQ := (s1, . . . ,sl ) ∈ ST EPl Next(sl ) = x, (5.51)⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l −1} : 
Beh(si+1) = Next(si)
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ 
  
Finally, SEQ(o j) := (s1, . . . ,sl ) ∈ SEQ | Res(sl ) = o j is the set of all se-
quences with result o j. With these deﬁnitions, the success and failure prob-
abilities of Arecover can be written as: 
Precover(Success) = ∑
seq ∈ SEQ(Success)
P(seq)
Precover(Fk) = ∑
seq ∈ SEQ(Fk)
P(seq)
(5.52) 
(5.53) 
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The occurrence probability of each sequence is the product of the occur-
rence probabilities of the outcomes of each step: 
l 
P((s1, . . . ,sl ) ∈ SEQ) =∏PI(si)(Res(si)) (5.54) 
i=1 
with I : ST EP → {1, . . . ,m} mapping each step si to the index of its as-
sociated behaviour. 
The evaluation of recovery actions as described here is based on the rule 
that the action sequence ASi of each recovery behaviour bi results in ei-
ther a success or exactly one failure mode Fk. As Section 5.3.1 discusses, 
the Markov transformation obeys this rule by assuming that Fk is uniquely 
determined by the ﬁrst failing action within ASi. Although in practice, mul-
tiple FODs may occur during the execution of ASi, such cases are rare and 
can typically be ignored if FODs occur independently from each other and 
each one has a low occurrence probability (see the illustrating example in 
Section 5.3.1). 
5.4 Complexity 
This section investigates the complexity of the PCM-REL Markov analy-
sis in terms of execution time (Section 5.4.1) and memory consumption 
(Section 5.4.2). The discussion focuses on the Markov transformation step 
with Markov state reductions switched on (see Section 5.1). A transforma-
tion without reduction operations may be used for special purposes such 
as comparisons to related approaches, but it is not the generally preferred 
choice. With state reductions switched on, the transformation results in a 
basic DTMC. Hence, the following solving step is trivial and can be omit-
ted from complexity considerations. The complexity of parameter depen-
dency solving preceding the Markov analysis (see Section 2.7.6) has been 
discussed in [Koz08] and is also omitted from consideration here. 
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5.4.1 Execution Time 
The PCM-REL Markov transformation is realized through an algorithm 
outlined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. This algorithm consists of several DTMC 
creation procedures, which follow a general scheme of DTMC initialization 
and repeated state resolution, and which invoke each other according to 
an overall hierarchical pattern (see Section 5.1.3). In the following, the 
execution time of the algorithm is assumed to be proportional to the number 
of created Markov states. State creation is a heavily repeated atomic step 
of the algorithm; it involves the effort of initializing a new state object in 
memory. Other atomic steps include the creation of Markov transitions, 
as well as the later deletion of states and transitions. The amount of these 
other steps is roughly proportional to the state creation. A created state 
is ﬁrst connected to an existing structure of states through newly created 
transitions; later, these transitions and the state itself are again deleted as 
part of a reduction operation. 
Table 5.6 lists the DTMC creation procedures involved in the Markov 
transformation, which can be categorized as procedures for evaluating sys-
tem hardware states (SHS), action sequences (AS) and individual actions 
(ACT ). Further abbreviations used in the table are as follows: 
• F : number of failure modes for a given PCM-REL instance and eval-
uation level; 
• R: number of hardware resources speciﬁed for a PCM-REL instance; 
• A: number of actions speciﬁed for an action sequence; 
• BT : number of branch transition behaviours speciﬁed for a branch 
action; 
• ∑Ci: sum over all iteration counts speciﬁed for a loop action; 
• BF : number of forked behaviours speciﬁed for a fork action; 
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• C: number of hardware resources strictly required for the opera-
tion of a resource container that represents the invocation target of 
a pointer action; 
• L: number of hardware resources required locally by a computation 
action; 
• BR: number of recovery behaviours speciﬁed for a recovery action. 
Each procedure listed in the table includes DTMC-creating calls. Although 
these calls are not further detailed in the provided Listings 5.4 to 5.20, 
DTMC sizes and structures follow from the accompanying DTMC illustra-
tions and the textual descriptions. The table indicates the names of the calls, 
their invocation counts within the procedures and the number of Markov 
states that they create. Generally, the created DTMCs include F +2 states 
for start, success and failure modes, as well as further states which are to 
be resolved through lower-level DTMCs. In most cases, the number of 
invocations of DTMC-creating calls per procedure is strictly limited to at 
most 4, and DTMC sizes are bounded by the number of provided model 
elements. For example, the “evaluateForkAction” procedure creates a sin-
gle DTMC of size F +2 +BF , where F is limited by the number of model 
elements expressing individual failure potentials4, and BF is equal to the 
number of speciﬁed forked behaviours. However, some procedures show 
increased complexity. First, the standard “evaluateScenario” procedure cre-
ates a DTMC with exponential size with respect to R. Second, the “evalu-
ateLoopAction” procedure creates a potentially large DTMC reﬂecting the 
sum over all speciﬁed loop iteration counts ∑Ci. Third, the single-state 
procedures “evaluteEntryPointerAction”, “evaluateRemotePointerAction” 
and “evaluateComputationAction” each create an exponential number of 
DTMCs with respect to C and L, respectively; each procedure contains one 
4The most differentiated evaluation level 3 (or PointOfFailure) includes one failure mode for 
each speciﬁed FODOccurrenceDescription, one for each ProcessingResourceSpec-
ification and one for each CommunicationLinkResourceSpecification. 
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Type Listing No. / Procedure DTMC Creation Required 
Lower-Level
Procedures
DTMC-creating Calls Included in 
Procedure
Size of Crea-
ted DTMCs Count Type
SHS
(5.4) evaluateScenario
[Standard] 1 x initTopLevelDTMC F + 2 + 2
R 2R AS
(5.5) evaluateScenario
[Single-State] 1 x initSingleStateTopLevelDTMC F + 2 + 1 1 AS
(5.6) evaluateScenario
[Approximated] - -
min: 1
max: 2R AS
AS (5.7) evaluateAction-Sequence 1 x initActionSequenceDTMC F + 2 + A A ACT
ACT
(5.10) evaluateDefaultAction 1 x initDefaultDTMC F + 2 - -
(5.11) evaluateBranchAction 1 x initBranchDTMC F + 2 + BT BT AS
(5.12) evaluateLoopAction 1 x initLoopDTMC F + 2 + Ci 1 AS
(5.13) evaluateForkAction 1 x initForkDTMC F + 2 + BF BF AS
(5.14) evaluateLocalPointer-
Action 1 x initLocalPointerDTMC F + 2 + 1 1 AS
(5.14) evaluateEntryPointer-
Action
1 x initEntryPointerDTMC
1 x createOperabilityCheckDTMC
F + 2 + 2
F + 2 1 AS
(5.14) evaluateRemotePointer-
Action
1 x initRemotePointerDTMC
1 x createOperabilityCheckDTMC
2 x createTransmissionDTMC
F + 2 + 4
F + 2
3
1 AS
(5.14) evaluateExternalPointer-
Action
1 x initExternalPointerDTMC
1 x createExternalCallDTMC
F + 2 + 1
F + 2 - -
(5.15) evaluateEntryPointer-
Action [Single-State]
1 x initEntryPointerDTMC
2C x createOperabilityCheckDTMC
F + 2 + 2C + 1
F + 2 1 AS
(5.15) evaluateRemotePointer-
Action [Single-State]
1 x initRemotePointerDTMC
2C x createOperabilityCheckDTMC
2 x createTransmissionDTMC
F + 2 + 2C + 3
F + 2
3
1 AS
(5.16) evaluateComputation-
Action
1 x initComputationDTMC
1 x createResourceConsumptionDTMC
1 x createInnerComputationDTMC
F + 2 + 2
F + 2
F + 2
- -
(5.17) evaluateComputation-
Action [Single-State]
1 x initSingleStateComputationDTMC
2L x createResourceConsumptionDTMC
1 x createInnerComputationDTMC
F + 2 + 2L + 1
F + 2
F + 2
- -
(5.20) evaluateRecoveryAction 1 x initRecoveryDTMC F + 2 + 1 BR AS
167,5 mm = 1.047
Table 5.6: Complexity of DTMC Creation Procedures 
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DTMC of exponential size. In practice, all of ∑Ci, C and L can be assumed 
to be low enough to keep the number of Markov states created by ACT 
procedures within feasible bounds (see Sections 5.3.4, 5.3.6 and 5.3.7). 
The approximated “evaluateScenario” procedure is included in the table 
for completeness but does not create an own DTMC structure. 
The overall execution time is not only determined by the complexity of 
individual procedures, but also by the number of executed procedures dur-
ing the transformation. As Table 5.6 indicates, a top-level SHS procedure 
invokes one or multiple AS procedures. Each AS procedure invokes one 
ACT procedure for each action contained in the evaluated sequence. In 
turn, each ACT procedure invokes one AS procedure for each behavioural 
speciﬁcation referenced by the evaluated action (the table omits intermedi-
ate procedures for invocation routing as shown in Listings 5.8, 5.9, 5.14 and 
5.15). Default actions, external pointer actions and computation actions do 
not reference any further behavioural speciﬁcations. Hence, their evalua-
tion procedures constitute the lowest level of the DTMC creation hierarchy. 
Overall, the AS and ACT procedures consider each action sequence occur-
rence of a behavioural view (as introduced in Section 4.1) – as well as each 
action within the sequence – exactly once. 
To give an upper bound for the Markov transformation’s execution time 
TI (U) for a usage scenario U of a PCM-REL instance I, consider the fol-
lowing deﬁnitions: 
• S: number of Markov states created during the transformation; 
• Smax(U): maximal number of Markov states created for a behavioural 
evaluation of the execution of U ; 
• Smax(AS): maximal number of Markov states created by an AS pro-
cedure; 
• Smax(ACT ): maximal number of Markov states created by an ACT 
procedure; 
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• CAS: number of action sequence occurrences in the behavioural view 
of U ; 
• Amax: maximal number of actions in any action sequence belonging 
to I; 
• Tmax: maximal time effort associated with a created Markov state. 
With standard evaluation of system hardware states, EI (U) is bounded as 
follows: 
TI (U)≤ S ×Tmax
≤ (F +2 +2R × (1 +Smax(U)))×Tmax
≤ (F +2 +2R × (1 +CAS × (Smax(AS)+Amax ×Smax(ACT ))))
×Tmax 
= (F +2 +2R × (1 +CAS × (F +2 +Amax × (1 +Smax(ACT )))))
×Tmax (5.55) 
Equation 5.55 relates the execution time TI (U) to the number of created 
Markov states S. The transformation creates F + 2 + 2R states at the top 
level and includes 2R behavioural evaluations, each with at most Smax(U)
created states. Each behavioural evaluation requires the consideration of 
CAS action sequence occurrences with at most Smax(AS) = F + 2 + Amax 
states, as well as up to Amax individual actions per sequence with at most 
Smax(ACT ) states. CAS depends on the number of behavioural speciﬁca-
tions (ScenarioBehaviours and ResourceDemandingBehaviours) in 
I and on the number of pointer actions (EntryLevelSystemCalls and 
ExternalCallActions) that refer to each behaviour. Smax(ACT ) depends 
on the concrete action speciﬁcations (see Table 5.6). The most signif-
icant factor inﬂuencing the execution time is the exponential number of 
behavioural evaluations, which leads to an overall complexity of O(2R) for 
the Markov transformation with standard evaluation of system hardware 
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states. With single-state evaluation, the factor 2R is omitted from Equa-
tion 5.55, and the complexity can be expressed as O(CAS) relating to the 
size of the behavioural view instead. The execution time of the approxi-
mated evaluation lies between single-state and standard, depending on the 
speciﬁed stop criteria. 
5.4.2 Memory Consumption 
A second complexity dimension refers to the maximal amount of mem-
ory required at a time during the Markov transformation. The discussion 
is based on the assumption that, at any point in time, the amount of re-
quired memory is proportional to the number of currently existing Markov 
states. Markov transitions require memory as well, but their number can 
be seen as being roughly proportional to the number of states. Due to the 
Markov reduction steps performed on-the-ﬂy, the transformation algorithm 
is highly space-efﬁcient. The discussion reuses deﬁnitions and results from 
the preceding Section 5.4.1 about execution time complexity. 
Table 5.6 shows the number and sizes of the DTMCs created by each in-
dividual transformation procedure. The speciﬁed sizes are the initial ones 
directly after DTMC creation. They are also the maximal sizes, as each 
procedure ultimately results in a single basic DTMC with only F +2 states 
(see Section 5.1.2 for a deﬁnition of the basic DTMC structure). All other 
states are removed during the execution of the procedure through state res-
olution steps as speciﬁed in Listings 5.4 to 5.205. As the procedures invoke 
each other according to a hierarchical pattern as shown in Figure 5.6, the 
maximal number of Markov states existing at any time is directly related 
to the maximal depth of the DTMC creation hierarchy. Let MI (U) be the 
required amount of memory for a UsageScenario U of a PCM-REL in-
stance I. Consider further deﬁnitions as follows: 
5Although a state resolution step temporarily adds another F +2 states itself, these additional 
states are the ones created by a lower-level procedure. Hence, the summation over all 
currently active procedures as done in this section is correct. 
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• ST : maximal number of Markov states existing at any step of the 
transformation; 
• Dmax: maximal depth of nested action sequence occurrences in the 
behavioural view of U ; 
• Mmax: maximal required amount of memory associated with a Mar-
kov state. 
Additionally, consider Smax(AS), Smax(ACT ) and Amax as deﬁned in Sec-
tion 5.4.1. With standard evaluation of system hardware states, MI (U) is 
bounded as follows: 
MI (U)≤ ST ×Mmax
≤ (F +2 +2R +Dmax × (Smax(AS)+Smax(ACT )))×Mmax
= (F +2 +2R +Dmax × (F +2 +Amax +Smax(ACT )))×Mmax 
(5.56) 
Equation 5.56 decomposes the number of existing Markov states ST into 
F +2 +2R states at the top level and Smax(AS)+Smax(ACT ) states at each 
of the Dmax further levels (each level includes an AS procedure for the se-
quence and an ACT procedure for a certain action within the sequence). 
Dmax depends on the structure of the behavioural view and has a value 
between 1 and – in the theoretical worst case – CAS (as deﬁned in Sec-
tion 5.4.1). The space complexity may be dominated either by the 2R states 
at the top level or by the Dmax DTMC creation levels, depending on the 
nature of I. Hence, it can be expressed as O(2R +Dmax). Although this 
complexity contains an exponential part, the 2R states in Equation 5.56 are 
not a multiplied factor as in Equation 5.55. With single-state evaluation, 
the 2R states at the top level are omitted and the complexity is O(Dmax). 
The same holds for the approximated evaluation, which avoids building a 
top-level DTMC and instead collects the results in a single data structure 
(see Section 5.2.4). 
185 
5 PCM-REL Reliability Evaluation 
5.5 Implementation 
The Markov analysis described in this chapter has been implemented and 
included in the PCM Workbench (see Section 4.8) to allow for evaluating 
the architectural IT system models created with PCM-REL. The implemen-
tation includes the complete Markov transformation and solving of the re-
sulting DTMC. The analysis is triggered through the Eclipse Run Conﬁgu-
ration mechanism; each analysis run can be ﬂexibly conﬁgured with respect 
to the options discussed in Section 5.1.1, namely the Markov evaluation 
level, usage of Markov state reductions and handling of system hardware 
states. In case of the approximated evaluation (Section 5.2.4), the users 
can specify one or multiple stop conditions regarding the maximal number 
of evaluated system hardware states, the minimal required accuracy of the 
prediction results, or the maximal execution time of the analysis. Then, 
the analysis run ﬁnishes as soon as any of the speciﬁed stop conditions is 
fulﬁlled. Further conﬁguration options for the analysis refer to the logging 
of the analysis steps and results. 
Figure 5.25 gives an impression of how prediction results are returned 
as a feedback to the user of the Workbench. The central form of feedback 
is a report (upper middle part) showing all prediction results for all usage 
scenarios of the analysed PCM-REL instance. The granularity of the re-
sults depends on the selected evaluation level (Section 5.1.1). At the most 
differentiated level 3 (or PointOfFailure), an additional failure impact 
analysis shows aggregated failure potentials of the speciﬁed components 
and component services, allowing for identifying critical architecture parts 
at a glance. The Workbench supports persisting the generated report and 
sharing it with other users. Further parts shown in the ﬁgure include a con-
sole (lower part) showing the progress of conducted analysis runs, as well 
as a tree-structured EMF editor (right-hand side, upper part) that shows 
the contents of the DTMC model resulting from the Markov transforma-
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Figure 5.25: PCM-REL Reliability Evaluation Tool Support 
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tion (the DTMC has a basic structure unless Markov state reductions are 
switched off, see Section 5.1.1). 
A further feature of the implementation is its built-in support for re-
peated analysis runs over multiple architectural variations of the system 
under study, thereby supporting sensitivity analyses (see Section 6.1). To 
this end, an EMF meta-model has been provided capturing variations of 
individual parameters of an underlying PCM-REL instance. Parameters 
may refer to PCM-REL entities such as speciﬁcations of VariableUsages
(Section 2.7.5) and reliability annotations. Variations of parameter values 
are speciﬁed in terms of sequences or ranges, based on double or string 
values, either absolute or relative to the given base values of the PCM-
REL instance. Multiple parameter variations can be combined to express 
more extensive architectural changes. Being provided with a speciﬁcation 
of parameter variations, the Workbench automatically conducts a series of 
analysis runs and adjusts the underlying PCM-REL instance in each run 
according to the speciﬁcation. The obtained prediction results allow for as-
sessing the inﬂuence of changing architectural properties and usage proﬁle 
aspects on the system’s reliability. In Figure 5.25, a speciﬁcation of param-
eter variations for a PCM-REL instance is visualised by a corresponding 
EMF editor (right-hand side, middle part). Overall, the Workbench pro-
vides a comprehensive and ﬂexible environment for reliability evaluation 
of PCM-REL instances through the built-in Markov transformation and 
support for sensitivity analyses. 
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This chapter presents efforts devoted to validate the PCM-REL approach as 
presented in the thesis. Due to the nature of the approach belonging to the 
ﬁeld of architecture-based software reliability prediction (ASRP), estab-
lished validation tools and methods in this ﬁeld also form the basic set of 
means for the validation of PCM-REL. A corresponding review of the state 
of the art in validating related ASRP approaches is provided by Section 6.1. 
The following Section 6.2 sets up a list of validation goals along the activ-
ities required for applying PCM-REL, assuring that all relevant aspects of 
the approach are covered by the validation efforts. An overview of these 
efforts is then given by Section 6.3. At the core of the chapter, Sections 6.4 
and 6.5 present two major case studies, applying PCM-REL to concrete 
IT systems under study. The ﬁrst one is the audio hosting service used 
as illustrating example throughout the thesis, with an existing prototypical 
implementation as its base. The second one is an existing industrial sys-
tem with e-mail processing functionalities. The studies complement each 
other and, in summary, provide evidence for the validation of all targeted 
PCM-REL aspects. The chapter is completed by a short discussion of other 
existing PCM-REL experiments and case studies in Section 6.6. 
6.1 Validating IT System Reliability 
This section discusses challenges that PCM-REL has to face for its valida-
tion, which to a large extent comply with the general validation challenges 
of architecture-based software reliability prediction (ASRP). Although val-
idation is an indispensable means of giving evidence for the applicability 
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Methodological
Cheung et al. [Che80] 1980 X X - -
Dolbec et al. [DS95] 1995 X - - -
Cortellessa et al. [CSC02] 2002 X X - -
Gokhale et al. [GT02] 2002 X X - -
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [GPHG+03] 2003 X X - -
Reussner et al. [RSP03] 2003 X X X -
Gokhale et al. [GWHT04] 2004 X X - (X)
Yacoub et al. [YCA04] 2004 X X - -
Grassi [Gra05] 2005 X X - -
Popic et al. [PDAC05] 2005 X X - -
Rodrigues et al. [RRU05] 2005 X - - -
Sharma et al. [ST06] 2006 X X - -
Wang et al. [WPC06] 2006 X - - X
Cortellessa et al. [CG07a] 2007 X X - -
Sato et al. [ST07a] 2007 X - - -
Sharma et al. [ST07c] 2007 X X - X
Lipton et al. [LG08] 2008 X X - -
Cooray et al. [CMRK10] 2010 X X X -
Filieri et al. [FGGM10] 2010 X X - -
Case Study Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [GPHP05] 2005 - - - XKoziolek et al. [KSB10] 2010 - - - X
122 mm = 0.763
Table 6.1: Validation of Software Reliability Prediction 
of software quality prediction approaches, speciﬁc issues arise in the ﬁeld 
of reliability prediction. A single – most probably successful – run of a 
usage scenario or system service invocation gives little insight into the reli-
ability properties of an IT system. Only when a statistical relevant number 
of failure-related events is observed, reliability can be deduced from the 
relative occurrence frequencies of those events. The required observation 
time may be several years or even longer than the system’s mission time, 
which makes reliability measurement experiments in the ﬁeld impractica-
ble at best, or impossible at worst. Nevertheless, certain means of valida-
tion have been established over the years in the ASRP domain. Table 6.1 
shows several ASRP publications and their included validation efforts. The 
table distinguishes methodological papers, which propose a novel predic-
tion approach, and case study papers, which apply existing prediction ap-
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proaches to speciﬁc systems under study. The validation efforts can be 
categorized as follows: 
• Illustrating examples: The presentation of an exemplary software ar-
chitecture, application of the approach to this architecture and inter-
pretation of the results is always conducted to reason for the general 
plausibility of the approach. Many examples are taken from real-
world domains, but there is generally no implementation available 
against which to check the prediction results. 
• Sensitivity analyses: Most authors examine the effects of input vari-
ations to the prediction results of their approaches, either formally or 
through repeated prediction runs. If an input variation is chosen such 
that it represents existing uncertainty regarding input estimations, the 
prediction results can be checked for their robustness. If the approach 
allows for drawing conclusions from the prediction results with high 
conﬁdence in spite of uncertain inputs, an argument for its validity 
has been established. 
• Prototype case study: A few authors (such as [RSP03, CMRK10]) 
apply their predictions to prototypical software implementations of 
limited complexity and compare prediction results to simulations or 
measurements. To assure the feasibility of the conducted experi-
ments, several simpliﬁcations are introduced compared to a real mea-
surement in the ﬁeld. Such simpliﬁcations may include the injection 
of artiﬁcial faults instead of natural faults, an artiﬁcial usage proﬁle 
that provokes frequent failures-on-demand, substitution of applica-
tion logic through code skeletons, and others. 
• Real-world case study: More recently, there are increased efforts to 
apply predictions to real-world open source or industrial systems, 
including dedicated case study papers (such as [GPHP05, KSB10]). 
Although these experiments have strong potential to show the ap-
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plicability of the examined prediction approaches, they still require 
certain simpliﬁcations. For example, Goseva-Popstojanova et al. 
[GPHP05] investigate an open source compiler of the C program-
ming language using an artiﬁcial usage proﬁle (namely, a regres-
sion test suite) that provokes frequent failures due to known software 
faults. Thus, the authors degrade the reliability of the application to 
much lower levels than those expected in the ﬁeld, in order to obtain 
measured reliability values. Koziolek et al. [KSB10] conduct predic-
tions for a large industrial control system and interpret the results, but 
do not compare the overall predicted system reliability to measured 
values. 
For PCM-REL, there is an additional validation challenge compared to 
ASRP in general, as the approach also considers hardware failure poten-
tials. Hardware resources typically only fail after several years of opera-
tion. While for software, failure rates can be artiﬁcially increased through 
speciﬁc usage proﬁles, provoking frequent hardware failures is associated 
with unacceptable costs. Nevertheless, the thesis provides validation ex-
periments that are up to the state of the art in the ASRP domain. The 
audio hosting example (introduced in Section 1.5) serves as an illustrat-
ing example throughout the thesis and as a case study based on a proto-
typical implementation (Section 6.4). While the reliability measurements 
do not account for hardware failure potentials, an additional simulation is 
conducted that takes all failure potentials considered by PCM-REL into ac-
count. A second case study applies PCM-REL to an industrial IT system 
with e-mail processing functionalities (Section 6.5). In both case studies, 
sensitivity analyses are conducted to examine the robustness of prediction 
results against uncertain input estimations. 
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6.2 Validation Goals 
This section discusses the validation goals in terms of statements for which 
the conducted validation experiments shall provide evidence. The top-level 
goal is to show that PCM-REL can feasibly be applied to predict the re-
liability of IT systems, and that its application is useful (namely, answers 
relevant questions regarding system design)1. Considering the whole pro-
cess of applying PCM-REL, including creation of an architectural model, 
input estimation of reliability annotations, Markov analysis and interpreta-
tion of prediction results, the top-level goal includes several sub goals dis-
cussed in Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.4. The validation does not focus on founda-
tional concepts employed by PCM-REL that are commonly established and 
accepted in the scientiﬁc communities of component-based software engi-
neering (CBSE), reliability engineering and architecture-based software re-
liability prediction (ASRP). More concretely, PCM-REL assumes without 
further validation that it is generally feasible to represent software failure 
potentials through independent “per-visit” failure-on-demand (FOD) prob-
abilities, hardware failure potentials through MTTF values, and to view 
software architectures from a component-based perspective. 
6.2.1 Feasibility of Modelling Abstractions 
Like every architecture modelling language, PCM-REL includes modelling 
abstractions which inevitably lead to a simpliﬁed view on a represented sys-
tem under study. The most signiﬁcant abstractions of the approach refer to 
the simpliﬁed high-level representation of control and data ﬂow, stateless 
software component modelling and the restriction to synchronous compo-
nent interactions. More concretely, dependencies of loop iteration counts 
1This goal formulation implies that the validation does not aim at measuring the beneﬁts and 
costs of a whole system engineering process enriched by continuous reliability modelling 
and prediction (as introduced in Section 3.2). Rather, the scope of validation roughly cor-
responds to a system design iteration (see Figure 3.3), focussing not on performance but 
purely on reliability. 
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and branch transition probabilities on component-internal state can only 
be implicitly expressed through probabilistic abstractions. Loop iteration 
counts are always ﬁnite and determined in advance; they may not depend 
on termination conditions evaluated within the loop bodies. All behavioural 
speciﬁcations are ﬁnite and must not contain cyclic invocations of compo-
nent service operations. Concurrent behaviours are modelled as being in-
dependent from each other; synchronisation issues that may lead to effects 
such as deadlocks, starvation or racing conditions can only be captured 
through probabilistic abstractions. Invocations of component service oper-
ations are generally modelled as being synchronous and blocking. 
The two case studies presented in this validation chapter give evidence 
that, in spite of the discussed abstractions, PCM-REL can feasibly be used 
to express an IT system under study with all its reliability-relevant aspects. 
For the audio hosting case study (Section 6.4), the compliance of the model-
based reliability predictions with measurements conducted on the imple-
mented system explicitly shows that the simpliﬁcations of the model do not 
prevent the obtained prediction results from being sufﬁciently accurate. 
6.2.2 Feasibility of Estimation of Reliability Annotations 
When applying PCM-REL to an IT system under study, the modelled PCM-
REL instance includes several reliability-speciﬁc annotations in terms of 
software FOD probabilities, hardware MTTF and MTTR values, as well 
as network transmission failure probabilities. A central assumption of the 
modelling step is that input estimations can feasibly be derived for those 
annotations, with a level of conﬁdence sufﬁcient for trusting the prediction 
results. In particular, the estimation of software FOD probabilities often 
constitutes a challenge and is a threat to the validity of ASRP approaches 
in general (see Section 2.3). In this validation chapter, the Astaro ASG 
case study (see Section 6.5) explicitly goes through the process of estimat-
ing reliability annotations for PCM-REL. The study shows that the required 
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estimations can be achieved based on existing information sources in a typ-
ical industrial software development context. 
6.2.3 Validity of Markov Analysis 
PCM-REL can only be successfully applied if the included Markov analy-
sis is valid – namely, if it produces accurate prediction results when pro-
vided with accurate inputs (where “input” refers to the whole architec-
tural model including reliability annotations). Threats to this validity in-
clude all known assumptions of the analysis that constitute simpliﬁcations 
compared to reality, as well as any further ﬂaws that might falsify the 
obtained prediction results. Regarding known assumptions, the Markov 
analysis abstracts from all time-related aspects. In particular, it treats a 
system under study as if its mission time was unlimited, and as if all us-
age scenario runs were instantaneous (namely, having zero time duration). 
Furthermore, it abstracts from the concrete impact of local FOD occur-
rences to the subsequent control and data ﬂow, assuming that the ﬁrst oc-
curred FOD within a ResourceDemandingBehaviour determines the re-
sult of the behaviour (see Section 5.3.1). The dependency solver, upon 
which the Markov analysis builds (see Section 2.7.6), additionally neglects 
stochastic dependencies between multiple variable usages within the same 
ResourceDemandingSEFF (see Figure 2.7), which can lead to incorrect 
occurrence probabilities of service execution paths. 
The validity of the Markov analysis is examined as part of the audio 
hosting case study, which compares prediction results obtained by analysis 
with a simulation of the system (Section 6.4.3). The simulation constitutes 
an alternative evaluation method of the original PCM-REL instance based 
on a queueing network (QN) formalism; it explicitly considers time-related 
aspects and is not affected by dependency solver assumptions. 
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6.2.4 Signiﬁcance and Robustness of Prediction Results 
The prediction results obtained from the application of PCM-REL are only 
useful if they allow for answering relevant design questions regarding the 
IT system under study, and if the drawn conclusions are sufﬁciently sta-
ble against existing input estimation uncertainties. To this end, the case 
studies presented in this validation chapter demonstrate how PCM-REL 
can be used to determine rankings between the reliabilities of multiple de-
sign alternatives and between reliability impacts of different failure poten-
tials throughout the architecture. Moreover, both studies include sensitivity 
analyses in terms of repeated prediction runs with varying input parameter 
values to account for the effects of uncertain inputs. The results allow for 
drawing signiﬁcant conclusions supporting relevant design decisions and 
for allocating quality assurance efforts during system development. 
6.3 PCM-REL Case Study Features 
Out of the set of available case studies conducted for PCM-REL, two stud-
ies have been selected and are discussed in detail in this validation chapter, 
namely the audio hosting case study (Section 6.4) and the Astaro ASG case 
study (Section 6.5). Together, both studies exhibit a comprehensive set 
of features, as shown in Table 6.2, to provide convincing evidence for the 
validity of PCM-REL. The audio hosting study is based on a prototypical 
implemented system of limited complexity. Illustrative reliability anno-
tation values are chosen to demonstrate the capabilities of the approach. 
The study features multiple design alternatives and establishes a ranking 
between those alternatives with respect to reliability, supporting software 
architects in their design decisions. In addition, predictions are compared 
to a simulation approach, as well as measurements conducted for the imple-
mented system. The ASG study refers to an industrial IT system and derives 
input estimations from existing qualitative and statistical failure data. The 
analysis mainly focuses on the reliability impacts associated with individ-
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Feature Audio HostingCase Study
Astaro ASG
Case Study
Real-world industrial IT system - X
Reliability annotations estimated based on 
existing qualitative and statistical failure data - X
Examination and ranking of multiple design 
alternatives X (X)
Examination of reliability impacts of existing 
architectural failure potentials X X
Investigation of robustness of prediction 
results through sensitivity analyses X X
Comparison to simulation X -
Comparison to measurements X -
140.6 mm = 0.879
Table 6.2: Overview of PCM-REL Case Study Features 
ual system processing steps and establishes a ranking between those steps, 
guiding the allocation of future testing and quality assurance efforts. Due 
to the high reliability levels of the application, no comparison to simulation 
or measurements was conducted for the ASG study. However, both stud-
ies include sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of the obtained 
prediction results against input estimation uncertainties. Other conducted 
PCM-REL case studies are shortly discussed in Section 6.6. 
6.4 Audio Hosting Case Study 
This section presents the audio hosting case study, which is based on the 
scenario introduced in Section 1.5 and on the modelled PCM-REL instance 
presented throughout Section 2.7. The audio hosting service constitutes 
an illustrating example and a typical use case for PCM-REL. It features 
a component-based software architecture whose components can be dis-
tributed across multiple computing nodes. Furthermore, its functionality is 
centred around data storage and processing, which is at the core of many 
business information systems. 
The case study adds additional design alternatives (Section 6.4.1) as a set 
of known possibilities at the start of a system design iteration. Section 6.4.2 
demonstrates how PCM-REL can be used to examine these alternatives and 
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derive relevant insights about the system under study. Further validation of 
the approach is provided through comparison of prediction results with a 
queueing network simulation (Section 6.4.3) and with measurements con-
ducted on an implemented prototype (Section 6.4.4). Finally, Section 6.4.5 
reviews the case study and its achievements. 
The modelled PCM-REL instances of the audio hosting service and its 
design alternatives are available for download at [BBKR12]. 
6.4.1 Design Alternatives 
To demonstrate the assessment of multiple design alternatives through 
PCM-REL, this case study does not only consider the initial architectural 
candidate as presented throughout Section 2.7. Rather, it takes into account 
a set of architectural improvements which show promise for increased re-
liability: 
• High-Availability Server (“ha”): Uses a single server hosting all in-
stantiated components. Replicated hardware resources on the server 
allow for fast fail-over in case of resource breakdowns. Addition-
ally, the potential for network transmission failures is eliminated as 
all communications are local on the single server. 
• High-Reliability Audio Processing (“hr”): Replaces standard algo-
rithms for encoding, watermarking and packaging of audio ﬁles by 
high-quality implementations with signiﬁcantly reduced FOD prob-
abilities. 
• Replicated Database Server (“re”): Uses two database servers with 
synchronized databases so that fail-over between the servers is pos-
sible. 
These improvements can also be partially combined to further increase the 
expected reliability of the system. Together with the initial architectural 
candidate, the case study considers six design alternatives, namely “std” 
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(denoting the initial or standard candidate), “ha”, “hr”, “re”, “ha+hr” (de-
noting the combined usage of a high-availability server and high-reliability 
audio processing) and “re+hr” (denoting a replicated DB server and high-
reliability audio processing). 
From a modelling point of view, all considered design alternatives must 
be represented through corresponding PCM-REL instances. Thanks to the 
reuse capabilities built into the modelling language, existing speciﬁcations 
of the “std” alternative can be reused to a large extent for the other alterna-
tives. Other speciﬁcations are added as a supplement. For the “ha” alter-
native, a new ResourceContainer is added to the resource environment 
model (see Section 2.7.4) representing the high-availability server, with re-
source MTTR values reduced by factors 20 (for the hard disk) and 200 (for 
the CPU), accounting for the fast fail-over. A new allocation model maps all 
component instances from the system deﬁnition to the new server. For “hr”, 
new BasicComponents “EncodingHR”, “WatermarkingHR” and “Pack-
agingHR” are added to the repository model (Section 2.7.2), along with 
a new CompositeComponent “AudioProcessingHR”, to represent the new 
high-reliability audio processing. An adjusted system model (Section 2.7.3) 
instantiates “AudioProcessingHR” instead of “AudioProcessing”, and this 
change is also propagated to the allocation model. Furthermore, the system 
now relies on its own encoding engine and does not longer need its re-
quired role for the “IEncoding” interface. For the “re” alternative, a second 
database server is added to the resource environment model, and a new link-
ing resource is established connecting the application server and the sec-
ond database server. Moreover, an additional BasicComponent “DBAc-
cessManagement” includes fault-tolerant data storage and retrieval and is 
instantiated by an accordingly adjusted system deﬁnition. The “UserD-
BAccess” and “AudioDBAccess” components are both instantiated twice 
and deployed on the two database servers through an adjusted allocation 
model. PCM-REL instances for the “ha+hr” and “re+hr” alternatives are 
obtained by corresponding combinations of the discussed speciﬁcations. 
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Figure 6.1: Audio Hosting System Model (re+hr) 
To further illustrate how the modelled design alternatives emerge from 
the initial architectural candidate “std”, the following ﬁgures depict parts 
of the PCM-REL instance for the “re+hr” alternative. First, Figure 6.1 
shows the corresponding system deﬁnition. The model differs from the 
“std” system model (as shown in Figure 2.11) by instantiating “AudioPro-
cessingHR” instead of “AudioProcessing”, by omitting the “IEconding” 
required system role, by duplicating the “UserDBAccess” and “AudioD-
BAccess” component instances, and by introducing “DBAccessManage-
ment”, which enables fault-tolerant data storage to and retrieval from the 
two database servers. “DBAccessManagement” provides both “IUserD-
BAccess” (to the “UserManagement”) and “IAudioDBAccess” (to the “Au-
dioManagement”). In turn, it includes two required roles for each of these 
interfaces, connected to the individual data accessing components. 
Figure 6.2 shows the resource environment and allocation models of the 
“re+hr” alternative. In contrast to “std” (see Figure 2.13), the environment 
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Figure 6.2: Audio Hosting Resource Environment and Allocation (re+hr) 
contains two database servers, each with its own allocated “UserDBAc-
cess” and “AudioDBAccess” instances and with a modelled “CPU” and 
“HDD” (hard disk drive) hardware resource. Both database servers are con-
nected to the application server by two individual linking resources “LAN-
Connection1” and “LANConnection2”. The application server hosts the 
additional “DBAccessManagement” component instance, which controls 
the propagation of service invocations to the database servers. 
As an example for the fault-tolerant behavioural speciﬁcations of “DB-
AccessManagement”, Figure 6.3 shows the “RetrieveFile” service opera-
tion provided by the component as part of the provided “IAudioDBAccess” 
interface. The speciﬁcation contains a RecoveryAction (see Section 4.7) 
with two inner behaviours. The ﬁrst behaviour tries to access the primary 
database server by invoking “IAudioDBAccess_Primary.RetrieveFile”. If 
this invocation fails, a second behaviour performs the same invocation on 
the secondary server. The represented FT mechanism does not only tol-
erate a hardware breakdown of the primary server (through its handled 
HardwareInducedFODTypes “CPUFailure” and “HDDFailure”) but also 
software failure potentials that prevent the data access from being success-
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Figure 6.3: RDSEFF “DBAccessManagement.RetrieveFile” (re+hr) 
ful (handled SoftwareInducedFODTypes “DBQueryFailure” and “Stor-
ageAccessFailure”). Hence, the mechanism represents combined software-
level and hardware-level FT. 
6.4.2 Audio Hosting Reliability Evaluation 
This section demonstrates how PCM-REL’s Markov analysis can be used 
to gain insights about the system under study. All analysis runs were 
conducted with Markov state reductions switched on (see Section 5.1.1) 
and standard evaluation of system hardware states (Section 5.2.2); the in-
dividual runs took less than 5 seconds on a standard laptop computer2. 
Based on the illustratively chosen values of reliability annotations as pre-
sented throughout Chapter 4 (including software FOD probabilities, hard-
ware MTTF and MTTR values, and network transmission failure proba-
bilities), PCM-REL predicts the reliability of the audio hosting service as 
shown in Figure 6.4. Subﬁgures (a) and (b) show the predicted FOD prob-
abilities f p_inter(alt) and f p_batch(alt) of the considered audio hosting 
2The experiments were conducted on a laptop computer with an Intel R� CoreTMi7-620M 
Processor, 8.0 GB RAM memory and a 64 Bit Windows 7 Professional operating system. 
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Figure 6.4: Audio Hosting Reliability Predictions by Design Alternatives, Usage 
Scenarios and Failure Dimensions 
design alternatives alt (as introduced in Section 6.4.1) for the two existing 
usage scenarios inter and batch (see Figure 2.15)3. As the ﬁgures show, 
the predicted FOD probabilities range from 6.89 ∗ 10−6 to 1.52 ∗ 10−4 for 
interactive usage and from 5.82 ∗10−5 to 2.94 ∗10−4 for batch usage. Al-
though the concrete predicted values are subject to uncertainty, the ﬁgures 
allow for drawing general conclusions. First, the initial candidate “std” has 
lowest reliability among all design alternatives, for both modes of usage. 
This corresponds to the construction of the other alternatives as architec-
tural improvements of “std”. Second, the batch mode differs from interac-
tive mode by generally lower reliabilities and smaller differences between 
3The FOD probability is the counterpart of reliability ( f p = 1 −P(Success)) and is chosen 
as the displayed metric in the ﬁgures of this section. The lower a bar in the presented bar 
charts is, the higher is the corresponding reliability. 
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the alternatives. While a signiﬁcant improvement of more than factor 10 
is achieved by “ha” and “ha+hr” (compared to “std”) in interactive mode, 
no such improvements are seen in batch mode. Further observation re-
veals that “ha+hr” is the best alternative in both modes, and that “hr” and 
“re+hr” are least affected by a change of mode. In conclusion, the results 
allow for recommending the “ha” and “ha+hr” alternatives for audio host-
ing installations whose main mode of usage is interactive. For batch mode, 
none of the alternatives achieves signiﬁcant reliability improvements over 
“std”. It may be worthwhile to examine further possible design alternatives 
especially for this mode. 
Subﬁgures (c) and (d) of Figure 6.4 provide reﬁned information by de-
noting the individual reliability impacts of the software, hardware and net-
work dimensions. This information is available because the PCM-REL 
Markov analysis explicitly determines the reliability impacts of failure po-
tentials throughout the system’s architecture at different levels of granular-
ity (see Section 5.1.1). The reﬁned perspective allows for further expla-
nation of observations made from Subﬁgures (a) and (b), and it indicates 
which failure potentials should be tackled to obtain further reliability im-
provements. Overall, Subﬁgures (c) and (d) indicate that the lower reliabil-
ities of the batch mode compared to interactive mode stem from increased 
software and network failure potentials. This corresponds to the fact that 
batch downloads include 30 audio ﬁles on average (see Figure 2.15) and 
hence require much more processing and network communication than in-
teractive downloads of a single ﬁle. On the other hand, the impact of hard-
ware failure-potentials does not depend on the amount of required software 
processing, and it stays constant across both modes. 
Going further into detail, Subﬁgure (c) reveals that most design alter-
natives are dominated by hardware failure potentials in interactive mode. 
As an explanation for the signiﬁcant improvements of “ha” and “ha+hr” 
compared to “std”, the ﬁgure shows that these two alternatives are the ones 
lowering the hardware impacts. This corresponds to the usage of a high-
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availability server in these alternatives (see Section 6.4.1). Furthermore, 
“ha” and “ha+hr” are single-server solutions and hence do not include any 
network failure potentials. However, the latter fact is not a signiﬁcant ad-
vantage over the other alternatives, as network-induced FOD probabilities 
are generally low. Further observation of Subﬁgure (c) reveals that the 
“re+hr” alternative has the lowest software-induced FOD probability (ap-
proximately 10−6) and promises high reliability, provided that software ar-
chitects ﬁnd a way to further modify the alternative and improve it with 
respect to hardware. Subﬁgure (d) shows that the reliability impacts of the 
different dimensions are more balanced in batch mode compared to inter-
active mode. The “re+hr” alternative has a very low software-induced FOD 
probability but is dominated by hardware and network impacts. Still, this 
alternative could signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from an adjusted resource environ-
ment with improved conditions for reliability. 
If software architects wish to examine reliability impacts throughout the 
architecture in detail, PCM-REL supports them by ﬁne-grained predic-
tion results. As an example, Figure 6.5 details the software reliability 
impacts of the audio hosting service according to the individual modelled 
SoftwareInducedFODTypes (see Section 4.2). Without going through all 
aspects shown in the ﬁgure, the discussion here focuses on the “re+hr” al-
ternative (combining database server replication and high-reliability audio 
processing) in batch mode. In Figure 6.4(d), this alternative shows a very 
low software-induced FOD probability, even though the software impacts 
of both “re” and “hr” are similar to that of “std”. From Figure 6.5(b), it 
is evident that both “re” and “hr” lower the impacts of a subset of the rel-
evant SoftwareInducedFODTypes, but only “re+hr” lowers all relevant 
types. The database server replication lowers the occurrence probabilities 
of database query and storage access failures, and the high-reliability audio 
processing decreases encoding, watermarking and packaging FOD prob-
abilities. 
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Figure 6.5: Software-Induced Failure-on-Demand Probabilities by Design Alterna-
tives, Usage Scenarios and Failure-on-Demand Types 
While the prediction results discussed so far give insight into the reliability 
characteristics of the audio hosting service, further examination is neces-
sary to determine the robustness of those results in the light of uncertain 
reliability annotations given as an input to the analysis. To this end, Fig-
ure 6.6 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis, focusing on groups of 
reliability annotations and examining all cases in which one of the groups 
is off by factor 10. In the example, the granularity of the groups (which, 
in the general case, should be equal to the granularity of conducted input 
estimations) is chosen such that all software FOD probabilities of a cer-
tain SoftwareInducedFODType (such as cache access failures or database 
query failures) form each a group, supplemented by the groups of hardware 
MTTF values, hardware MTTR values and network transmission failure 
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Figure 6.6: Robustness of Ranking of Design Alternatives Against Parameter Group 
Variations, Differentiated by Usage Scenarios and Change Directions 
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probabilities. The ﬁgure shows the FOD probabilities f p_inter(var) and 
f p_batch(var) of the audio hosting design alternatives over the individual 
parameter group variations var for the two modes of usage inter and batch. 
While Subﬁgures (a) and (c) deal with improvements of individual parame-
ter groups (which means multiplying hardware MTTF values by 10 or other 
annotations by 0.1), the other two Subﬁgures (b) and (d) denote degrada-
tions of the respective groups. Although the variation scales are discrete, 
the ﬁgure connects the individual predictions through line segments. This 
presentation allows for recognizing changes in the ranking of design alter-
natives as crossings of line segments. 
The ﬁrst and most important observation from Figure 6.6 is that the rank-
ing of design alternatives is very stable in interactive mode (no line cross-
ings) and less stable in batch mode. As expected, improvements regarding 
individual parameter groups – as shown in Subﬁgures (a) and (c) – also 
improve the overall reliability of each design alternative, compared to the 
original setting (namely, each alternative has its highest FOD probability in 
the leftmost “original” category). Subﬁgures (b) and (d) show that the ar-
gument can be reversed, with degradations of individual parameter groups 
also degrading the overall reliability of each alternative. Generally, the 
biggest impacts are caused by changing hardware MTTF or MTTR val-
ues. This corresponds to Figures 6.4(c) and 6.4(d) showing that hardware 
failure potentials have the greatest reliability impact on most design al-
ternatives. The unstable ranking of alternatives in Subﬁgures (c) and (d) 
is generally in line with the observation that the differences between the 
alternatives are only marginal in batch mode, as shown in Figure 6.4(b). 
Moreover, software-induced FOD probabilities are signiﬁcantly increased 
in batch mode compared to interactive mode (Figures 6.4(c) and (d)), which 
explains why the reliabilities of the design alternatives are more sensitive 
to software-related input variations in batch mode than in interactive mode. 
As the improvements obtained by the design alternatives with respect to 
individual SoftwareInducedFODTypes in batch mode are highly diverse 
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(Figure 6.5(b)), it is plausible that – especially in the case of software-
related degradations (Figure 6.6(d)) – the ranking of the design alternatives 
changes over the individual variations. In conclusion, the results of the sen-
sitivity analysis support the initial ﬁndings: Design alternatives “ha” and 
“ha+hr” can be recommended in interactive mode with high conﬁdence. In 
batch mode, no unambiguous recommendation is possible. Instead, further 
design alternatives should be evaluated. 
6.4.3 Comparison with Simulation 
While the preceding Section 6.4.2 has demonstrated how PCM-REL can 
analyse an IT system under study with respect to reliability, the only cause 
of inaccuracy of prediction results considered so far is the uncertainty of 
input estimations, whose consequences have been examined through a sen-
sitivity analysis. However, a ﬂawed Markov analysis could likewise lead 
to inaccurate results, and it might not be possible to detect such ﬂaws just 
by repeated analysis runs. Therefore, this section compares prediction re-
sults obtained through PCM-REL with the results of a simulation-based 
approach. The simulation is based on the same original PCM-REL in-
stance, but it uses a queueing network (QN) formalism as its simulation 
model and provides an own transformation from the PCM-REL instance 
to an instance of the simulation model. Hence, it constitutes an alternative 
evaluation method of the PCM-REL instance, and the obtained results can 
be compared to those of the Markov analysis. 
Figure 6.7 shows the two evaluation methods, namely the Markov anal-
ysis (coloured in grey) and the QN simulation. The latter is an exten-
sion of SimuCom, an existing PCM discrete-event performance simula-
tion (see [Bec08] for a detailed description). SimuCom takes into account 
performance-speciﬁc annotations which are neglected by the Markov anal-
ysis, such as inter-arrival times between consecutive usage scenario runs 
and resource demand sizes. It observes user behaviour, system execution 
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Figure 6.7: PCM-REL Markov Analysis and Simulation 
and hardware resource consumptions over a simulated timeline and col-
lects data about the system’s performance such as completion times of ser-
vice execution and the utilization of resources. For validation of PCM-
REL, SimuCom was extended to take the reliability-speciﬁc aspects of the 
model into account, and to trigger FOD occurrences according to the mod-
elled failure potentials. The extended simulation represents software FODs 
through exceptions thrown according to the speciﬁed probabilities, draw-
ing samples from a random number generator to decide about the result 
of each visited potential point of failure (PPOF). The same procedures are 
employed to trigger network transmission failures. For hardware resources, 
the simulation uses the given MTTF and MTTR values as mean values of 
an exponential distribution and draws samples from the distribution to de-
termine actual resource failure and repair times. Whenever service exe-
cution requires a currently unavailable hardware resource, it fails with an 
exception. Overall, the simulation records the execution results of all usage 
scenario runs, and the so-determined occurrence frequencies of success-
ful and failed scenario runs constitute a benchmark to which the Markov 
analysis results can be compared. 
Besides being an alternative evaluation method, the simulation also dif-
fers in its assumptions from the Markov analysis. While the analysis ab-
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stracts from time-related aspects, the simulation takes the concept of time 
explicitly into account. Each simulation experiment observes a system over 
a limited mission time interval and records a ﬁnite number of usage scenario 
runs during this interval. It tracks hardware resource failures and repairs 
along the simulated timeline, rather than using an aggregated steady-state 
availability value per resource (see Section 5.2.1). It is not affected by 
dependency solver assumptions such as the disregard of stochastic depen-
dencies between variable usages (see Section 6.2.1). Hence, the simulation 
experiment serves to validate that the additional abstractions of the anal-
ysis compared to simulation do not lead to insufﬁcient accuracy of the 
prediction results. 
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Figure 6.8: Single-Download Usage Scenario for the Audio Hosting Service 
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Figure 6.9: Audio Hosting Reliability Predictions with Varying Reliability Annota-
tions, Based on the Single-Download Usage Scenario 
The most severe limitation of the simulation is that it consumes signiﬁ-
cantly more time than the Markov analysis. The time consumption depends 
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on the number of events to be processed during the simulation experiment, 
which in turn is proportional to the number of observed usage scenario runs 
and the complexity of the executed behaviour in each run. In the context 
of this case study, two simpliﬁcations are introduced to keep the number 
of simulation events within feasible bounds. First, a simpliﬁed usage sce-
nario as shown in Figure 6.8, which consists of a single-ﬁle download only, 
simpliﬁes the user and system behaviour involved in each scenario run. 
Second, all reliability annotations in the model are upscaled so that FODs 
occur more frequently, which allows for observing a statistically relevant 
number of failure events within fewer usage scenario runs. The upscaling 
includes multiplying all software FOD probabilities and network transmis-
sion failure probabilities with a constant factor, as well as dividing hardware 
resource MTTF values by the same factor. Figure 6.9 depicts FOD prob-
abilities f p(scale) and f p_std(scale) obtained through Markov analysis 
for different scaling factors scale, ranging from the original setting 1.0 to 
1000.0. The predictions are based on the singe-download scenario. As the 
ﬁgure shows, the scaling changes the absolute reliability levels of the audio 
hosting service but preserves the proportions between design alternatives 
(Subﬁgure (a)) and failure dimensions (shown by example for the “std” al-
ternative in Subﬁgure (b)). Hence, the simpliﬁcations are introduced in a 
way such that the fundamental characteristics of the case study scenario are 
changed as little as possible. 
Figure 6.10 shows the result of a series of simulation experiments Exp1, 
compared to predictions obtained by the Markov analysis. The series con-
sists of one simulation experiment per design alternative, based on the 
single-download scenario and upscaled reliability annotations by factor 
1000.0. Each experiment includes 10000 usage scenario runs. While Sub-
ﬁgure (a) depicts the overall FOD probabilities f p_1000(alt) of the design 
alternatives alt, the other subﬁgures show the reliability impacts of each of 
the software, hardware and network dimensions. In spite of the simulation 
results being based on observed instances of usage scenario runs and thus 
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of Reliability Predictions with Simulation by Design Al-
ternatives and Failure Dimensions 
subject to statistical variation, prediction results and observations are gen-
erally very close. In particular, fundamental ﬁndings such as the superior 
reliability of the “ha” and “ha+re” alternatives are supported by both eval-
uations. Existing differences vary in sizes and directions and can safely be 
accredited to the effects of statistical variation. 
To give further evidence that the comparison between prediction results 
and simulation is meaningful in spite of the introduced simpliﬁcations, 
further simulation experiments Exp2 and Exp3 were conducted with de-
creased scaling factors 100.0 and 10.0, which are closer to the original 
setting. Because of the effects of statistical variation, the achieved degree 
of compliance of Exp1 (as shown in Figure 6.10) can only be expected to 
be upheld if the number of observed usage scenario runs is increased in 
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Figure 6.11: Differences Between Reliability Predictions and Simulations, by Scal-
ing Factors and Design Alternatives 
proportion to the change of scaling. Hence, each experiment of the EXP2 
series was conducted with 100000 usage scenario runs, and the EXP3 se-
ries included 1000000 scenario runs per experiment. Experiments with 
further downscaled reliability annotations and accordingly increased sce-
nario run numbers are possible but increasingly difﬁcult to conduct due to 
time limitations. Figure 6.11 depicts the differences between prediction re-
sults and simulation of all experiments Exp1 to Exp3 with corresponding 
scaling factors 1000.0 to 10.0. Subﬁgure (a) shows the absolute differ-
ences di f f _abs(scale) across all scaling factors scale and design alterna-
tives. While the concrete differences are subject to statistical variation, the 
overall trend clearly shows that the differences decrease together with the 
scaling factor, due to the increasing number of observed scenario runs per 
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experiment. On the other hand, this trend is actually required to maintain 
the same degree of compliance across all experiments. To this end, Subﬁg-
ure (b) shows normalized differences di f f _norm(scale), multiplying each 
difference in Exp2 by factor 10 and each difference in Exp3 by factor 100. 
The normalized differences are stable across all experiments (apart from the 
effects of statistical variation). Subﬁgure (c) further summarizes the ﬁnd-
ings by showing the absolute and normalized differences ∅di f f (scale) for 
the scaling factors, averaged across all design alternatives. In conclusion, 
the same level of compliance between predictions and simulations could 
be achieved for all series of experiments Exp1, Exp2 and Exp3, giving 
evidence for the assumption that validating also high-reliability values by 
simulation would be possible if the available time for experiment execu-
tion was not limited. 
The simulation experiments discussed so far do not consider the inﬂu-
ence of a limited real-world mission time on the observed system relia-
bility. Exp1 included 10000 usage scenario runs over a simulated time 
interval of 0.6 years (which translates to an average inter-arrival time of ap-
proximately 32 minutes between two scenario runs). Due to the increased 
number of observed scenario runs, system mission times covered by Exp2 
and Exp3 are 6 years and 60 years, respectively. Such mission times may 
be unrealistically high for real-world IT systems, which leads to the ques-
tion if it is possible to validate reliability predictions for systems with lim-
ited mission times. For software and network failures potentials, it can be 
reasoned that the expected number of observed FOD occurrences depends 
only on the modelled FOD probabilities and the overall number of scenario 
runs during the system’s mission time, but not on the mission time itself. 
One must only be aware that low input FOD probabilities will not lead to 
any observed FOD occurrences if the overall number of scenario runs is 
too low. However, hardware-induced FOD occurrences depend on resource 
Times-to-Failure (TTF) and Times-to-Repair (TTR). There may not be a 
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statistically relevant number of hardware failure and repair events during 
a limited system mission time. 
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Figure 6.12: Variation of Hardware-Induced Reliability Impacts Depending on Sys-
tem Mission Time 
For a closer examination of this question, another experiment Exp4 is con-
ducted simulating the modelled PCM-REL instance for the “std” alternative 
in its original setting (namely, without scaling of reliability annotations) 
based on the single-download usage scenario as shown in Figure 6.8. The 
system is observed over a theoretical mission time of 50 years with 250000 
usage scenario runs. Figure 6.12 shows the hardware-induced FOD prob-
ability f p_HW ([0, t]) as predicted by the Markov analysis and observed 
by simulation between system start at t0 = 0 and t. Two separate sim-
ulations are conducted, where one simulation assumes new hardware at 
t0 and the other one already used hardware4. While the predicted value 
is constant (due to the time-abstracting character of the Markov analysis), 
the observations by simulation initially differ from this value and eventu-
ally converge to it. In the experiment, both simulations do not experience 
any hardware-induced FOD occurrences in the ﬁrst three years, leading to 
f p_HW ([0, t]) = 0 during that time. The experiment results suggest that, 
4Both simulations assume exponentially distributed TTFs and TTRs for hardware resources, 
based on the modelled MTTF and MTTR values. 
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in spite of a principally valid prediction of hardware-induced FOD proba-
bilities, signiﬁcant differences from the predicted values may be observed 
in practice. This is due to statistical variation, whose impact depends on 
the length of the system’s mission time, the number of hardware resources 
used by the system, as well as the number of observed system installations 
(if considering the average results across all installations). All these as-
pects inﬂuence the expected overall number of hardware failure and repair 
events. The higher this number, the closer the expected compliance be-
tween prediction and observation. An additional ﬁnding of the experiment 
is that the simulation of the system running with initially new hardware 
stays below the predicted threshold, until it eventually converges towards 
it. In this case, the assumption of steady-state availability as included in the 
Markov analysis (see Section 5.2.1) is not correct in the early stages of the 
system’s lifetime, which starts with all hardware resources being available 
at t0 = 0 with probability 1.0. In conclusion, it has to be noted that observed 
hardware reliability impacts may differ from predicted ones for scenarios 
with a low number of overall hardware failure and repair events, and that 
predictions are rather conservative in cases where a system’s mission time 
starts with initially new hardware resources. 
6.4.4 Comparison with Measurements 
The previous discussion of simulation experiments as part of the audio 
hosting case study has provided evidence of the validity of the Markov 
analysis. However, both the analysis and the simulation have the original 
PCM-REL instance as a common starting point and are equally affected 
by all abstractions included into the PCM-REL modelling language. This 
section provides a supplementary discussion validating those modelling ab-
stractions. To this end, a prototypical implementation of the audio hosting 
service has been created which the PCM-REL instance represents. Reli-
ability measurements conducted on the implementation are compared to 
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predictions to observe if any signiﬁcant deviations are caused by the mod-
elling abstractions. The implementation is based on Enterprise Java Beans 
(EJB [Ora12b]) deployed on a GlassFish Application Server [Ora12a] and 
using an Apache Derby database [Apa12] for storage of user and audio 
data. For the measurements, the application is executed in a testbed that 
triggers usage scenario runs and service invocations according to a built-in 
workload driver and records the results of all scenario runs. 
In order to feasibly conduct the measurements, several simpliﬁcations 
had to be included compared to a real-world ﬁeld experiment. First, the 
overall number of scenario runs is limited to 4000 (divided into four mea-
surement runs with 1000 scenario runs each). This limitation is due to 
the fact that the scenarios are executed in real time (unlike the accelerated 
simulated time in the previous experiments). Second, the implementation 
comprises only basic functionality for user registration, user login, audio 
data storage and processing. System reliability is not measured due to real 
faults but rather to injected ones, with externally controlled FOD proba-
bilities of individual processing steps. Third, the executed system instance 
is deployed on a single hardware node (ruling out network transmission 
failures), and this node is assumed to be perfectly available (as the dura-
tion of the measurement runs is too short to observe any hardware break-
downs). For comparison between predictions and measurements, a PCM-
REL instance is created that represents the speciﬁc implemented architec-
tural candidate of the audio hosting service. This candidate corresponds 
to a modiﬁed “std” design alternative with a single computing node host-
ing all software component instances. While hardware resources possess 
perfect availability (with MTTF and MTTR values equal to zero), software 
FOD probabilities are upscaled compared to the original settings by factor 
10000. This scaling is done so that a statistically relevant amount of FODs 
can be observed during the measurements. The single-download usage sce-
nario as shown in Figure 6.8 is employed to represent user behaviour, and 
it is implemented by the testbed’s workload driver. 
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The most signiﬁcant modelling abstraction of PCM-REL with respect to the 
implemented prototype is the abstraction from component-internal state, 
which, in the implementation, governs certain control ﬂow decisions. For 
example, the “AudioManagement” component conducts ﬁle encoding dur-
ing download only if the requested bitrate is smaller than the bitrate of 
the audio ﬁle retrieved from the database (see Figure 2.9). The model 
does not explicitly represent the stored audio ﬁles and their bitrates; in-
stead, a BranchAction “EncodingCases” represents the decision using 
ﬁxed branch transition probabilities of 0.5 for each of the two possible 
cases (conduct or omit encoding). Similarly, the result of a cache access 
(which may be a hit or a miss) inﬂuences the subsequent control ﬂow and 
is modelled by PCM-REL through ﬁxed hit and miss probabilities. Both 
the decisions about encoding and about cache accesses have a potential 
to inﬂuence the resulting system reliability. Omission of encoding elimi-
nates one source of software-induced FOD occurrences during download. 
A cache hit saves database accesses and most of the required audio process-
ing, thereby signiﬁcantly reducing the failure potentials of the conducted 
service operation. 
Figure 6.13 shows the results of the conducted measurements as well as 
the comparison to prediction. Each subﬁgure depicts one out of four con-
ducted measurement runs with its FOD probabilities f p_10000(type) for 
each occurring SoftwareInducedFODType type. By manual alteration 
of the stored cache and database contents for the implemented prototype, 
different relative frequencies of cache hits and conducted encodings were 
observed during each of the measurement runs. As the results indicate, 
these variations have signiﬁcant impact on the occurrence probabilities of 
individual FOD types. A high cache hit probability lowers the occurrence 
probabilities of DB query failures, storage access failures, encoding fail-
ures and watermarking failures. Additionally, the occurrence probability 
of encoding failures rises and falls together with the rate of conducted en-
codings. Each of the measurement runs is accompanied by a reliability 
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Figure 6.13: Comparison of Reliability Predictions with Simulation by Failure-on-
Demand Types and Measurement Runs 
prediction with modelled cache and encoding probabilities adjusted to the 
observed values. The so-calibrated model leads to accurate predictions in 
all four cases, with deviations that can safely be accredited to statistical 
variation. As Figure 6.13 shows, the consistent absolute variations across 
all failure types imply lower relative variations for types with high occur-
rence probabilities (such as cache access failures) compared to types with 
low occurrence probabilities (such as web request failures). An increased 
number of scenario runs per measurement run would be required to further 
improve the overall compliance to the predicted values. 
As the experiment shows, the cache and encoding probabilities have a 
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the system’s reliability, and accurate predictions 
can only be achieved with an accordingly calibrated model. However, it is 
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feasible to assume that these probabilities can be estimated by experience 
or derived from observations obtained from similar systems. The model 
calibration is not a process of data ﬁtting. No prediction results are used as 
a feedback for the calibration. Rather, the relevant parameters are directly 
estimated for the system under study and included in the model. 
6.4.5 Case Study Assessment 
Within the context of the audio hosting case study, the PCM-REL ap-
proach presented in this thesis could successfully be applied to an IT system 
which features typical characteristics of business information systems with 
component-based software architectures. A comprehensive set of exper-
iments was conducted that demonstrates the capabilities of the approach 
and validates several of its assumptions. More concretely, the achieve-
ments of the case study with respect to the original validation goals (see 
Section 6.2) are as follows: 
Feasibility of modelling abstractions: Reliability predictions obtained 
by PCM-REL were compared to measurements conducted for a prototyp-
ical implementation which the modelled PCM-REL instance represents. 
The probabilistic abstraction of control ﬂow dependencies on component-
internal state received special attention. While a model calibration step is 
required estimating the control ﬂow probabilities, such calibration can fea-
sibly be achieved, and the resulting predictions are highly accurate. 
Feasibility of estimation of reliability annotations: In this case study, 
reliability annotations were illustratively chosen. The full process of input 
estimation is demonstrated by the Astaro ASG study (Section 6.5). 
Validity of Markov analysis: Several simulation experiments were con-
ducted and compared to predicted reliability values. The simulation uses 
an own underlying formalism and is not affected by the known assump-
tions of the analysis. Simulation and prediction results generally showed 
a high level of compliance. For hardware-induced FOD probabilities, ob-
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served values may deviate from predictions for systems with short mission 
times or few used hardware resources. Predictions are conservative if the 
system starts its mission time with initially new resources. 
Signiﬁcance and robustness of prediction results: The results of the 
Markov analysis could be used to gain several insights into the reliability 
characteristics of the audio hosting service. Recommendations for choos-
ing between multiple design alternatives could be given with high conﬁ-
dence, based on a sensitivity analysis examining the robustness of the re-
sults. Conclusions could be drawn about further potential for improvement 
which might be exploited in future system design iterations. 
6.5 Astaro ASG Case Study 
This section presents a PCM-REL case study for the Astaro Security Gate-
way (ASG) [Ast12], a system that enables a secure interconnection between 
company-internal IT infrastructures and and external communication net-
works. The system includes functionality in the area of network security 
(such as a network ﬁrewall, remote access capabilities and bandwidth con-
trol), mail security (such as spam and virus detection), web security (ﬁl-
tering, reporting and control) and web application security (such as an ap-
plication ﬁrewall). A full installation includes dedicated hardware hosting 
the system’s software on top of a Linux operating system. Multiple repli-
cated hardware nodes may co-operate for improved system performance 
and availability. Different node sizes are available supporting a recom-
mended number of 10 to 4 000 users per node. The ASG is a product of the 
Sophos (formerly Astaro) company. There are a worldwide estimated total 
of 60 000 ASG installations operating in the ﬁeld. 
The case study focuses on a speciﬁc part of the ASG’s functionality, 
namely the processing of e-mails received via SMTP. The study includes 
modelling the involved parts of the software architecture and examining 
the ASG’s reliability with respect to e-mail processing. The description 
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Figure 6.14: ASG Case Study Activities and Information Flows 
respects the need for conﬁdentiality and omits several details. However, 
it is comprehensive in giving evidence for the applicability of PCM-REL 
to an industrial system such as the ASG. The following gives a general 
outline of the study (Section 6.5.1), introduces its inputs (Section 6.5.2), 
describes the modelling activities (Section 6.5.3) including the estimation 
of required input parameters (Section 6.5.4), illustrates the analysis results 
(Section 6.5.5) and assesses the case study achievements (Section 6.5.6). 
6.5.1 Case Study Outline 
This section provides an outline of the ASG case study, which can also more 
generally serve as a raw model of how to apply PCM-REL to an existing 
industrial system under study. Figure 6.14 shows the case study’s activities 
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and information ﬂows. The study comprises four main activities: failure 
data analysis, software reliability baseline estimation, reliability modelling 
and reliability evaluation. There is no need to perform these activities in 
a strictly sequential order. Rather, there are ﬂows of information between 
the activities, as well as data outputs of activities that serve as inputs to 
other activities. A set of information sources provides the required input 
information, and a set of ASG reliability predictions constitutes the result 
of the study. 
As the ﬁgure shows, the starting point of the study is given by the def-
inition of a case study scenario (1) specifying the considered part of the 
system’s functionality and usage, as well as a set of reliability-speciﬁc ques-
tions (2) that shall be answered by the study’s results. The considered sys-
tem usage scenario (3) specifying relevant system service invocations and 
input parameters follows directly from the case study scenario. The system 
architecture scope (4) speciﬁes the relevant part of the system’s architecture 
in terms of software components, interfaces, behaviour and allocation to the 
hardware resource environment. It is obtained from existing architectural 
documentation (5) and, as required, reviews of the system’s implementation 
(6). Furthermore, the case study scenario and questions help to determine 
the relevant fraction and required modelling granularity of the architecture. 
The considered FOD types and potential points of failure (PPOFs) within 
the architecture (7) follow mainly from the case study scenario; however, 
the analysis of failure data (8) from the bug tracker database (9) may reveal 
additional FOD types and PPOFs not originally considered. Eventually, the 
speciﬁed PPOFs must be annotated with software FOD probabilities (10). 
In the ASG case study, a mixed approach was chosen to obtain those prob-
abilities, with a baseline estimation (11) for all probabilities determined 
from expert knowledge (12), enriched by existing failure statistics (13), 
and further weighted by the results of the bug tracker analysis. Addition-
ally, hardware MTTF and MTTR values (14) are determined from existing 
hardware data sheets (15). 
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All gathered data as discussed in the previous paragraph serves as an in-
put to the reliability modelling activity (16). Furthermore, a set of scenario 
parameters (17) specifying variable aspects of the system’s usage and con-
ﬁguration need to be reﬂected in the model so that their inﬂuence on the 
system’s reliability can be examined. The set of relevant parameters fol-
lows from the case study scenario deﬁnition. The modelling activity pro-
duces a PCM-REL instance (18) which serves as an input to the reliability 
evaluation (19). The evaluation includes repeated Markov analysis runs for 
the PCM-REL instance and its variations (created to examine the sensitivity 
of the system’s reliability to varying scenario parameters and reliability an-
notations). A set of reliability prediction results (20) constitutes the output 
of the evaluation activity and is interpreted to answer the initial case study 
questions. The following sections discuss the outlined case study inputs, 
activities and results in detail. 
6.5.2 Case Study Scenario and Questions 
This section introduces the case study scenario and relevant questions to 
answer, which emerged from initial discussions with ASG developers and 
constitutes the ﬁrst input to the case study (see Figure 6.14). The study fo-
cuses on the processing of e-mails received via SMTP, which may be either 
incoming (sent from an external origin to a recipient within the company-
internal network) or outgoing (sent to an external recipient from an internal 
origin). The processing includes a series of performed processing steps 
for each e-mail, namely mail acceptance checks (such as spam detection) 
and mail-handling operations (such as content encryption). The set of per-
formed processing steps may differ depending on the properties of the e-
mail and the ASG’s conﬁguration. If an e-mail does not pass an acceptance 
check, it is not further processed but either rejected or deposited in a quar-
antine storage. In the ﬁrst case, the ASG returns a rejection notice to the 
sender. In the second case, an administrator has to decide about the fur-
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ther treatment of the e-mail. If an e-mail passes all acceptance checks, the 
ASG forwards it to its destination. Information about processed e-mails 
and processing outcomes is written to the system logs and partially stored 
in a local ASG database. 
The described system functionality provides the context for the deﬁni-
tion of the central scenario of the case study, namely the SMTP processing 
scenario. This scenario starts with the arrival of an incoming or outgoing 
e-mail and includes all processing steps performed on this e-mail. The ex-
ecution of the scenario has three possible regular outcomes, namely (i) the 
acceptance and sending, (ii) the rejection or (iii) the quarantining of the pro-
cessed e-mail. A further (unwanted) outcome is the cancellation of the pro-
cessing before its completion and loss of the e-mail. The scenario execution 
is considered successful if all of the following success criteria are met: 
• Mail Processing: Each processing step is performed on the e-mail if 
and only if it is expected to be performed. 
• Mail Integrity: Each performed processing step completes without 
corrupting the e-mail (namely, changing header data or contents of 
the e-mail in unexpected ways). 
• Mail Classiﬁcation: Each performed mail acceptance check produces 
its expected result (either passing or disapproving the e-mail), lead-
ing also to the expected scenario outcome5. 
Minor problems such as wrong logging are not considered as being FODs. 
Processing delays are only considered as being FODs if they are extreme, 
such as one day or more. Furthermore, the analysis only considers problems 
that are directly related to the described scenario. This excludes FODs dur-
ing the further processing of quarantined e-mails from consideration. Un-
5Notice that the overall scenario outcome may be as expected even though an individual 
acceptance check produces a wrong result. It was decided to consider such cases as failed 
processing. Beyond the overall outcome of the scenario, each individual processing step is 
expected to perform failure-free. 
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wanted side effects during e-mail processing (such as writing wrong data to 
the local database) are not considered as being FODs if they do not violate 
the deﬁned success criteria of the scenario, even though they might impact 
the processing of further e-mails or other ASG functionality. However, the 
analysis must consider the fact that a side effect during the processing of 
one e-mail may manifest itself as a FOD while processing another e-mail. 
The deﬁnition of the SMTP processing scenario provides the basis for de-
termining relevant FOD types and PPOFs (as shown in Figure 6.14). From 
the deﬁned success criteria, it is evident that the PPOFs are connected to 
the individual e-mail processing steps. Furthermore, FOD occurrences can 
be categorized according to the type of violation that they constitute: 
• Mail Wrongly Passed: A mail acceptance check wrongly classiﬁes 
an e-mail as “OK” instead of “BAD”. This may lead to acceptance 
and sending of the e-mail as an overall unexpected scenario outcome 
(instead of rejecting or quarantining the e-mail). 
• Mail Wrongly Disapproved: A mail acceptance check wrongly clas-
siﬁes an e-mail as “BAD” instead of “OK”. The e-mail will not be 
accepted and sent, even if this scenario outcome is the expected one. 
• Mail Corrupted: A processing step results in a corruption of an e-
mail. The e-mail will not arrive at the expected recipient or in its 
expected form, even if the ASG accepts and forwards it. 
• Mail Wrongly Processed: A processing step is performed on an e-
mail even though it is expected to be skipped. This may have several 
implications; for example, an e-mail may be rejected instead of ac-
cepted. 
• Mail Processing Wrongly Omitted: A processing step of an e-mail is 
skipped even though it is expected to be performed. One potential 
implication is that the e-mail may be accepted instead of rejected. 
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• Mail Processing Cancelled: The processing of an e-mail stops unex-
pectedly before its completion. The e-mail is lost and can neither be 
sent nor rejected or quarantined. 
Another observation with respect to FOD occurrences during SMTP pro-
cessing is that they may signiﬁcantly differ in their criticality; highly crit-
ical ones are less tolerable than minor ones. In this respect, FODs can be 
categorized as follows: 
• Minor: This category includes spam classiﬁcation problems due to 
imperfect spam detection. A non-spam e-mail may be wrongly dis-
approved as being spam, or a spam e-mail may not be identiﬁed as 
such. Spam detection is a heuristic method performed under high un-
certainty. Misclassiﬁcations with a certain frequency of occurrence 
are generally accepted by users and are not particularly critical. 
• Major: This is the standard category for failed SMTP processing. It 
includes all FOD occurrences which are neither minor nor critical. 
• Critical: This category includes the non-identiﬁcation of virus e-
mails due to imperfect virus detection. Undetected viruses may 
severely and unpredictably damage data and computation within the 
ASG, and they may further propagate and cause damage at the recipi-
ent’s side. Hence, FODs of this kind should have very low occurrence 
probabilities in the ﬁeld. 
For the ASG case study, the described categorization of FOD occurrences 
according to violation type and criticality guides the speciﬁcation of FOD 
types during reliability modelling (see Table 6.3). 
The case study questions of interest are centred around two major issues. 
First, as the development of the ASG’s software continues, the question 
arises which parts of the software are most critical and should receive spe-
cial attention in terms of quality assurance efforts (which may comprise 
extended testing, code reviews or even partial re-implementation). Second, 
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the central means to avoid critical FOD occurrences is a redundant virus 
check of processed e-mails by two independent virus detection engines. 
The case study shall quantify the relative improvement gained by this re-
dundancy compared to a single-engine check, as a basis for justifying the 
introduced runtime performance overhead. 
6.5.3 ASG Architectural Model 
This section introduces the PCM-REL instance created during the relia-
bility modelling activity (see Figure 6.14). The discussion focuses on the 
model parts that result from the determined system usage scenario (element 
3 in the ﬁgure), system architecture scope (4), FOD types and PPOFs (7), as 
well as scenario parameters (17). These inputs follow from the case study 
scenario (1) and questions (2) as introduced in Section 6.5.2. Additionally, 
existing architectural documentation (5) was leveraged and the system’s 
implementation was inspected (6) to determine the required information. 
6.5.3.1 Model Overview 
The PCM-REL instance which represents the SMTP processing part of 
an ASG installation speciﬁes 16 BasicComponents, 5 CompositeCom-
ponents, 8 Interfaces and 3 model-speciﬁc DataTypes. Figure 6.15 
shows the top-level structure, which consists of 10 AssemblyContexts
instantiating the BasicComponents ClusterProtocol, SMTPDatabase and 
CONFDatabase, as well as the SMTPProxy CompositeComponent. The 
model represents an average-sized cluster ASG installation with triple re-
dundancy. Each of the three SMTPProxies implements IMessageProcessor 
so that it can serve e-mail processing requests. The proxies negotiate the 
distribution of e-mails between them through the cluster protocol. Even 
though each proxy takes an active part in the protocol, this cannot be di-
rectly expressed in PCM-REL, which only allows for modelling passive 
components. Hence, the model contains a “virtual” ClusterProtocol com-
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Figure 6.15: ASG SMTP Processing System Model 
ponent that receives e-mails ﬁrst and propagates them to the proxies. This 
modelling variant is chosen such that it does not change any of the system’s 
reliability characteristics with respect to the context of the case study. Fur-
thermore, the SMTP processing involves two databases whose contents are 
replicated for each proxy. The SMTPDatabase is used to store information 
about processed e-mails; the CONFDatabase contains the ASG’s conﬁgu-
ration information and is queried to decide about the set and conditions of 
performed mail acceptance checks and mail-handling operations. 
Figure 6.16 shows the ASG resource environment and the allocation 
of software components to hardware hosts. The model contains four Re-
sourceContainers ASGSwitch, ASGHost (1), ASGHost (2) and ASGHost 
(3). Each of the three hosts contains a full ASG software installation in-
cluding an SMTPProxy and local replica of the SMTPDatabase and CONF-
Database. Each host receives and sends e-mails via the ASGSwitch, which 
contains the virtual ClusterProtocol. Hardware resources within the hosts 
and the switch are not individually modelled but aggregated to single Pro-
cessingResourceSpecifications per node using two custom Pro-
cessingResourceTypes ASGHostHW and ASGSwitchHW. Each Pro-
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Figure 6.16: ASG Resource Environment and Allocation Model 
cessingResourceSpecification has its “RequiredByContainer” ﬂag 
set to “true” to indicate that the node is only operational when its hard-
ware is available. 
Figure 6.17 depicts the ASG usage model, which speciﬁes a single 
UsageScenario “SMTPProcessingScenario” with a single EntryLev-
elSystemCall to the “ProcessMessage” operation of the “IMessagePro-
cessor” Interface. Several VariableUsages specify properties of the 
invoked operation’s input parameter “message” and its sub parameters. 
“Message” is a CompositeDataType contained in the ASG Repository 
Model, representing the e-mail that is to be processed by the ASG. It has 
a set of inner declarations to reﬂect properties that inﬂuence its treatment 
in the system. These properties include the number of recipients of the 
e-mail, the classiﬁcation of the e-mail as being spam or containing a virus, 
containing forbidden expressions in the subject or body, containing crit-
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Figure 6.17: ASG Usage Model 
ical ﬁle name extensions in the set of attached ﬁles, as well as being an 
incoming or outgoing e-mail. Using the PCM-speciﬁc Stochastic Expres-
sions (StoEx) language [Koz08], Probability Mass Functions (PMFs) of 
type Integer (IntPMF) and Boolean (BoolPMF) are employed to specify 
those properties. The ﬁgure shows the speciﬁcation of a processing request 
for an e-mail with one recipient, which is no spam, does not contain a virus, 
has no bad expressions or ﬁle name extensions, and is either incoming or 
outgoing, each with probability 0.5. The request properties can be mod-
iﬁed during a sensitivity analysis to examine how the system’s reliability 
is inﬂuenced by such changes. 
The inner structure of the SMTPProxy CompositeComponent is shown 
in Figure 6.18. The proxy makes use of the open source mail transfer 
agent Exim [HWW+12] for the initial handling of received e-mails (re-
alized through the SMTPServerExim component), as well as the sending 
of completely processed e-mails (realized through SMTPClientExim). The 
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Figure 6.18: ASG SMTP Proxy Model 
SMTPServerExim performs initial checks on each received e-mail and ei-
ther rejects it or passes it on to a message queue for further internal pro-
cessing by the SMTPDaemon. Depending on the conﬁguration of the ASG 
and the properties of a received e-mail, the SMTPServerExim may perform 
a check for spam or viruses using the spam and virus detection engines 
of the SMTPDaemon. The latter can access the SMTP and conﬁguration 
databases, and it can hand e-mails over to the SMTPEximClient for send-
ing after all processing steps have been completed. The PCM-REL instance 
further divides the SMTPServerExim in two sub components ServerEximC-
trl and ServerEximChecks (not shown in the ﬁgure) to distinguish between 
the control ﬂow that decides over the execution of individual processing 
steps and the execution of those steps itself. 
Figure 6.19 further details the inner structure of the SMTPDaemon. The 
included sub components can be categorized in message queues (namely 
InputQueue, WorkQueue and OutputQueue, which implement the “IMes-
sageQueue” Interface), message processors (QueueManager and Mail-
Analyzer, implementing “IMessageProcessor”) and the message deposit 
Quarantine (implementing “IMessageDeposit”). While in reality, the mes-
sage processors are active components that observe the queues and fetch e-
mails from them for processing, this cannot be directly expressed in PCM-
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Figure 6.19: ASG SMTP Daemon Model 
REL. Instead, the queues are modelled as actively invoking the message 
processors to trigger the processing of an e-mail. This modelling variant 
allows for considering the SMTP processing scenario as deﬁned in Sec-
tion 6.5.2 as a whole and for deriving its overall success probability, rather 
than only considering the reliability of individual scenario parts. When-
ever an e-mail is placed in the InputQueue (through the “IMessageQueue” 
Interface), it is propagated to the QueueManager, which stores infor-
mation about the e-mail in the SMTP database and then places it in the 
WorkQueue. From there, it further propagates to the MailAnalyzer, which 
is the central component responsible for all internal mail processing steps. 
The MailAnalyzer queries the CONF database to decide upon the set of 
processing steps to be performed for the e-mail. As a result of the executed 
mail acceptance checks, the MailAnalyzer either accepts the e-mail and 
places it in the OutputQueue or disapproves it and places it in the Quaran-
tine (through the “IMessageDeposit” Interface). The further processing 
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of quarantined e-mails requires further user interaction. It is excluded from 
the case study model because it is not part of the considered SMTP process-
ing scenario. From the OutputQueue, the e-mail visits the QueueManager 
one more time and is ﬁnally passed on to the SMTPClientExim for sending 
(via the “IMessageProcessor” Interface, see Figure 6.18). 
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Figure 6.20: ASG Mail Analyzer Model 
Figure 6.20 gives further insight in the internals of the MailAnalyzer Com-
positeComponent. The central Scanner accepts e-mails via the “IMes-
sageProcessor” Interface and is responsible for performing the required 
processing steps. The PCM-REL instance further distinguishes two sub 
components ScannerCtrl and ScannerChecks of the Scanner (not shown in 
the ﬁgure) to separate the decisions about the execution of the individual 
processing steps from the execution itself. The range of possible process-
ing steps includes checking an e-mail for forbidden expressions and critical 
ﬁle name extensions in the attachments, as well as performing spam and 
virus detection (if not already done by SMTPServerExim, see Figure 6.18). 
Furthermore, e-mail contents may be encrypted (for outgoing e-mails) or 
decrypted (for incoming e-mails), and a digital signature may be checked 
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(for incoming e-mails) or created (for outgoing e-mails). For spam and 
virus detection, the Scanner employs the existing engines SpamDetector, 
VirusDetector_A and VirusDetector_B (the original names of the engines 
are omitted for conﬁdentiality reasons). Having an e-mail checked by two 
independent virus detection engines is a fault-tolerance capability of the 
ASG that decreases the probability of critical FOD occurrences due to 
undetected viruses. The provided Interfaces of the SpamDetector and 
VirusDetector_A are not only used internally but also offered as provided 
Interfaces of the MailAnalyzer. Hence, the engines can be used by the 
SMTPServerExim if required. 
6.5.3.2 Behavioural Speciﬁcations 
The system behaviour modelled for SMTP processing through the ASG 
comprises 24 ResourceDemandingSEFFs. The core behaviour consists 
of the execution of mail acceptance checks and mail-handling operations 
by the SMTPServerExim (see Figure 6.18) and Scanner (see Figure 6.20). 
Further relevant aspects include the distribution of e-mails to SMTPProxies 
by the ClusterProtocol (Figure 6.15) and the ﬁnal processing of an accepted 
e-mail for sending by the SMTPClientExim (Figure 6.18). The following 
exemplary excerpts of behavioural speciﬁcations illustrate how the PCM-
REL instance captures SMTP processing behaviour. 
Figure 6.21 shows part of the “ProcessMessage” ResourceDemanding-
SEFF of ServerEximCtrl. The Exim server performs different mail ac-
ceptance checks on each received e-mail based on Access Control Lists 
(ACL). The ACL Connect Check and ACL Data Check are performed 
once per e-mail; the ACL Recipient Check is performed for each recipi-
ent. Each individual check may lead to disapproval and rejection of the 
e-mail without any further checks being performed. If the e-mail passes all 
checks, the Exim server places it in the InputQueue of the SMTPDaemon 
(see Figure 6.19). The execution of the individual checks by ServerEx-
imChecks is triggered within a RecoveryAction “PerformACLChecks” 
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Figure 6.21: RDSEFF “ServerEximCtrl.ProcessMessage” (Excerpt) 
(the ﬁgure shows only the invocation of the Connect Check and omits 
the Data and Recipient Check invocations). The model captures the gen-
eral potential of an ACL check being wrongly omitted through custom 
FailureTypes (such as “ACLConnectCheckWronglyOmitted”) and an 
additional InternalAction before each check indicating a correspond-
ing point of failure (such as “EvaluatePerformACLConnectCheck”). The 
ﬁnal ExternalCallAction places the e-mail in the queue and passes 
all its relevant properties through VariableUsages on to the called be-
haviour. When invoked, ServerEximChecks indicates any disapproval of 
the e-mail through one of the SoftwareInducedFODTypes “ACLConnect-
Disapproval”, “ACLDataDisapproval” or “ACLRecipientDisapproval”. In 
ServerEximCtrl, the RecoveryActionBehaviour “HandleDisapproval” 
speciﬁes that no further checks are invoked after a disapproval, and the 
e-mail is not passed on to the queue. Hence, the “PerformACLChecks” 
RecoveryAction does not represent fault-tolerant behaviour in a strict 
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Figure 6.22: RDSEFF “ServerEximChecks.PerformACLConnectCheck” 
sense. Rather, it controls the handling of e-mail rejection during the ACL 
checks. 
Figure 6.22 shows the execution of the ACL Connect Check through 
ServerEximChecks as invoked by ServerEximCtrl. The speciﬁcation has to 
account for the general probability of a reject and the possibility of wrong 
passing, wrong disapproval, corruption or cancelled processing of the e-
mail. The expected result of the check (pass or disapprove) depends on 
the properties of the e-mail (such as the sender domain) and the conﬁgu-
ration of the ASG (such as the set of sender domains that are considered 
legitimate). However, detailed modelling of all relevant e-mail proper-
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ties and ASG conﬁguration options would not be feasible. For example, 
it would not be possible to specify a probability distribution over all pos-
sible sender domains as part of the usage model. Instead, the model ag-
gregates all inﬂuencing factors into a general probability of rejection spec-
iﬁed as a component parameter “ACLConnectDisapprove” of ServerExim-
Checks, which is directly estimated for a given ASG application scenario. 
In the behavioural speciﬁcation, the BranchAction “ACLConnectDisap-
proveCases” evaluates this parameter to determine the expected result of 
the check. The check itself is represented by an InternalAction “Perfor-
mACLConnectCheck”, which may produce an FOD occurrence of one of 
the types “ACLConnectCheckFalseNegative”, “ACLConnectCheckFalse-
Positive”, “MailCorruptedByACLConnectCheck” or “MailProcessingCan-
celledByACLConnectCheck”. An additional InternalAction indicates 
the “ACLConnectDisapprove” with probability 1.0 in the case where this 
result is expected. 
Figure 6.23 depicts the e-mail decryption as an example for a mail-
handling operation. The operation is invoked by ScannerCtrl and carried 
out by ScannerChecks. The speciﬁcation accounts for the general probabil-
ity that decryption is to be performed, for the possibility of wrong omission 
or wrong execution of the operation, as well as FOD occurrences during 
the operation that lead to e-mail corruption or cancellation of the process-
ing. As decryption is only performed on incoming e-mails, the “isOutgo-
ing” property must be checked to decide about the execution of the opera-
tion. Further aspects that inﬂuence the probability of decryption are aggre-
gated into a component parameter “PerformDecryption” of ScannerChecks. 
As the ﬁgure shows, the BranchAction “PerformDecryptionCases” de-
cides about the execution of the decryption. The probability of a wrong 
decision is expressed through an InternalAction “EvaluatePerformDe-
cryption” that may produce FODs of type “DecryptionWronglyOmitted” or 
“DecryptionWronglyPerformed”. The operation itself is represented by an 
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Figure 6.23: RDSEFF “ScannerChecks.PerformDecryption” 
InternalAction “PerformDecryption” that may produce a “MailCorrupt-
edByDecryption” or a “MailProcessingCancelledByDecryption” FOD. 
Figure 6.24 shows part of the “AnalyzeExpressions” operation carried 
out by ScannerChecks, as an example for a mail acceptance check that con-
siders the general probability of the check to be performed, the possibility 
of wrong omission or wrong execution of the check, wrong mail passing 
or disapproval as a check result, as well as mail corruption or cancelled 
mail processing due to the check. The probability that the check is ex-
pected to be performed is captured through the component parameter “Per-
formExpressionsAnalysis”. A wrong decision about the execution leads 
to FODs “ExpressionsAnalysisWronglyOmitted” or “ExpressionsAnaly-
sisWronglyPerformed” in the InternalAction “EvaluatePerformExpres-
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Figure 6.24: RDSEFF “ScannerChecks.AnalyzeExpressions” (Excerpt) 
sionsAnalysis”. The inner BranchAction “HasBadExpressionsCases” 
examines the “hasBadExpressions” property of the “message” parame-
ter. Its structure is similar to that of the BranchAction in Figure 6.22, 
potentially producing FODs of type “AnalyzeExpressionsFalseNegative”, 
“AnalyzeExpressionsFalsePositive”, “MailCorrupedByExpressionsAnaly-
sis” or “MailProcessingCancelledByExpressionsAnalysis”. Furthermore, 
the BranchAction indicates an “AnalyzeExpressionsDisapproval” with 
probability 1.0 (which is handled by the invoking ScannerCtrl) in the 
GuardedBranchTransition “CaseTrue”. 
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Figure 6.25: RDSEFF “ScannerChecks.PerformVirusDetection” (Excerpt) 
The next two ﬁgures 6.25 and 6.26 show the parts of the system’s be-
haviour that are related to fault tolerance. First, Figure 6.25 illustrates 
the fault-tolerant virus detection triggered through the “PerformVirusDe-
tection” operation of ScannerChecks. The detection itself is carried out by 
the engines VirusDetector_A and VirusDetector_B (see Figure 6.20) and in-
voked by ScannerChecks through corresponding ExternalCallActions. 
The contamination of an e-mail with a virus is explicitly modelled through 
the “hasVirus” boolean property of the “message” parameter and passed 
on to the engines. If the e-mail does contain a virus, the engines indicate 
this condition through a “VirusDetected” SoftwareInducedFODType, if 
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no mail corruption or cancelled mail processing occurs (the corresponding 
behavioural speciﬁcation is similar to that of Figure 6.22). As shown in 
Figure 6.25, the overall virus detection invokes both engines and can tol-
erate a single “VirusDetectionFalseNegative” FOD. The execution of the 
displayed RecoveryAction “PerformFaultTolerantVirusDetection” starts 
with the “Main” RecoveryActionBehaviour and proceeds as follows: 
• If the processed e-mail contains no virus, it may successfully pass 
both engines, or a “VirusDetectionFalsePositive” may occur, which 
is not handled by the modelled fault tolerance mechanism. 
• If the e-mail contains a virus, the ﬁrst invoked engine VirusDetec-
tor_A may indicate this virus through a “VirusDetected” Failure-
Type (which is handled outside the displayed RecoveryAction), 
or it may produce a “VirusDetectionFalseNegative” FOD. The latter 
case leads to the execution of the “HandleFalseNegative” behaviour, 
which gives the virus a second chance to be detected by VirusDe-
tector_B. However, the ability of VirusDetector_B to detect the virus 
may be compromised by failure correlation (taking into account that 
this virus was already overlooked by VirusDetector_A). The addi-
tional probability of a second “VirusDetectionFalseNegative” FOD 
due to failure correlation is expressed through the “EvaluateFail-
ureCorrelation” InternalAction. 
• In both discussed cases, VirusDetector_A and VirusDetector_B may 
also produce FOD occurrences of type “MailCorruptedByVirusDe-
tection” or “MailProcessingCancelledByVirusDetection”. None of 
these FODs are handled by the modelled fault tolerance mechanism. 
A design alternative with only a single virus check can be represented by 
substituting the displayed RecoveryAction with a single ExternalCall-
Action invoking one of the engines. Having both design alternatives mod-
elled enables a quantitative comparison of their reliability and an assess-
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ment of the relative improvement gained by the introduction of the sec-
ond engine. 
Further parts of the “PerformVirusDetection” operation of Scanner-
Checks, which are not shown in Figure 6.25, deal with the general proba-
bility of virus detection to be performed (captured through a ScannerChecks 
component parameter) and with the possibility of wrong omission or wrong 
execution of the check. The decision about the execution is done individu-
ally for each e-mail recipient, but the check itself is executed at most once, 
as it refers to the e-mail as a whole. 
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Figure 6.26: RDSEFF “ClusterProtocol.ProcessMessage” (Excerpt) 
Figure 6.26 shows how the distribution of e-mails to ASG hosts through 
the ClusterProtocol is modelled in PCM-REL. From the viewpoint of re-
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liability, the most relevant aspect of the cluster protocol is that an e-mail 
can be processed if at least one of the three ASG hosts is operating. The 
model abstracts from the details of the distribution of e-mails between mul-
tiple operating hosts. Instead, all hosts are targeted in a constant order 
until the ﬁrst operating host is detected. A host is deemed operational if its 
hardware (modelled by ProcessingResourceSpecifications of type 
“ASGHostHW”) is available at the moment of the processing request. This 
modelling reﬂects the feedback of ASG developers saying that unavailable 
hardware is the single most important reason for an ASG host being not 
operational. As the ﬁgure shows, the ﬁrst RecoveryActionBehaviour
“SelectFirstHost” of the displayed RecoveryAction “PerformFaultToler-
antMailDistribution” invokes the “ProcessMessage” operation of the ﬁrst 
SMTPProxy instance, which is allocated to ASGHost_1 (see Figure 6.16). 
All relevant message properties are passed as input parameters to the re-
spective ExternalCallAction (not fully shown in the ﬁgure). A fur-
ther RecoveryActionBehaviour “SelectSecondHost” handles the case 
that the unavailability of the ﬁrst host’s hardware prevents it from being 
operational. A corresponding HardwareInducedFODType “ASGHostH-
WUnavailable” has been deﬁned in the ASG Repository model and is 
pointed out as a handledFODType of the behaviour. Beyond the invo-
cation of the second SMTPProxy instance, the behaviour also expresses 
the possibility that the fail-over process triggered by the unavailability 
of ASGHost_1 might not be correctly handled by the cluster protocol, 
leading to an unhandled FOD of type “ClusterProtocolFailure”. The last 
RecoveryActionBehaviour “SelectThirdHost” is structured like the sec-
ond one, invoking the third SMTPProxy instance. 
6.5.3.3 Model Parametrization 
This section introduces the parts of the created PCM-REL instance that re-
fer to failure potentials and scenario parameters (elements 7 and 17 in Fig-
ure 6.14), which can be viewed as the dynamic parameters of the model. 
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The software-related reliability annotations comprise a total of 93 software 
FOD probabilities associated to 65 SoftwareInducedFODTypes and oc-
curring at 57 InternalActions as potential points of failure (PPOFs) dur-
ing service execution. Table 6.3 shows a list of considered FOD classes 
and gives examples of speciﬁed SoftwareInducedFODTypes related to 
each class. The table distinguishes initial classes, which were added to 
the model according to the initially identiﬁed success criteria and violation 
types of the case study scenario (see Section 6.5.2), and additional classes, 
which were identiﬁed during the analysis of the bug tracker database (see 
Figure 6.14). These additional classes show that a cancellation of e-mail 
processing can be caused not only by individual malfunctioning processing 
steps but also by other problems such as complete inoperability of ASG 
software parts. Beyond the software FOD probabilities, the ASG PCM-
REL instance contains further reliability annotations in its ResourceEn-
vironment model (see Figure 6.16), namely MTTF and MTTR values 
for each of the four ProcessingResourceSpecifications and network 
FOD probabilities for each of the three speciﬁed LinkingResources). 
Section 6.5.4 discusses how input estimations for the modelled reliability 
annotations were derived within the case study process. 
The scenario parameters refer to usage and conﬁguration aspects of ASG 
installations, as well as probabilistic abstractions from ASG-internal states. 
They constitute the calibration parameters of the model an were estimated 
by ASG developers from experience. More concretely, the scenario pa-
rameters comprise input properties of e-mail processing requests, as well 
as execution probabilities and expected outcomes of individual processing 
steps. The former are expressed through VariableUsages in the modelled 
UsageScenario (see Figure 6.17) and comprise a total of six probability 
values (modelled as boolean probability mass functions) and one probabil-
ity distribution (modelled as integer probability mass function). The latter 
are expressed through a total of 12 component parameters of the ServerEx-
imChecks and ScannerChecks components, as shown in Table 6.4. Each 
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Failure-on-Demand Class Modelled Failure-on-Demand Type(s)
I n
i t i
a l
 C
l a
s s
e s
MailCorruptedByProcessingStep:
A mail acceptance check or mail-handling operation results 
in a failure-on-demand and corrupts the e-mail.
• MailCorruptedByACLConnectCheck
• MailCorruptedByDecryption
• …
MailProcessingCancelledByProcessingStep:
A mail acceptance check or mail-handling operation results 
in a failure-on-demand and cancels the e-mail processing.
• MailProcessingCancelledByACLConnectCheck
• MailProcessingCancelledByDecryption
• …
AcceptanceCheckFalsePositive:
A mail acceptance check disapproves an e-mail even 
though it should pass the e-mail.
• ACLConnectCheckFalsePositive
• ExpressionsAnalysisFalsePositive
• …
AcceptanceCheckFalseNegative:
A mail acceptance check passes an e-mail even though it 
should disapprove the e-mail.
• ACLConnectCheckFalseNegative
• ExpressionsAnalysisFalseNegative
• …
ProcessingStepWronglyOmitted:
A mail acceptance check or mail-handling operation is 
omitted for an e-mail even though it should be performed.
• ExpressionsAnalysisWronglyOmitted
• DecryptionWronglyOmitted
• …
ProcessingStepWronglyPerformed:
A mail acceptance check or mail-handling operation is 
performed on an e-mail even though it should be omitted.
• ExpressionsAnalysisWronglyPerformed
• DecryptionWronglyPerformed
• …
A d
d i
t i o
n a
l  C
l a
s s
e s
MailProcessingCancelledByClusterProtocol:
The cluster protocol does not properly operate and the
e-mail processing is cancelled.
• ClusterProtocolFailure
MailProcessingCancelledByASGDown:
The ASG software is not ready to process e-mails and the
e-mail processing is cancelled.
• SMTPDown
• ScannerDown
MailProcessingCancelledByDatabaseCorruption:
The SMTP or CONF databases cannot be properly 
accessed and the e-mail processing is cancelled.
• SMTPDatabaseCorrupted
• CONFDatabaseCorrupted
161 mm = 1.006
Table 6.3: ASG Software-Induced Failure-on-Demand Types 
component parameter is modelled as a boolean probability mass function 
and represents either an expected outcome of a mail acceptance check (such 
as “ACLConnectDisapprove”) or an expected decision about conducting a 
mail-handling operation (such as “PerformDecryption”). The parameters 
abstract from ASG conﬁguration options and e-mail properties that are not 
explicitly modelled to avoid an overly complex speciﬁcation. The mod-
elled ResourceDemandingSEFFs evaluate the component parameters for 
control ﬂow decisions. For example, Figure 6.22 shows that the “ACLCon-
nectDisapprove” parameter is evaluated to decide about the expected out-
come of the ACL Connect Check. The actual outcome may differ from the 
expected one, as indicated by the modelled “ACLConnectCheckFalseNeg-
ative” and “ACLConnectCheckFalsePositive” FailureTypes of the “Per-
formACLConnectCheck” InternalAction. 
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Modelled Component 
Parameter
Description
S e
r v
e r
E x
i m
C
h e
c k
s
PerformVirusDetection Probability that virus detection is to be performed by SMTPServerExim on a received e-mail.
PerformSpamDetection Probability that spam detection is to be performed by SMTPServerExim on a received e-mail.
ACLConnectDisapprove Probability that a received e-mail is to be disapproved by the ACL Connect Check.
ACLRecipientDisapprove Probability that a received e-mail is to be disapproved by the ACL Recipient Check (evaluated for each recipient).
ACLDataDisapprove
Probability that a received e-mail is to be disapproved by the ACL Data Check 
(evaluated based on the precondition that the e-mail is not disapproved based 
on classification as spam or virus).
S c
a n
n e
r C
h e
c k
s
PerformVirusDetection Probability that virus detection is to be performed by the Scanner on a received e-mail (evaluated for each recipient).
PerformSpamDetection Probability that spam detection is to be performed by the Scanner on a received e-mail (evaluated for each recipient).
PerformEncryption Probability that a received outgoing e-mail is to be encrypted by the Scanner.
PerformDecryption Probability that a received incoming e-mail is to be decrypted by the Scanner.
PerformExpressionsAnalysis Probability that expressions analysis is to be performed by the Scanner on a received e-mail.
PerformFileNamesAnalysis Probability that file names analysis is to be performed by the Scanner on a received e-mail.
PerformMessageSigning Probability that message signing is to be performed by the Scanner on a received e-mail.
160 mm = 1.0
Table 6.4: ASG Component Parameters 
6.5.4 Estimation of Reliability Annotations 
This section describes the estimation of reliability annotations as an input 
to the reliability modelling activity (see Figure 6.14). The reliability anno-
tations comprise the software FOD probabilities (element 10 in the ﬁgure) 
and hardware MTTF / MTTR values (14). The former part required a major 
effort analysing failure data (8) from a bug tracker database (9) and combin-
ing the results with a software reliability baseline estimation (11) derived 
from expert knowledge (12), as well as existing failure statistics (13). The 
latter part could be determined from hardware data sheets (15). 
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6.5.4.1 Software Failure-on-Demand Probabilities 
The estimation of model parameters representing software FOD probabili-
ties constituted the most signiﬁcant challenge among all input estimations. 
Due to the high number of modelled parameters (see Section 6.5.3.3), es-
timations were done for parameter groups (rather than individual parame-
ters) and based on a common software reliability baseline estimation. The 
most important source of information for the estimations was a bug tracker 
database that supports the ASG software development. The bug tracker is 
used to report about the occurrence of software-induced FODs, the iden-
tiﬁcation of underlying implementation faults, as well as the status and 
responsibilities of fault removal. Failure reports stem from internal soft-
ware tests as well as external customer feedback for devices operating in 
the ﬁeld. The development, test and fault removal of current and new ASG 
software releases is a continuous process, and each bug tracker entry re-
lates to a certain release version. 
While the bug tracker entries describe implementation faults and result-
ing ASG failures, they provide no direct input for the reliability modelling 
activity. They describe circumstances of failure, but not the frequency of 
occurrence of those circumstances. The provided information is qualitative 
rather than quantitative. Furthermore, existing entries are historical and 
relate to faults that have already been removed. They do not impact cur-
rent or future ASG software releases. Hence, the bug tracker data can only 
serve as a preliminary input that needs further interpretation and analysis 
to derive quantitative estimations. One way to do this analysis is to use 
software reliability growth models (SRGMs, see Section 2.3.1) on a com-
ponent level (more precisely, on a PPOF level). However, the existing ASG 
bug tracking process signiﬁcantly violates the underlying assumptions of 
SRGMs (for example, the software continues to evolve during the data col-
lection), and important input information for the analysis is missing (such 
as the number of visits to each PPOF per test run). The analysis method 
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had to be adjusted to be applicable to the existing ASG bug tracker data. 
Like conventional SRGMs, the analysis assumed that current and future 
failure rates can be deduced from historical failure rates. However, the 
historical failure rates were not directly available but had to be estimated 
from the qualitative failure data. Because of the involved uncertainty, the 
analysis did not aim at determining absolute FOD probabilities but rather 
relative weights of the individual FOD types and PPOFs. More concretely, 
the analysis included the following steps: 
1. Selection of bug tracker entries to consider; 
2. Semantic examination of each selected entry; 
3. Deduction of a relative weight for each modelled PPOF (differenti-
ated according to occurring FOD types). 
The ﬁrst step involved the assessment of existing data ﬁelds that each entry 
possesses in order to select a relevant set of entries for the analysis. A cate-
gory ﬁeld describes the part of the ASG’s functionality that is impacted by 
a certain reported problem. This ﬁeld is used to reduce the set of consid-
ered entries to those related to SMTP processing. A project ﬁeld captures 
the major release version to which an entry is related. In order to exclude 
entries which are insigniﬁcant due to their age, the analysis was limited 
to the current and the previous major ASG software release, spanning a 
time interval of roughly 1.5 years. Within this scope, the SMTP process-
ing architecture as modelled through PCM-REL can be considered stable. 
Furthermore, each entry has an associated severity level that assesses the 
impact of a certain reported problem. The analysis was limited to the most 
and second-most severe levels to exclude minor problems such as wrong 
logging from consideration. After applying all described reductions, 65 
entries remained as being relevant for the analysis. 
The second step involved an in-depth semantic examination of each rel-
evant entry, covering all contents of the entry. The entries include natural-
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language discussion threads between several parties (software testers, de-
velopers and customer support staff). The relevant information about the 
nature of occurred FODs, the triggering circumstances, the underlying 
faults and any actions taken for their removal had to be extracted from 
these discussions. During the semantic examination, the validity of each 
entry was checked ﬁrst. The following entries were considered invalid with 
respect to the case study and excluded from further consideration: 
• Entries that are duplicates of other (valid) entries; 
• Entries that describe problems resulting from user operation or con-
ﬁguration errors rather than implementation faults; 
• Entries that describe feature or documentation requests; 
• Entries that are related to security rather than reliability; 
• Entries whose included information is incomplete and cannot further 
be exploited. 
After the validity check, 27 entries remained for consideration, each of 
which describes a distinct SMTP processing problem leading to FOD oc-
currences, namely violations of the speciﬁed success criteria of the case 
study scenario (see Section 6.5.2). Each of these entries was further ex-
amined and categorized as shown in Table 6.5 in order to make more sys-
tematic and reﬁned statements about the induced FOD occurrences. The 
ﬁrst three categories refer to the location within the architecture where the 
FODs originate. More concretely, FOD occurrences are mapped to one 
of the InternalActions in the modelled PCM-REL instance (category 
“Point of Failure”), which is part of an RDSEFF (category “Service Op-
eration”) of a BasicComponent (category “Software Component”). The 
table contains an example in which FODs are located to the “Evaluate-
PerformACLConnectCheck” action within the “ProcessMessage” opera-
tion of the “ServerEximCtrl” component (see Figure 6.21). Two more 
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Service Operation e.g. “ProcessMessage”
Point-of-Failure e.g. “EvaluatePerformACLConnectCheck”
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p e Failure-on-Demand Class e.g. “ProcessingStepWronglyOmitted”
Failure-on-Demand Type e.g. “ACLConnectCheckWronglyOmitted”
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e
Failure-on-Demand 
Occurrence Likelihood
• Very low (not expected to occur in practice)
• Low (may occur in practice under specific cirumstances)
• Medium (likely to occur for a few customers and installations)
• High (likely to occur for a considerable number of customers and 
installations)
• Very high (occurs for all customers and installations)
• Unknown
Failure-on-Demand 
Persistence
• Single (single failures-on-demand without further impact)
• Transient (disrupted processing for limited period of time)
• Until ASG restart
• Until ASG reconfiguration
• Until ASG version update
• Unknown
Configuration Dependencies e.g. spam detection enabled, expression filters configured, …(can be “none” or “unknown”)
Request Dependencies e.g. mail with >100 recipients, mail with special characters, …(can be “none” or “unknown”)
160 mm = 1.0
Table 6.5: Semantic Categorization of ASG Bug Tracker Entries 
categories refer to type infor ation, selecting a certain class of FODs 
(as listed in Table 6.3) and a modelled SoftwareInducedFODType. To-
gether, the type and location categories unambiguously select a certain 
FODOccurrenceDescriptionwithin the modelled PCM-REL instance. 
The remaining categories serve as indications for the probability of oc-
currence of the FODs, namely the “FODProbability” attribute of the mod-
elled FODOccurrenceDescriptions (see Figure 4.5). First, the category 
“FOD Occurrence Likelihood” speciﬁes the fraction of existing customers 
and ASG installations that are expected to experience FODs due to the re-
ported problem, with values ranging from “very low” (namely, no FODs are 
expected to occur in the ﬁeld) to “very high” (namely, FODs are expected to 
occur for all customers and installations). The category “FOD Persistence” 
describes the system behaviour after a FOD has occurred. There may be no 
consequences on further e-mail processing requests (value “single”), or the 
processing may be temporarily disrupted and then function again (value 
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“transient”). Alternatively, the processing may be permanently disrupted 
until administrative action is taken (values “until ASG restart / reconﬁgura-
tion / version update”). The two remaining categories “Conﬁguration De-
pendencies” and “Request Dependencies” describe preconditions of FOD 
occurrences in terms of ASG conﬁguration options and request properties. 
For example, a reported problem may only lead to FODs if the ASG is 
conﬁgured to perform spam detection, and if an e-mail contains speciﬁc 
characters in its body message. All categories contain an additional value 
“unknown” in case that the bug tracker entry does not contain enough in-
formation to determine a concrete value. 
(1) 
Baseline 
Estimation
(2) Bug Tracker Analysis (3) Resulting
Software Failure-on-
Demand ProbabilityConditions Weight
1.0E-b • At least 4 reported problems
• At least 1 reported problem with occurrence likelihood “low” 
(or higher) OR persistence “restart” (or higher) OR occuring 
for all configurations and requests
3 1.0E-(b-3)
1.0E-b • At least 2 reported problems
• At least 1 reported problem with occurrence likelihood “low” 
(or higher) OR persistence “transient” (or higher)
2 1.0E-(b-2)
1.0E-b • At least 1 reported problem with occurrence likelihood “low” 
(or higher)
1 1.0E-(b-1)
1.0E-b All other cases 0 1.0E-b
155.6 mm = 0.973
Table 6.6: Determination of Software Failure-on-Demand Probabilities 
As a result of the semantic examination of the bug tracker entries, each FOD 
type occurring at a PPOF (represented by a FODOccurrenceDescription
in the modelled PCM-REL instance) is associated with a set of zero or more 
entries. As Table 6.6 shows, the corresponding software FOD probability is 
determined by a baseline estimation 10−b and adjusted by a relative weight 
w ∈ {0, ..,3} resulting in 10−b+w (the actual probabilities are omitted for 
conﬁdentiality reasons). The weight values w were deduced in a third and 
ﬁnal step of the bug tracker analysis. They are a relative indication of the 
estimated historical FOD probabilities connected to each PPOF and FOD 
type. The exact range of weight values and the conditions of each value 
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result from a manual assessment of the whole considered failure data set; 
they may vary for other data sets in similar case studies. Generally, the 
assigned weights depend on the number of associated entries, the FOD oc-
currence likelihood, the degree of FOD persistence, as well as the degree 
of existing conﬁguration and request dependencies. The adjustment of the 
baseline estimations by the determined weights is based on the assump-
tion that historical FOD probabilities can be extrapolated to the future – 
the higher a historical FOD probability for a certain PPOF and FOD type 
is, the higher is also its current and future FOD probability expected to be. 
The baseline estimation value b is the same for all software FOD proba-
bilities. It was manually contributed by ASG developers and is subject to 
relatively high uncertainty. For this reason, the reliability evaluation done 
for the case study refrains from absolute statements about the ASG’s reli-
ability (see Section 6.5.5). 
In addition to the described bug tracker analysis, some software FOD 
probabilities related to false negatives and false positives during spam and 
virus detection were directly estimated from existing statistical failure data. 
The corresponding FODs are not caused by implementation faults in a strict 
sense, and they are not reported in the bug tracker database. Rather, they 
result from natural limitations of the existing detection engines, which can-
not achieve perfect success rates. Corresponding failure statistics are com-
monly available (for example, see failure statistics of commercial anti-virus 
engines in [AV-10]). Likewise, concrete FOD probabilities for the ASG’s 
spam and virus detection engines could be determined from existing fail-
ure statistics. 
6.5.4.2 Further Reliability Annotations 
Besides the software failure potential of the ASG’s SMTP processing, there 
is also a failure potential stemming from the system’s resource environment 
(see Figure 6.16) that impacts its reliability. To this end, different hardware 
conﬁgurations are available for the ASG hosts with speciﬁed data sheet 
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MTTF values between 50 000 and 100 000 hours. In the modelled PCM-
REL instance, MTTF values were set to 60 000 hours reﬂecting a common 
default installation. The MTTF value for the ASG switch was also taken 
from data sheet speciﬁcations and set to 200 000 hours. MTTR values of all 
hardware devices depend on the repair times of each speciﬁc customer and 
installation. For the case study, average values of 12 hours were assumed. 
As a local ASG installation does not contain any complex or long-range 
network communication technology, network transmission failure proba-
bilities were set to a low value of 10−9. 
6.5.5 ASG Reliability Evaluation 
This section presents the results of the reliability evaluation done for the 
ASG case study through Markov analysis (see Figure 6.14, element 19). 
The evaluation is based on the PCM-REL instance (18) created by the 
modelling activity (16). From the overall set of possible analysis exper-
iments, those experiments were chosen that can answer the relevant case 
study questions (2), which have been described in Section 6.5.2. For sensi-
tivity analysis, the existing PCM-REL instance was altered with respect to 
the variable model parameters identiﬁed in Section 6.5.3.3. All presented 
result diagrams denote FOD probabilities on the vertical axis on a logarith-
mic scale to the power of ten. The actual probability values are omitted 
for conﬁdentiality reasons. The analysis runs were conducted with Markov 
state reductions switched on (see Section 5.1.1) and standard evaluation 
of system hardware states (Section 5.2.2). Each run took approximately 4 
seconds on a standard laptop computer. 
First, Figure 6.27 presents the results of a single analysis run without 
any model variations, aggregated according to different categories of inter-
est. Subﬁgure (a) shows the general distinction of failure potentials accord-
ing to the software, hardware and network dimensions dim. While overall, 
software-induced FODs clearly dominate the other dimensions, Subﬁgure 
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Figure 6.27: ASG Reliability Predictions by Failure Dimensions and Mail Process-
ing Steps 
(b) presents a more ﬁne-grained distinction according to criticality (see Sec-
tion 6.5.2). When focussing on major and critical FOD occurrences, it turns 
out that reliability impacts of similar signiﬁcance are caused by the hard-
ware and software dimensions (assuming that hardware and network FOD 
occurrences are generally “major”). Subﬁgure (c) further differentiates the 
software failure potential according to individual mail acceptance checks 
ch_1 to ch_7, mail handling operations op_1 to op_7 and generic failure 
potentials gen_1 to gen_3 which cannot be associated with a single check 
or operation (the original names have been altered for conﬁdentiality). Each 
distinguished category x includes a list of modelled FOD types. For exam-
ple, a check ch_i may be wrongly conducted or wrongly omitted, it may 
wrongly pass or wrongly disapprove an e-mail, and it may cause corrup-
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Figure 6.28: Robustness of Ranking of Failure Dimensions Against Software Base-
line and Usage Proﬁle Variations 
tion of the e-mail or even the cancellation of its processing. As the ﬁgure 
shows, the spam detection, gen_2, gen_3, ch_5 and op_7 contain the most 
signiﬁcant failure potentials. The speciﬁcally high FOD occurrence prob-
ability associated with the spam detection is acceptable as it causes only 
minor FODs. In summary, the analysis results indicate to which dimen-
sions and individual mail processing steps future quality assurance efforts 
should predominantly be allocated. 
To further investigate how existing input uncertainties and varying us-
age properties inﬂuence the expected reliability of SMTP processing, Fig-
ure 6.28 shows reliability impacts differentiated according to criticality and 
failure dimensions (excluding network) over varying model parameters. 
The biggest uncertainty in the model is caused by the estimation of software 
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FOD probabilities relative to a baseline value b, yielding probability val-
ues 10−b+w (w ∈ {0, ..,3}) (see Section 6.5.4.1). Subﬁgure (a) varies these 
probabilities on a logarithmic scale between 10−b+w−2 and 10−b+w+2 to ac-
count for the uncertainty of the baseline estimation. As the ﬁgure indicates, 
the results allow for stable statements about the “minor” and “critical” fail-
ure categories, and the baseline variation affects only the “major” category. 
This is due to the fact that the “minor” and “critical” categories refer to 
spam and virus detection, for which baseline-independent estimations were 
possible due to available statistical failure data. The ﬁgure further shows 
that one can assume the “major” potential to be in an acceptable range be-
tween “minor” and critical” (only for the border case of b +2, the “major” 
category overtakes the “minor” one). Subﬁgure (b) introduces another vari-
ation regarding the probability of malicious inputs (namely, spam or virus 
e-mails). For different customers and installations, this probability varies, 
depending on the trustworthiness of the involved communication partners 
and transmission paths. More concretely, the ﬁgure varies the probability of 
spam e-mails between P(spam) = 10% and P(spam) = 90% and the prob-
ability of viruses between P(virus) = 0.01% and P(virus) = 10% (each on 
a linear scale). As the ﬁgure shows, the variation affects mainly the “mi-
nor” and “critical” categories, while leaving “major” relatively stable. For 
high probabilities of malicious content, the “critical” category rises to lev-
els above the “major” one. Hence, it may be worthwile to increase efforts 
avoiding critical FODs speciﬁcally for environments with many malicious 
inputs. Subﬁgure (c) varies the average number of recipients #rec per e-
mail between 1 and 100 to examine the inﬂuence of this usage parameter. 
More recipients require more processing, as some processing steps have to 
be repeated for each recipient. However, major inﬂuences on the resulting 
failure potentials can only be observed for #rec ≥ 20. Interestingly, the 
“minor” and “critical” categories even decrease with increasing #rec. A 
possible explanation is that each recipient may trigger spam and virus de-
tection (if not already done for the current e-mail), lowering the probability 
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Figure 6.29: Robustness of Ranking of Processing Step Reliability Impacts Against 
Usage Proﬁle Variations 
of undetected malicious inputs. In sum, the software-induced reliability 
impact is stable and hence independent from the number of recipients. 
While the sensitivity analysis presented so far only distinguishes the 
main failure dimensions, Figure 6.29 goes one step further and shows the 
inﬂuence of a varying model parameter – namely, the number of e-mail 
recipients – on the reliability impacts of the individual processing steps. 
Depending on the concrete step, increasing #rec has a slightly negative ef-
fect (ch_2, ch_6, ch_7, op_1 to op_3), a strongly negative effect (op_4 
to op_7), no effect (ch_1, gen_1 to gen_3), or even a slightly positive ef-
fect (spam, ch_3, ch_5). Apart from the spam detection, gen_3 and op_7 
may rise to relatively high levels and should be speciﬁcally tested for e-
mails with many recipients. Overall, the results support the ﬁndings of 
Figure 6.27(c) about which processing steps have the most signiﬁcant fail-
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Figure 6.30: Effectiveness of Redundant Virus Detection 
ure potentials. The variation of #rec additionally reveals that ch_5 is more 
critical for lower numbers of recipients than for higher ones. 
Figure 6.30 presents the results of another experiment that speciﬁcally 
focuses on the redundant virus detection which the ASG performs during 
e-mail processing. To this end, the ﬁgure depicts the occurrence proba-
bility of critical FODs and varies the most important inﬂuencing factors – 
namely, the probability of a virus e-mail (between P(virus) = 0.01% and 
P(virus) = 10%) and the conditional probability that a virus not detected 
by the ﬁrst engine is also missed by the second one (between c = 0.0 and 
c = 1.0). The border case of c = 1.0 corresponds numerically to the design 
alternative with only one virus engine. With both the x-axis and the y-axis 
being logarithmic, the occurrence probability of critical FODs presents it-
self as a steadily increasing. The relative beneﬁt of using a second engine 
is stable against the occurrence probability of viruses and only depends on 
the degree of correlation between both engines, with a FOD probability 
reduced by up to approximately one power of ten in case of complete in-
dependence c = 0.0. For an example target value as shown in the ﬁgure, 
determining an envisioned upper bound for critical FOD occurrences, the 
second engine is required for P(virus)≥ 1%, and even further measures for 
avoiding critical FODs should be considered for P(virus)≥ 10%. 
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6.5.6 Case Study Assessment 
The ASG case study is an important milestone providing evidence of the 
applicability of PCM-REL to an industrial IT system. The approach could 
successfully be used to model the ASG’s SMTP processing part with all as-
pects relevant for reliability prediction. Based on this model, the conducted 
analysis could answer the relevant case study questions. This section re-
views the most important aspects of the case study process and results along 
the line of the validation goals presented in Section 6.2. 
Feasibility of modelling abstractions: Even though the ASG’s archi-
tecture does not follow a component-based paradigm as strictly as as-
sumed by PCM-REL, it could be adequately represented by a PCM-REL 
instance providing a valid base for reliability prediction. Some adapta-
tions were necessary to build the model (such as substituting the asyn-
chronous queue-based e-mail processing through a chain of synchronous 
component calls) but did not impact the reliability calculations or the ﬂex-
ibility of the model. The behavioural speciﬁcations were capable of ex-
pressing all required details of the ASG’s behaviour. Future potential re-
mains to reduce the size and complexity of the speciﬁcations through more 
advanced modelling constructs (for example, encoding parameter condi-
tions directly in FailureOccurrenceDescriptions could save the ef-
fort of duplicate InternalActions with surrounding BranchActions
and BranchConditions, as seen in Figure 6.22). 
Feasibility of estimation of reliability annotations: The available in-
put information sources of the case study as shown in Figure 6.14 can be 
deemed typical for many industrial software development projects. While 
for the ASG, enough information was available to conduct the case study, 
more signiﬁcant and detailed analysis results would be possible with more 
comprehensive and stable failure data. Improved input data could be gath-
ered through measures such as extended statistical tests of ASG products or 
extended collection of failure data in the ﬁeld. The process of extracting es-
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timates of FOD probabilities from a bug tracker database (see Section 6.5.4) 
was subject to high uncertainty and could only provide relative estimates; 
more research on how to extract the statistical FOD probabilities required 
for PCM-REL would be desirable. 
Validity of Markov analysis: Validation of Markov analysis was not in 
the focus of this case study. For a validation of this aspect, see the audio 
hosting study (Section 6.4). 
Signiﬁcance and robustness of prediction results: Experiments could be 
conducted that answered the relevant case study questions. Sensitivity anal-
ysis was applied to gain further evidence about the robustness of the results 
in the light of existing input uncertainties. Even though the estimation of 
most software FOD probabilities was only relative to a baseline estimation 
value (see Table 6.6), it was possible to reveal the most critical process-
ing steps and the relative beneﬁts of redundant virus detection with high 
conﬁdence (see Section 6.5.5). Due to the high number of variable model 
parameters (see Section 6.5.3.3), considerable effort was required to iden-
tify the most signiﬁcant ones with the respect to the case study questions. 
Further automation to support the identiﬁcation of signiﬁcant parameters 
would be desirable. 
Further ﬁndings of the case study are related to scalability and efforts: 
The created PCM-REL instance did not pose any scalability issues to the 
analysis, with individual analysis runs requiring less than 5 seconds on a 
standard laptop computer. The overall effort for conducting the case study 
was acceptable; interaction with ASG developers and architects was re-
quired to establish the case study scenario and questions, to analyse the 
bug tracker database, to evaluate the relevant information sources and to 
conduct a baseline estimation for the software FOD probabilities. The in-
teraction comprised ﬁve interview sessions and further e-mail communica-
tion with four involved ASG team members. The main work took approx-
imately two weeks (one week for analysing the bug tracker database and 
one week for reliability modelling and evaluation). This does not include 
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initial learning efforts on how to apply PCM-REL in an industrial context 
and how to leverage the relevant information sources, nor the documenta-
tion of the study for the thesis. 
6.6 Further PCM-REL Case Studies 
Besides the two case studies presented in this chapter, further studies have 
been conducted for the PCM-REL approach, based on modelled system 
architectures of a web-based media store product line [BBKR11], an in-
dustrial control system [BKBR11], a distributed business reporting sys-
tem [BKBR11] and a sales support system for retail chains [KB09]. The 
experiments conducted within these case studies include ranking multiple 
design alternatives, assessing quantitative improvements gained by differ-
ent fault tolerance mechanisms, identifying critical architectural compo-
nents and processing steps, as well as assuring the robustness of obtained 
prediction results. To give an impression of one of the conducted studies, 
Figure 6.31 gives an overview of the PCM-REL instance modelled for the 
business reporting system, which generates management reports from busi-
ness data collected in a database. The model features multiple usage scenar-
ios reﬂecting different user roles (accounting manager, sales manager and 
administrator), multiple servers with dedicated computing tasks, as well as 
fault-tolerant design in terms of triple redundancy of certain software and 
hardware parts of the architecture. Beyond the mentioned case studies, fur-
ther conducted experiments give evidence of the scalability of the Markov 
analysis and of the savings that can be realized in terms of model size by 
using parameter dependencies as offered by PCM-REL [BKBR11]. Due to 
space limitations, the details of the mentioned case studies and experiments 
are omitted from this thesis. Further information and case study models for 
download can be found at [BBKR12]. 
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Figure 6.31: Business Reporting System (Overview) 
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The PCM-REL approach presented in this thesis belongs to the ﬁeld of 
architecture-based software reliability prediction (ASRP). While the ap-
proach beneﬁts from the experiences gained in this ﬁeld, it also presents 
unique features that enhance the state-of-the-art. The main distinguish-
ing aspects of PCM-REL are the combined consideration of software and 
hardware failure potentials (Section 7.1), the consideration of fault toler-
ance capabilities (Section 7.2), as well as usage proﬁle modelling and input 
parameter propagation (Section 7.3). The covered related work mostly be-
longs to the ﬁeld of ASRP, but further approaches are also mentioned that 
are related to PCM-REL in one or multiple speciﬁc aspects. A ﬁnal discus-
sion in Section 7.4 includes a general assessment of PCM-REL against the 
state-of-the-art in the ﬁeld of ASRP. 
7.1 Combined Consideration of Software and Hardware Failure 
Potentials 
One of the factors that make PCM-REL unique is the way how the ap-
proach integrates failure potentials of software components and hardware 
resources into a common analytical model and derives a system reliability 
value that accounts for both dimensions. If only software failure poten-
tials are considered for ASRP, the prediction results are over-optimistic, 
neglecting the potential for failure-on-demand (FOD) occurrences due to 
unavailable hardware resources. If, on the other hand, software and hard-
ware failure potentials are analysed independently, it remains unclear how 
an overall system reliability value should be derived. Only an integrated 
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analysis can consider the circumstances under which a hardware resource 
is actually used by the service execution, such that its hardware failure re-
sults in a system level FOD (see Section 4.4). 
In spite of the relevance of hardware failures to system reliability, and 
although mathematical foundations for a combined consideration were pre-
sented by Laprie et al. already in 1992 [LK92], until today many ASRP ap-
proaches and related case studies focus purely on software [CG07b, DS95, 
GWTH98, GPHP05, KSB10, PEO11, RSP03, ST07b, ST07c, WPC06, 
YCA04, KM97]. However, some approaches have made steps towards 
an integrated consideration of hardware and software failure potentials. 
A closer investigation of those approaches reveals that they do not match 
the generality and comprehensiveness of the combined software/hardware 
consideration as done by PCM-REL. The following Sections 7.1.1 to 7.1.4 
discuss existing strategies and approaches for the combined consideration, 
within the ﬁeld of ASRP and beyond. 
7.1.1 MTTF/MTTR Model for Software Components 
A number of approaches exist that aim at reusing hardware-oriented anal-
yses for combined software/hardware considerations [DW04b, DW04a, 
KMT09, RS07, STTA08, TWH+08]. These approaches extend the scope 
of the standard failure model for hardware resources (see Section 2.2) by 
applying it also to software components. Hence, software and hardware 
components in a system are treated in a uniﬁed manner, annotated each 
with a pair of MTTF and MTTR values, from which a steady-state avail-
ability Av can be derived. Formalisms such as fault trees can be used to 
express static relations between components such as “component C1 re-
quires component C2”. A component is regarded as ready for service only 
when it is available, and when all its required components are also avail-
able. One or several components are marked as being top-level (namely, 
providing the system-level services), and the system is by deﬁnition ready 
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for service when all its top-level components are. Standard combinatorial 
calculation yields the fraction of time in which the system is ready, or – 
under a slightly different interpretation – the probability that the system is 
ready for service when accessed at an arbitrary point in time, hence de-
livering service as expected. As this calculation is based on component 
availabilities, most authors speak of system availability prediction, rather 
than reliability prediction. 
While the discussed strategy seems intuitive and therefore attractive, its 
applicability to software-intensive systems is limited. Probably the most 
severe limitation is the missing consideration of transient FOD occurrences 
of software components. As an extreme example, consider a software com-
ponent C that does not have any permanent failures but produces wrong 
computational results for 50% of all service invocations. The proposed ap-
proaches would mark C as being perfectly available even though it has a 
very high failure rate. Musa [Mus04] restricts software availability con-
siderations to “major software failures” such as crashes or hang-ups, which 
require system restarts and possibly data recovery actions before the system 
is again ready for service. However, such a policy certainly captures only 
part of the possible failure behaviours of software. 
A further drawback is the fact that the approaches do not cover the re-
lation of system availability or reliability to the system usage. Software 
component availability and component interdependencies are statically for-
mulated without taking into account any usage parameters. The authors 
do not even implicitly account for usage aspects when determining soft-
ware MTTF and MTTR values in their demonstrating examples [KMT09, 
STTA08, TWH+08]. 
Another distinguishing aspect of PCM-REL and the discussed approach-
es is that most of them focus on special kinds of IT systems, such as 
virtualized systems [KMT09, RS07], blade server systems [STTA08] or 
the IBM c© SIP Application Server [TCD+08]. Only Das et al. [DW04b, 
DW04a] provide a generalized architectural modelling formalism. 
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7.1.2 Usage Period Model for Hardware Resources 
A few approaches have proposed to account for hardware failures in ASRP 
by considering hardware failure rates and usage periods during service exe-
cution [Gra05, GMS07, Hap04]. The approaches explicitly model the indi-
vidual requests for hardware resource consumption by software. The time 
needed by the resource for processing each request is directly annotated to 
the model [Hap04] or can be calculated from a given requested process-
ing amount and resource processing speed [Gra05]. Based on the given 
resource failure rates, the probabilities that the required resources complete 
their processing without failure are determined per request [Gra05] or over 
all requests of a resource [Hap04]. The system’s reliability is determined 
as the probability that no software and no hardware failures occur during 
service execution. 
The main drawback of this strategy is that it treats hardware resources 
as if they were non-repairable entities. The failure probability for each 
resource request is calculated under the precondition that the resource is 
non-failed at the beginning of the request. Hence, the predicted system 
reliability is the probability that service execution at a point in time t suc-
ceeds if all resources of the system have survived until t. Furthermore, a 
general system reliability value R independent from t can only be calcu-
lated under the assumption of exponential hardware TTFs, which has been 
demonstrated to be a rather inaccurate approximation in practice [SG07]. 
Although the signiﬁcance of the prediction results is questionable in light 
of these limitations, the authors do not discuss them. In contrast, the PCM-
REL prediction yields the probability of successful service execution at an 
arbitrary point in time t, accounting for the fact that hardware resources can 
fail and be repaired or replaced over the system’s lifetime. 
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7.1.3 Alternative Modelling Approaches 
Beyond the approaches discussed so far, several other works aim at sys-
tem reliability or availability prediction based on modelling formalisms 
featuring a combined consideration of software and hardware components 
[CMRK10, KKM03, KOBMP99, KOB00, MRKE09, MKK03, RKK07, 
RFKK08, ST06, ST07a, WT05]. However, these approaches focus on spe-
ciﬁc failure scenarios, they do not make the inﬂuence of software and hard-
ware failures explicit in the model, or they do not take both dimensions 
into account for predicting system reliability. 
Kaaniche et al. [KKM03] and Martinello et al. [MKK03] examine the 
availability of services provided over the Internet. They focus on replica-
tion schemes for web servers [MKK03] and on the example of a web-based 
travel agency [KKM03]. The consideration of failures is limited to special 
failure types, namely overﬂowing service request buffers as software fail-
ures and unavailability of computer hosts as hardware failures. Due to this 
special focus, the authors avoid explicit modelling of software architecture 
and components. Instead, they use queueing theory to directly calculate the 
reliability impact of the considered failure potentials. 
Wang [WT05] combines a system availability model (SAM) with a user 
behaviour graph (UBG) to determine the probability that user sessions are 
successfully completed in spite of the risk of the system becoming partially 
or totally unavailable. The SAM is a CTMC capturing the different possible 
availability states of the system under study. However, the author does not 
give any general rule how to construct the SAM. Hence, the reader is left 
alone with the exercise to express software and hardware failures and their 
effects implicitly in the states of the SAM. 
The speciﬁc domain of mobile applications is targeted by the approaches 
of Malek et al. [MRKE09] and Cooray et al. [CMRK10]. The authors intro-
duce the notion of the context of mobile devices and software components 
executed on them. The context includes all aspects of the frequently chang-
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ing environment, such as the location, reachability of other hosts, available 
network bandwith, battery charge, and others. Hence, the context includes 
software and hardware aspects. The authors propose continuous reliability 
prediction during system operation based on component reliability models 
(see Section 2.3.3) with the dynamically changing context properties im-
plicitly encoded in the transition probabilities. However, the context prop-
erties are only generically speciﬁed as a vector of numeric parameters. No 
further instruction is given as to which individual context properties should 
actually be considered, and how they should be encoded in the vector. Fur-
thermore, the main focus is on context changes due to mobility rather than 
failures in the software or hardware environment. 
The approach of Sato et al. [ST07a] is close to PCM-REL in that it pre-
dicts the reliability of a system with software services and hardware re-
sources, explicitly taking into account the usage of the resources by the 
service execution, as well as the hardware-speciﬁc failure potentials. The 
approach models the software architecture as a DTMC whose states repre-
sent service invocations and resource usages. The availability states of each 
resource are captured through a CTMC. The central difference to PCM-
REL is that Sato et al. do not consider software failure potentials. Their 
approach assumes that all service failures are due to hardware resource un-
availability. Consequently, the approach yields over-optimistic prediction 
results for systems with imperfect software. 
The approach of Sharma et al. [ST06] predicts the software reliability 
of a component-based system subject to software failures during service 
execution, as well as operating system (OS) and hardware failures in the 
execution environment. A DTMC captures the software components and 
their failure behaviour; hardware and OS failures are expressed through 
a CTMC per involved machine. Based on the assumption that a failing 
machine does not lead to a service failure but only to a delayed service ex-
ecution (where the delay is caused by the waiting time of service requests 
until the machine is rebooted and again ready for service), machine fail-
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ures are not taken into account for reliability prediction, but only for the 
performance-related evaluation of the goodput, namely the rate of success-
fully completed service requests per unit of time. Hence, the reliability 
prediction only accounts for the software failures in the system. 
Kanoun et al. [KOBMP99, KOB00] provide an alternative approach 
to availability modelling and prediction of IT systems using Generalized 
Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN), which can be viewed as an evolution of the 
strategy discussed in Section 7.1.1. Instead of providing a single MTTF 
and MTTR value per software and hardware component, the approach ﬂex-
ibly models failure and repair processes with multiple stages and transition 
rates through a dedicated GSPN per component. Additional interaction 
GSPNs capture relations between components, where a state change in 
one component impacts the behaviour of other components. Rugina et 
al. [RKK07, RFKK08] build upon these results and provide a transfor-
mation from the SAE Architectural Analysis and Design Language (SAE-
AADL) to the GSPNs for IT system availability prediction. While these 
approaches offer detailed modelling capabilities for software and hardware 
availability states and interactions, they still share signiﬁcant shortcomings 
with those discussed in Section 7.1.1. First, they do not consider purely 
transient FOD occurrences but only failures that lead a component into an 
error state with a non-zero duration. Second, they do not account for system 
usage and its reﬂection in the component and interaction models. 
7.1.4 Combined Software/Hardware Consideration in General 
Several approaches exhibit a combined consideration of software and hard-
ware components and their failure potentials, but differ in their scope 
and their goals from the ﬁeld of ASRP [BMP09, DJP96, DL93a, DL93b, 
DDPH94, GHK+99, GI93, HLL+05, KOBMP99, KP00, SL88, VPMM05]. 
Bernardi et al. [BMP09] present a dependability proﬁle as part of UML 
MARTE [Obj07] offering comprehensive capabilities for modelling soft-
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ware and hardware failures and their effects. The main focus of this work 
is on modelling rather than prediction and on dependability rather than re-
liability only. The authors demonstrate a transformation from a case study 
design model to a deterministic and stochastic Petri net (DSPN) and con-
duct availability prediction for the case study, but they do not propose a 
transformation and prediction method for the general case. 
Several authors [DJP96, GI93, HLL+05] have proposed approaches for 
the simulative or analytical evaluation of software behaviour over imperfect 
hardware resources. Considered hardware faults are low-level (such as de-
structed memory bits or CPU registers), and metrics of interest are fault de-
tection times and coverages rather than system reliability. The approaches 
aim at improving given hardware designs; software behaviour is not mod-
elled through an architecture but captured in terms of types and frequencies 
of hardware requests, thus functioning as a hardware usage proﬁle. 
An early work of Shin et al. [SL88] proposes an architectural model for 
systems composed from modules, where a module may refer to either soft-
ware, hardware or a combination of both. However, the approach is con-
cerned with error propagation times rather than system reliability. 
Vilkomir et al. [VPMM05] evaluate the availability of a system with soft-
ware and hardware failures and multiple recovery procedures. Instead of 
modelling the system architecture, the approach constructs a DTMC repre-
senting multiple system failure levels and considers the sojourn times and 
failure and restauration probabilities at each level. Similarly, Stark [Sta87] 
presents a speciﬁc DTMC with 6 system availability states (of which 2 are 
deemed failure states) and estimates transition probabilities for a Shuttle 
Mission Simulator (SMS) in order to evaluate its availability and reliability. 
Section 7.2.1 contains a related discussion of non-architectural availabil-
ity and reliability evaluation of fault tolerance mechanisms and structures; 
most of the approaches mentioned there include combined software/hard-
ware consideration. 
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A further class of approaches deals with the problem of ﬁnding optimal re-
dundancy allocations for components in a system (see [KP00] for a survey). 
These approaches belong to the ﬁeld of reliability optimization. A system 
is deﬁned as a sequential or parallel structure of redundant components, 
where each component may refer to software, hardware or both dimen-
sions. Each component is associated with a time- and usage-independent 
reliability value, and the overall system reliability is optimized using ge-
netic algorithms or other methods, subject to a set of constraints. The focus 
is on the efﬁciency and quality of the employed optimization algorithms 
rather than a differentiated system reliability model. 
7.2 Consideration of Fault Tolerance Capabilities 
This section discusses the ability of PCM-REL related work to model fault 
tolerance (FT) capabilities of an IT system under study, and to quantita-
tively evaluate their inﬂuence on its reliability. FT capabilities are com-
monly included in IT systems (see Section 2.6) and constitute an important 
means to improve reliability. Therefore, PCM-REL explicitly considers 
such capabilities in terms of failure recovery during service execution (see 
Section 4.7). The approach allows software architects for taking FT-related 
measures into consideration during system design, as demonstrated in both 
the audio hosting case study (Section 6.4) and the Astaro ASG case study 
(Section 6.5). 
In contrast, many other ASRP approaches do not provide any mod-
elling constructs to express FT [Che80, CSC02, DS95, GWTH98, GT02, 
GWHT04, GPK03, GPHG+03, GPHW06, KM97, LG08, PEO11, RSP03, 
ST07a, ST07c, YCA04, ZL10] or have only basic FT expressiveness (see 
Section 7.2.3). Further approaches provide more detailed FT analysis, but 
their scope is limited to individual FT mechanisms and structures consid-
ered in isolation (see Section 7.2.2). PCM-REL is unique in combining 
highly expressive FT modelling with an architectural scope, analysing how 
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individual FT capabilities employed in different parts of a system’s ar-
chitecture inﬂuence the overall reliability of the system. The following 
Sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.4 give a detailed overview of PCM-REL related work 
with respect to FT modelling and analysis. 
7.2.1 Availability Evaluation of Fault-Tolerant System 
Architectures 
Several approaches target system availability rather than reliability but are 
still closely related to the ﬁeld of ASRP [DW04b, DW04a, KOBMP99, 
KOB00, KMT09, RKK07, RFKK08, STTA08, TWH+08]. Typically, they 
treat software and hardware components in a uniﬁed manner, assigning 
MTTF and MTTR values to each component (also see Section 7.1.1). Es-
pecially for software components, MTTR annotations may indicate FT ca-
pabilities either within the components or in their execution environment 
(which may, for example, have the ability to restart components upon de-
tection of an error). However, component repair may also be an act of main-
tenance carried out by an external agent [ALRL04]. The MTTR annotation 
does not distinguish between both cases, and it does not explicitly denote 
any FT capabilities which lead to component repair. Hence, the possibility 
to account for FT through MTTR annotations is limited to a basic level. 
Some approaches have enriched the standard availability evaluation with 
speciﬁc constructs for considering FT. One possibility of doing so is to ex-
tend inter-component relationships from simple “C1 requires C2” relations 
to “C1 requires C2 OR . . . OR Cn ” relations [DW04b, DW04a, STTA08, 
TWH+08]. Such relations express that a system contains redundancy, stat-
ing that only 1 out of the set of hardware and / or software components 
{C2, ..,Cn} has to be ready for service so that C1 can deliver its respec-
tive service. 
While the consideration of OR relationships is still limited to special 
kinds of FT capabilities, the approaches of Kanoun et al. [KOBMP99, 
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KOB00] and Rugina et al. [RKK07, RFKK08] (which have been discussed 
in Section 7.1.3) offer a highly expressive availability evaluation includ-
ing detailed FT modelling capabilities. The modeller is free to specify 
each component and each inter-component dependency through a dedicated 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN), capturing system structure and 
functional interactions between components, as well as reconﬁguration and 
maintenance activities. 
Compared to PCM-REL, all discussed approaches are limited in that 
they only evaluate the availability impact of the modelled FT capabilities, 
thereby leaving their inﬂuence on system reliability unclear. For example, 
wait-and-retry strategies can signiﬁcantly improve the reliability of dis-
tributed applications with purely transient network transmission failures. 
However, as the availability of the network is not impacted by the tran-
sient failures, availability-tailored approaches cannot evaluate the beneﬁts 
of the wait-and-retry. Moreover, the approaches do not take the system’s 
usage into consideration (see also Section 7.1.1). Hence, they cannot ac-
count for the usage dependencies of the fault-tolerant service execution (see 
Section 4.7). 
7.2.2 Non-Architectural Fault Tolerance Modelling and 
Prediction 
A substantial amount of work focuses on availability and reliability eval-
uations of individual FT mechanisms and structures – examples include 
[BDT+87, CLL78, DT89, DL93a, DL93b, DDPH94, DL95, GHK+99, 
GLT97, KKB+93, LKBK91, MSHT92, TG83, YSP09, YSP11]. The eval-
uation is done based on DTMCs, CTMCs, Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) or 
variations of these formalisms. However, the formalisms are not used as ar-
chitectural models, denoting components and transitions of control ﬂow be-
tween them. Rather, they denote a set of different availability states and the 
possible transitions between those states, annotated with transition proba-
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bilities or rates. While the expressiveness of such modelling approaches 
with respect to the targeted FT mechanisms or structures may be as high or 
even higher than that of PCM-REL, their scope is limited to system frac-
tures rather than whole system architectures. Even though some authors 
speak of “system” availability or reliability as an achieved prediction re-
sult, they assume that the considered structure essentially forms the system. 
This assumption holds for speciﬁc systems under study, but it is generally 
infeasible with respect to modern distributed and heterogeneous system ar-
chitectures. Moreover, approaches targeted at reliability evaluation mostly 
focus on the time-dependent probability that a considered FT structure “sur-
vives” from a deﬁned start t0 = 0 up to a point in time t without visiting 
any failure states, which differs from the goal of PCM-REL to predict the 
probability of successful service execution at an arbitrary point in time. 
Costes et al. [CLL78] examine the availability and reliability of single or 
redundant units or elements that may be affected by both software and hard-
ware failures. The authors take maintenance activities into account, namely 
hardware replacements and software fault removal (thereby accounting for 
software reliability growth processes). Laprie et al. [LKBK91] take a sim-
ilar approach, but more generally consider n redundant or non-redundant 
components. 
Further approaches [DL93a, DL93b, DDPH94, DL95] examine certain 
variations of well-established FT mechanisms, namely Distributed Recov-
ery Blocks (DRB), N-Version Programming (NVP) and N-Self-Checking 
Programming (NSCP). The authors aim at a combined consideration of 
software and hardware failures through Markov Reward Models (MRM) 
and Fault Trees. Gokhale et al. [GLT97] propose an alternative evalua-
tion through simulation instead of analysis. Kanoun et al. [KKB+93] use 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) to evaluate the reliability of Re-
covery Blocks (RB) and NVP. 
Garg et al. [GHK+99] focus on Passive Replication Schemes and evalu-
ate the performance and reliability of server applications with either Cold 
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Replication or Warm Replication. For the evaluation, the authors include 
hardware and software failure and repair events in a common CTMC. Mup-
pala et al. [MSHT92] evaluate the availability of VAX-cluster systems using 
Stochastic Reward Nets (SRN) as a variation of the SPN formalism. Other 
authors [BDT+87, DT89, TG83] introduce the notion of behavioural de-
composition as a two-level modelling formalism, including high-level case-
speciﬁc fault trees or CTMCs representing the availability states of a con-
sidered FT structure, as well as lower-level CTMCs or Extended Stochas-
tic Petri Nets (ESPN) representing fault detection and recovery processes 
within each FT structural element. 
Yusuf et al. [YSP09, YSP11] propose the Recovery-Aware Component 
(RAC) pattern for grid applications and employ Parameterized Markov 
Models (PMM) to evaluate the pattern’s reliability. In contrast to other 
approaches discussed in this section, the authors introduce RACs explicitly 
as an architectural pattern, and they propose a reference architecture based 
on RACs. The reference architecture includes speciﬁc components desig-
nated to the FT management of grid applications. In contrast to PCM-REL, 
the authors focus on the speciﬁc domain of grid applications, as opposed 
to IT systems in general. 
7.2.3 Architectural Reliability Prediction Considering Fault 
Tolerance 
This section discusses approaches that evaluate software architectures re-
garding reliability, considering certain FT capabilities of a system under 
study [CG07a, CG07b, FGGM10, GLT98, GL05, Gok05, Gra05, MZ08, 
PDAC05, ST06, WWC99, WPC06]. Although the goals of these approach-
es are closely related to PCM-REL, their FT expressiveness is signiﬁcantly 
more limited than that of PCM-REL (which has been presented in Sec-
tion 4.7). 
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The approach of Sharma et al. [ST06], which has also been discussed in 
Section 7.1.3, takes the possibility of component restarts and application 
retries into consideration. More concretely, if a software component ex-
hibits a FOD during service execution, it may be either visited again (in-
terpreted as a component restart), or the whole service execution may be 
repeated from start (interpreted as application retry), or the service execu-
tion results in failure (denoting that the component FOD could neither be 
handled by component restart nor application retry). Fixed probabilities for 
component restart, application retry and system failure are annotated per 
component to the architectural DTMC. The authors also consider hardware 
failures and repairs, but they do not take them into account for reliabil-
ity prediction (see Section 7.1.3). Compared to PCM-REL, the approach 
lacks FT expressiveness in several respects, including individual recovery 
behaviours in response to FOD occurrences, multi-stage recovery, multi-
type recovery, as well as inﬂuencing aspects of service usage and recovery 
from hardware failures. 
Wang et al. [WWC99, WPC06] propose several architectural styles, in-
cluding a fault-tolerant architectural style, and use an extended architec-
tural DTMC to evaluate the reliability of system architectures incorporat-
ing those styles. Similar to the OR relation discussed in Section 7.2.1, the 
FT architectural style considers a set of n redundant software components 
{C1, . . . ,Cn}. Only 1 out of the n components is required to be ready for 
service for an overall successful service execution. The FT architectural 
style is the only FT capability considered by the authors. 
Gokhale et al. [GLT98, GL05] propose a simulation approach to evalu-
ate an architectural DTMC for reliability. The simulation takes individual 
FT conﬁgurations per software component into account. An FT conﬁgu-
ration may refer to FT structures such as N-Version Programming (NVP) 
or Distributed Recovery Block (DRB). In contrary to PCM-REL, the ap-
proach does not take into account hardware failures and recovery, system 
usage inﬂuences on FT execution, nor any FT structures that involve mul-
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tiple components. Other aspects such as limited FT coverage, imperfect 
recovery, multiple recovery stages and types might be realized by the simu-
lation procedures but are not explicitly discussed by the authors. Moreover, 
the authors do not discuss the scalability of the approach, which may be 
critical with respect to failure probabilities. While in practice, failure prob-
abilities may be as small as 10−9, the demonstrating examples in [GL05] 
only show reliability values between 0.69 and 0.96. 
Another approach of Gokhale [Gok05] proposes to annotate software 
components in an architectural DTMC with an additional coverage factor 
per component that indicates the possibility of component-level FOD oc-
currences to be recovered from before resulting in an overall service execu-
tion failure. This approach provides only basic FT capabilities compressed 
into a single FT-speciﬁc value per component. 
Cortellessa and Grassi [CG07b, Gra05] focus on reliability prediction for 
service-oriented architectures (SOA). They consider recursively composed 
services, where each service may invoke multiple external services in order 
to complete its own execution. The approach conducts an algorithmic eval-
uation of the probability of successful execution of a top-level user-invoked 
service. Similarly to previously-discussed approaches, the authors intro-
duce the OR completion model denoting the possibility that a composed 
service requires only 1 out of n invoked external services to be successful 
in order for its own execution to succeed. 
Several ASRP approaches enrich their analysis by explicit considera-
tion of error propagation [CG07a, FGGM10, MZ08, PDAC05], relaxing 
the prevalent assumption of each component-level FOD automatically re-
sulting in a system-level FOD. They introduce speciﬁc concepts such as 
multiple failure types and error propagation probabilities, which may be 
used to express the masking or conversion of FOD occurrences, represent-
ing FT capabilities of the modelled system. In contrast to PCM-REL, these 
approaches do not model FT mechanisms and structures explicitly. Instead, 
they rely on direct estimation of the additional error propagation probabili-
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ties, which may be hard to acquire in practice. Moreover, the approaches do 
not reﬂect the inﬂuence of system usage or hardware failures and recovery 
on the FT-related component behaviour. 
7.2.4 Further Fault Tolerance Considerations 
This section shortly discusses approaches that consider FT capabilities of 
IT systems but differ in their goals and scope from PCM-REL [BMP09, 
CL04, CLV05, EL85, KP00, LM89, PSMK03, TST02, Wol10]. Some of 
these approaches focus on speciﬁc problems related to FT and provide 
detailed accounts of these. For example, Eckhardt, Littlewood, Popov et 
al. [EL85, LM89, PSMK03] examine the theoretical effects of failure cor-
relation on the overall failure probability of multi-version software. Cai 
et al. [CL04, CLV05] complement these considerations through empirical 
studies and experiments. Wolter [Wol10] examines the timeout selection 
problem, aiming at a good choice for the frequency of periodic FT activi-
ties such as restart, rejuvenation and checkpointing. 
The work of Trapp et al. [TST02] targets embedded systems and specif-
ically focuses on the data ﬂow throughout a system’s architecture. The 
authors explicitly consider how the quality of input data (such as the accu-
racy of a measured temperature value) affects the operation of the system 
and its produced outputs. An object-oriented hierarchical Petri net is used 
to represent the system with its components and performed tasks. As with 
approaches considering error propagation (see Section 7.2.3), the approach 
can be used to implicitly reﬂect FT capabilities of the system under study. 
Further approaches, which have been introduced in Section 7.1.4, include 
FT considerations: Bernardi et al. [BMP09] provide capabilities for mod-
elling redundant system structures; Kuo et al. [KP00] provide an overview 
of reliability optimization, covering the redundancy allocation problem as 
a speciﬁc component-level redundancy pattern. 
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7.3 Usage Proﬁles and Input Parameter Propagation 
This section assesses the capabilities of approaches related to PCM-REL 
for consideration of system usage aspects. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, 
the usage proﬁle may heavily affect the reliability of a software-intensive 
system in non-intuitive ways. Hence, it is an important factor that should 
be explicitly considered for reliability modelling and prediction. 
PCM-REL is particularly strong in its consideration of usage aspects. 
Based on the capabilities of the existing PCM approach [BKR09], it offers 
an explicit meta-model capturing a system usage proﬁle with multiple us-
age scenarios, as well as an explicit speciﬁcation of input parameter prop-
erties for individual system service invocations (see Section 2.7.5). The 
speciﬁcation of system behaviour includes parameter dependencies (Sec-
tion 2.7.6) to account for the inﬂuence of input parameter properties on 
the service execution. A sophisticated Stochastic Expressions (StoEx) lan-
guage [Koz08] allows for specifying the properties through arbitrary prob-
ability distributions rather than single values only. Moreover, user and 
system behavioural speciﬁcations are strictly separated to assure the in-
dependence of developer roles and the reusability of model artefacts (Sec-
tion 2.7.1). While these features are essentially part of the existing PCM 
approach for software performance prediction, they are highly innovative 
and unique for reliability predictions and the ASRP ﬁeld. In the thesis, ex-
periments conducted for the Astaro ASG case study (Section 6.5) show how 
usage proﬁle changes can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the expected reliability of 
an IT system (Figures 6.28 and 6.29). 
The following Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.5 examine capabilities of PCM-REL 
related work for consideration of usage proﬁles aspects, including the num-
ber and sequence of system service invocations, as well as input parame-
ter properties of individual invocations and their inﬂuence on service ex-
ecution. 
281 
7 Related Work 
7.3.1 Usage-Agnostic Prediction Approaches 
Several approaches, which typically speak of predicting software availabil-
ity rather than reliability, have been proposed that do not take any usage as-
pects into account [DW04b, DW04a, KOBMP99, KOB00, KMT09, RS07, 
RKK07, RFKK08, STTA08, TWH+08]. Many of these approaches assign 
MTTF and MTTR values to software and hardware components and have 
been discussed in Section 7.1.1. Their applicability is essentially limited 
to the consideration of crash failures and other permanent failure situations 
whose occurrence frequencies do not depend on speciﬁc usage patterns. 
While some of the approaches [KOBMP99, KOB00, RKK07, RFKK08] 
(see Section 7.1.3) are more expressive in modelling failure and repair pro-
cesses, they still share the principal disadvantage of neglecting usage as-
pects. With these approaches, modellers have no means to determine which 
parts of a created system model are affected by changes in the envisioned 
system usage; analysing a system under a different usage proﬁle requires 
restarting the modelling activity from scratch. 
7.3.2 Implicit Consideration of Usage Proﬁles 
Most of the related approaches of PCM-REL fall under the category of 
implicit usage proﬁle consideration [CG07a, CG07b, Che80, FGGM10, 
GLT98, GT02, GWHT04, GL05, GPK03, LG08, RSP03, RPS03, ST07a, 
ST06, ST07c, WWC99, WPC06, ZL10, GWTH98]. These approaches em-
ploy either an architectural model expressing the transfer of control be-
tween the services or components of a system, or a workﬂow model ex-
pressing the ﬂow of execution within “composite” services or components, 
invoking further “basic” or “atomic” services. Modelling formalisms of 
choice are either equal or closely related to DTMCs, or they include ex-
plicit control ﬂow constructs such as branches, loops or forks. All models 
include probabilistic annotations, such as DTMC transition probabilities, 
branch transition probabilities and loop iteration counts. These annota-
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tions inﬂuence the set and occurrence probabilities of possible sequences 
of visited components or steps during service execution. Hence, the an-
notations merge aspects of system behaviour (namely, the implementa-
tion) and system usage (namely, input parameter properties). Although 
several approaches call their models “usage proﬁles” or “operational pro-
ﬁles”, they express system behaviour inﬂuenced by its usage, rather than 
user behaviour. However, by considering the topmost level of composition 
as being the usage scenario itself, it is actually possible to represent the 
behaviour of system users. In conclusion, the main differences between 
the discussed approaches and PCM-REL are that (a) their modelling for-
malisms do not explicitly distinguish between user and system behaviour, 
and that (b) they do not explicitly reﬂect how input parameter properties 
of service invocations inﬂuence service execution; instead, they merge sys-
tem and usage aspects when modelling the service execution. Hence, the 
approaches suffer from signiﬁcantly reduced reusability with respect to us-
age proﬁle changes. 
The following gives a short overview of the approaches in this cate-
gory. A well-known representative approach is the Cheung model [Che80] 
(see Section 2.4), which expresses inter-component control ﬂow through 
an absorbing DTMC and encodes the system’s usage proﬁle into the tran-
sition probabilities. Cortellessa et al. [CG07a] and Filieri et al. [FGGM10] 
build upon the same formalism and additionally superimpose error prop-
agation models. Wang et al. [WWC99, WPC06] extend the formalism to 
capture heterogeneous software architectures that incorporate different ar-
chitectural styles. Further approaches building upon the Cheung model 
are [GWTH98, GLT98, GT02, GWHT04, GL05, GPK03, LG08, ST06, 
ST07c]. Reussner et al. [RSP03, RPS03] employ the Rich Architecture 
Deﬁnition Language (RADL) for model creation but build upon the same 
underlying theory as Cheung for model resolution and reliability prediction. 
Cortellessa et al. [CG07b] (Section 7.2.3) and Sato et al. [ST07a] (Sec-
tion 7.1.3) use the absorbing DTMC formalism to express execution work-
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ﬂows of composite services with the states representing external service in-
vocations, internal operations or resource usages. Zheng et al. [ZL10] em-
ploy a workﬂow description for composite services with sequences, loops 
and parallel structures. 
7.3.3 Scenario-Based Software Reliability Prediction 
Several approaches can be subsumed as being scenario-based [CSC02, 
GPHG+03, PDAC05, RRU05, YCA99, YCA04]. These approaches share 
the idea that systems experience different scenarios occurring with different 
frequencies or probabilities, and that system reliability should be expressed 
averaged across all scenarios. Yacoub et al. [YCA99, YCA04] specify sce-
narios through component sequence diagrams (similar to UML sequence 
diagrams) and attach an occurrence probability to each scenario. An over-
all component dependency graph (which extends the DTMC formalism 
through variable state sojourn times and transition reliability values) is de-
duced from the given scenario speciﬁcations and used as a basis for relia-
bility prediction. Cortellessa et al. [CSC02] and Popic et al. [PDAC05] em-
ploy annotated UML use case diagrams to specify system users, use cases 
and occurrence probabilities, as well as UML sequence diagrams to specify 
a set of scenarios per use case. The authors predict the success probability 
of scenario execution averaged over all speciﬁed scenarios, considering per-
visit FOD probabilities of the involved software components and network 
transmission failure probabilities for remote inter-component invocations. 
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [GPHG+03] use a similar method but addition-
ally differentiate multiple failure severities from minor to catastrophic and 
derive risk factors from component state charts, predicting an overall sys-
tem risk factor across all speciﬁed scenarios and use cases. Rodrigues 
et al. [RRU05] specify scenarios through basic message sequence charts 
(BSMCs) and use an overall high-level message sequence chart (HMSC, 
284 
7.3 Usage Proﬁles and Input Parameter Propagation 
similar to an absorbing DTMC) to capture possible sequences of scenario 
executions and their occurrence probabilities. 
While scenario-based approaches provide modelling concepts (such as 
use case diagrams) or annotations (such as scenario occurrence probabil-
ities) that explicitly refer to usage aspects, they still merge system and 
usage aspects in their scenario speciﬁcations, because component invoca-
tion sequences are generally inﬂuenced by input parameter properties of the 
scenario-triggering system service invocations. None of the discussed ap-
proaches keeps track of parameter properties and their propagation through-
out the invocation sequences. Hence, the approaches are signiﬁcantly lim-
ited compared to PCM-REL with respect to usage proﬁle consideration. 
7.3.4 Parametrized Reliability Prediction Approaches 
A few approaches explicitly deal with the effect of input parameter prop-
erties on the service execution and provide a correspondingly parametrized 
service speciﬁcation [HMW01, Gra05, GMS07]. One of these approaches 
is provided by Hamlet et al. [HMW01], whose main focus is on the data 
ﬂow throughout a component-based software architecture, rather than its 
control ﬂow. The approach considers service execution as a sequence of 
component executions, where each component takes an input (from the sys-
tem user or the previous component) and produces an output (which is, in 
turn, the input of the next component). The set of possible component exe-
cution sequences is speciﬁed through a reliability algebra that can express 
linear sequences, loops and branches. Moreover, each component visit may 
trigger a FOD; the approach predicts the probability of successful execution 
of the overall sequence. The authors explicitly consider parameter proper-
ties by breaking down the overall input domain (namely, the set of possible 
input values) into a set of disjoint subdomains, and by expressing the FOD 
probability of each component, as well as its produced output, as a function 
of the subdomain of its received input. A set of occurrence probabilities 
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of the individual subdomains characterizes the initial user input and hence 
constitutes a usage proﬁle for the service execution. The most signiﬁcant 
disadvantage of the approach is that the authors do not provide any means 
to capture the component-internal mapping from input to output domains 
through modelling; instead, they rely on software architects to assemble 
and execute the system under study in order to derive the mapping. This 
method may be associated with very high efforts and effectively prevents 
the application of the approach at early system design stages. 
The approach of Grassi [Gra05] is very close to the approaches discussed 
in Section 7.3.2, especially to the one of Cortellessa et al. [CG07b] (also 
see Sections 7.1.2 and 7.2.3), expressing execution workﬂows of compos-
ite services through absorbing DTMCs. Additionally, Grassi explicitly re-
ﬂects input parameter properties of the composite service invocation, their 
propagation to external service invocations, and the resulting inﬂuence on 
the FOD probabilities of atomic services. The same concepts are reused by 
Grassi et al. [GMS07], who propose the Kernel Language for Performance 
and Reliability Analysis (KLAPER). Compared to PCM-REL, limitations 
still exist in that user and system behaviour are not explicitly distinguished, 
and the DTMC transition probabilities still merge both aspects. 
7.3.5 Further Usage Proﬁle Considerations 
Besides the previously discussed categories, a few further approaches ex-
hibit capabilities for consideration of usage aspects [BMP09, KKR01, 
KKM03, WT05]. Kaaniche et al. [KKR01, KKM03] (see Section 7.1.3) 
provide a dependability modelling framework, allowing for combining dif-
ferent modelling formalisms and prediction methods. They distinguish 
multiple modelling levels, namely user, function, service and resource. In 
a demonstrating example of a web-based travel agency, the authors model 
the user level through a DTMC-style operational proﬁle graph, with states 
representing the execution of functions. In turn, each function is modelled 
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by an interaction diagram expressing possible sequences of invocations of 
services. The interaction diagrams include branches, loops and parallel 
structures, with probabilistic annotations for branch transition probabili-
ties and loop iteration counts. Hence, the approach is similar to those 
discussed in Section 7.3.2 but additionally distinguishes user and system 
behaviour explicitly. 
The approach of Wang et al. [WT05] (see Section 7.1.3) also explicitly 
expresses user behaviour through its user behaviour graph (UBG). How-
ever, the approach does not consider input parameter properties of service 
invocations, and it speciﬁes the system through a set of availability states 
rather than an architectural model. Bernardi et al. [BMP09] (Section 7.1.4) 
demonstrate the combination of annotated UML use case diagrams, deploy-
ment diagrams, sequence diagrams and statecharts for availability predic-
tion in their reported case study. 
7.4 PCM-REL and Architecture-Based Software Reliability 
Prediction 
This section reviews the overall degree of innovation of PCM-REL com-
pared to existing ASRP approaches. As discussed in the previous Sec-
tions 7.1 to 7.3, the main scientiﬁc contributions of the approach are the 
combined consideration of software and hardware failure potentials, the 
consideration of fault tolerance (FT) capabilities for reliability prediction 
and the explicit modelling of usage proﬁles and input parameter propaga-
tion. Although these are individual contributions, they are related to each 
other, and PCM-REL combines them to signiﬁcantly advance the support 
that software architects can get from ASRP during system design. To this 
end, the consideration of hardware failures could be misleading if a sys-
tem’s ability to recover from them was not considered as well. On the other 
hand, the consideration of FT capabilities should not be limited to the soft-
ware level only and beneﬁts from an integrated software/hardware view. 
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In addition, both the software/hardware integration and the FT modelling 
beneﬁt from the explicit consideration of usage proﬁles and input parame-
ter propagation. The system’s usage inﬂuences the service execution paths 
taken throughout the architecture and the involved accesses to hardware re-
sources, as well as the alternative behaviours executed for failure recovery. 
Together, the modelling and analysis capabilities of PCM-REL allow for 
a differentiated view on an IT system and a comprehensive assessment of 
relevant questions during system design, as shown by the audio hosting and 
Astaro ASG case studies reported in the thesis (see Chapter 6). 
Table 7.1 provides an overview of ASRP approaches and assesses these 
with respect to the innovative features of PCM-REL. The focus of this 
overview is narrowed down compared to the discussion in the previous sec-
tions to ASRP approaches in a strict sense only (see Section 2.5), excluding 
further discussed approaches (such as the ones predicting a system’s avail-
ability rather than its reliability). Furthermore, the overview omits publi-
cations with a main focus on reporting experiments and case studies rather 
than new methodologies, as well as survey and overview papers. Any entry 
in parentheses indicates that an approach exhibits capabilities with respect 
to a certain feature but is limited compared to PCM-REL. 
As the table shows, related ASRP approaches are generally limited com-
pared to PCM-REL with respect to its main scientiﬁc contributions (which 
are listed in the ﬁrst three feature columns). All approaches exhibit cer-
tain capabilities for usage proﬁle considerations; most of them implic-
itly include usage aspects in probabilistic annotations to their underly-
ing modelling formalisms (see Section 7.3.2). Several approaches pro-
vide basic consideration of FT capabilities (Section 7.2.3), and a few ap-
proaches provide some form of differentiation between software and hard-
ware failure potentials (Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3). Overall, the approaches 
of Grassi [Gra05], Grassi et al. [GMS07] and Sharma et al. [ST06] are close 
to PCM-REL in that they exhibit capabilities in all three aspects. Sato et 
al. [ST07a] show conceptual similarity to PCM-REL as they consider a ser-
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Cheung et al. [Che80] 1980 - - (X) - - - - - -
Dolbec et al. [DS95] 1995 - - (X) - - - - - -
Gokhale et al. [GWTH98] 1998 - - (X) - - - - - (X)
Gokhale et al. [GLT98] 1998 - (X) (X) - - - - - (X)
Wang et al. [WWC99] 1999 - (X) (X) - - - - - -
Yacoub et al. [YCA99] 1999 - - (X) X - - (X) - -
Cortellessa et al. [CSC02] 2002 - - (X) X - - X - -
Gokhale et al. [GT02] 2002 - - (X) - - - - - -
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [GPHG+03] 2003 - - (X) X X - X - (X)
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [GPK03] 2003 - - (X) - - - - - (X)
Reussner et al. [RSP03] 2003 - - (X) X - - X - (X)
Reussner et al. [RPS03] 2003 - - (X) X - - X - (X)
Gokhale et al. [GWHT04] 2004 - - (X) - - - - - (X)
Yacoub et al. [YCA04] 2004 - - (X) X - - (X) - -
Gokhale et al. [GL05] 2005 - (X) (X) - - - - - (X)
Gokhale [Gok05] 2005 - (X) (X) - - - - - -
Grassi [Gra05] 2005 (X) (X) (X) X - (X) - - -
Popic et al. [PDAC05] 2005 - (X) (X) X - - X - X
Rodrigues et al. [RRU05] 2005 - - (X) - - - (X) - (X)
Sharma et al. [ST06] 2006 (X) (X) (X) - - - - - (X)
Wang et al. [WPC06] 2006 - (X) (X) - - - - - -
Cortellessa et al. [CG07a] 2007 - (X) (X) - - - - - -
Cortellessa et al. [CG07b] 2007 - (X) (X) X - X - - -
Grassi et al. [GMS07] 2007 (X) (X) (X) X - (X) (X) - (X)
Sato et al. [ST07a] 2007 (X) - (X) (X) - - - - -
Sato et al. [ST07b] 2007 - - (X) - - - - - -
Sharma et al. [ST07c] 2007 - - (X) - - - - - (X)
Lipton et al. [LG08] 2008 - - (X) X - - - - -
Mohamed et al. [MZ08] 2008 - (X) (X) - X - (X) - -
Cooray et al. [CMRK10] 2010 (X) - (X) - - - (X) - X
Filieri et al. [FGGM10] 2010 - (X) (X) - X - - - -
Zheng et al. [ZL10] 2010 - - (X) - - - - - (X)
Palviainen et al. [PEO11] 2011 - - (X) - - - X - X
132 mm = 0.825
Table 7.1: Feature Overview of ASRP Approaches 
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vice execution ﬂow (modelled through a DTMC) and its accesses to a set 
of independent and potentially unavailable hardware resources. Further-
more, Bernardi et al. [BMP09] (Section 7.1.4) provide very comprehensive 
reliability modelling capabilities; their work is not mentioned in the ASRP 
overview table as the authors do not target automated transformation and 
reliability prediction for general speciﬁed architectures. 
Looking beyond the central contributions, the table indicates that several 
but not all approaches share with PCM-REL the ability to express failure 
potentials related to component interoperations. While PCM-REL assigns 
transmission failure probabilities to network links (Section 4.5), FOD prob-
abilities have also been assigned to component connectors or interfaces by 
related approaches. Furthermore, several approaches allow for modelling 
architectures in a design-oriented way, rather than directly using DTMCs 
or related formalisms. On the other hand, a distinction between multiple 
failure modes (Section 4.2) is rarely offered by related approaches. The 
same holds for a ﬂexible modelling of potential points of failure (PPOFs) 
that are not strictly related to the software components or invoked services 
of an architecture (see Section 4.3). Moreover, the issue of a separation of 
modelling concerns along the lines of multiple developer roles (in order to 
support a truly distributed software development process, see Section 2.7.1) 
is – to the best of the author’s knowledge – not explicitly discussed and 
considered by any of the related ASRP approaches. Regarding tool sup-
port, several but not all approaches point out tools and implementations 
created or used for realizing the presented methodologies. However, most 
presented tool support is limited in that it covers only part of the method-
ology (such as only the prediction but not the modelling part), it focuses 
on accompanying tasks rather than the centre of the approach (such as test 
coverage tools for deriving component reliability values), or there is no 
reference to any publicly available version of the tool. The most com-
prehensive tool support is provided by Popic et al. [PDAC05], Cooray et 
al. [CMRK10] and Palviainen et al. [PEO11]. 
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In conclusion, none of the related ASRP approaches matches PCM-REL 
in its overall set of innovative features, which are targeted at providing 
comprehensive and differentiated ready-to-use support for software archi-
tects during IT system design. While Table 7.1 lists a set of features rel-
evant for this goal, related ASRP approaches have presented other kinds 
of contributions. To this end, some approaches investigate alternative 
modelling formalisms such as Markov reward models (MRM) [ST07a] or 
Bayesian networks (BN) [CSC02], focus on prediction through simula-
tion [GLT98, GL05], integrate ASRP and software reliability growth mod-
elling (SRGM) [GL05], conduct reliability optimization [LG08, FGGM10], 
offer combined predictions of multiple quality attributes [GT02, ST07b, 
ST06, ST07c], focus on service oriented architectures (SOA) [CG07b, 
Gra05, ZL10], describe methods for deriving reliability annotations [ZL10, 
GWTH98, GWHT04, PEO11] and provide closed-formula considerations 
of input uncertainties and the corresponding sensitivity of analysis re-
sults [GT02, GPK03]. In future work, PCM-REL may beneﬁt from adopt-
ing those contributions and integrating them with its existing achieve-
ments. 
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8 Summary and Outlook 
This chapter concludes the thesis, providing a summary of the presented 
contents and achievements (Section 8.1), an overview of completed and 
ongoing research efforts associated with the PCM-REL approach (Sec-
tion 8.2), a discussion of promising directions for future developments 
(Section 8.3), as well as a ﬁnal assessment of the approach and its bene-
ﬁts (Section 8.4). 
8.1 Summary of Contents 
This thesis has presented PCM-REL, an approach to integrated software 
architecture-based reliability prediction for IT systems. PCM-REL offers 
a design-oriented modelling language that comprehensively integrates the 
different reliability-inﬂuencing factors into an overall architectural speciﬁ-
cation of a system under study. A corresponding analysis method evalu-
ates the architectural speciﬁcation and obtains the probability of success-
ful service execution as a prediction result. Overall, the following aspects 
are explicitly expressed by the modelling language and considered for the 
analysis: 
• the structure of an IT system in terms of its included software com-
ponent instances and their interconnections; 
• the provided and required interfaces of each software component, as 
well as its internal (high-level) control and data ﬂow; 
• the resource environment of the system with its computing nodes, 
their interconnections and included hardware resources; 
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• the allocation of software components to computing nodes and the 
usage of hardware resources during service execution; 
• the usage of system-external services for providing the system’s own 
services; 
• the system’s usage proﬁle in terms of a set of usage scenarios, where 
each scenario speciﬁes the sequences of invoked system services and 
their input parameter properties; 
• the software, hardware and network failure potentials that the system 
comprises; 
• the failure potentials associated with system-external service invoca-
tions; 
• the capabilities of service execution to recover from local failure oc-
currences and to prevent them from reaching the system’s bound-
aries. 
With the help of PCM-REL, software architects can assess multiple design 
alternatives of a system under study and rank them with respect to their 
expected reliabilities. They can identify reliability-critical parts in the ar-
chitecture or processing steps during service execution, and they can assess 
the inﬂuence of envisioned changes in a system’s architecture and usage 
on its reliability. The application of PCM-REL does not require the actual 
system being assembled and executed; hence, the approach can already be 
applied at early system design stages, when the most fundamental architec-
tural decisions are to be made. 
While a broader scientiﬁc context of PCM-REL is given through the 
existing ﬁelds of reliability engineering, software reliability engineering 
and component-based software engineering, the approach more concretely 
belongs to the ﬁeld of architecture-based software reliability prediction 
(ASRP). The state-of-the-art in this ﬁeld is advanced by PCM-REL through 
the following central contributions: 
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• Combined consideration of software and hardware failure potentials: 
PCM-REL allows for modelling both software components and hard-
ware resources with their speciﬁc failure potentials. The approach 
considers how unavailable resources affect service execution, and it 
derives an overall reliability value accounting for both dimensions of 
failure. 
• Consideration of fault tolerance capabilities: PCM-REL offers mod-
elling constructs to express how service execution can recover from 
local failure-on-demand (FOD) occurrences by carrying out alter-
native behaviours, thereby avoiding the occurrence of system-level 
FODs. Failure recovery can compensate for FOD occurrences in-
duced by software, hardware and network failure potentials. The 
deﬁnition of system-speciﬁc FOD types allows for precisely describ-
ing which failure situations are handled by a modelled recovery con-
struct. 
• Explicit consideration of usage proﬁles and the propagation of input 
parameter properties: PCM-REL explicitly speciﬁes a system’s us-
age proﬁle as a set of usage scenarios, describing possible sequences 
of system service invocations and their occurrence probabilities. Ser-
vice invocations can be annotated with stochastic speciﬁcations of in-
put parameter properties, and control ﬂow constructs within the ser-
vice execution are speciﬁed depending on those properties. Hence, 
the approach explicitly considers how the input parameter properties 
of system service invocations inﬂuence the service execution. 
In contrast, related ASRP approaches provide none or only limited capa-
bilities in these respects, thereby signiﬁcantly reducing the reusability of 
model artefacts and the decision support offered to software architects. Fur-
ther innovative aspects of PCM-REL include the consideration of network 
transmission failures, the ﬂexible speciﬁcation of potential points of failure 
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(PPOFs) within the service execution control ﬂow, as well as its design-
oriented modelling language providing a consequent separation of mod-
elling concerns along the lines of multiple envisioned developer roles. In 
addition, the approach offers comprehensive tool support including a graph-
ical modelling environment and automated analysis capabilities. 
To realize the set of features discussed above, PCM-REL builds upon the 
existing Palladio Component Model (PCM), which allows for modelling 
component-based software architectures, as well as its associated tool sup-
port. The approach extends the PCM meta-model by the speciﬁcation of 
software, hardware and network failure potentials, as well as modelling 
constructs for failure recovery. Furthermore, PCM-REL adds a Markov 
analysis that transforms a modelled PCM-REL instance to an absorbing 
discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) and resolves this DTMC by applying 
existing Markov theory. As a result, the analysis delivers the probability 
of successful execution of each speciﬁed usage scenario, as well as the oc-
currence probabilities of potential failure modes differentiated according to 
the software, hardware and network categories, individual FOD types or 
individual PPOFs. Compared to the use of DTMCs in related ASRP ap-
proaches, PCM-REL’s Markov analysis is innovative in that it includes the 
user behaviour, the intra-component control ﬂow, the state of the system’s 
hardware resources and multiple failure modes in its DTMC representation. 
A time- and space-efﬁcient transformation procedure compensates for the 
signiﬁcantly increased size of the resulting DTMC models. The transfor-
mation has been implemented and included in the tool environment, allow-
ing for a fully automated Markov analysis and the display of the obtained 
prediction results as a visual feedback. 
The thesis includes two major case studies, which demonstrate the capa-
bilities of the approach and validate that PCM-REL can feasibly be applied 
to predict the reliability of IT systems. More concretely, the validation 
gives evidence of the feasibility of the included modelling abstractions, the 
feasibility of estimating the required reliability annotations, the validity of 
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the Markov analysis itself, as well as the signiﬁcance and robustness of the 
obtained prediction results. The ﬁrst case study is about a system providing 
audio hosting functionality. The study assesses and ranks multiple design 
alternatives, compares the prediction results to those obtained by a simula-
tion approach and to measurements conducted for an implemented system 
prototype. The second case study features the Astaro Security Gateway 
(ASG), a well-established industrial IT system, focussing on the system’s 
SMTP processing functionality. The study creates an architectural system 
model based on existing documentation and feedback from developers, de-
rives input estimations for the required reliability annotations from existing 
qualitative and statistical failure data, and it assesses the reliability impacts 
associated with individual system processing steps, as well as the quantita-
tive reliability improvements achieved by the system’s included fault toler-
ance capabilities. While the conducted case studies generally support the 
validity of the approach, they also reveal certain potentials for future work, 
such as further research devoted to the input estimation of reliability anno-
tations, as well as further extensions of PCM-REL’s modelling capabilities 
to allow for a more intuitive representation of system behaviour. More-
over, occurrence frequencies of hardware-induced FODs observed over a 
limited system mission time interval may deviate from the predicted val-
ues if the expected number of hardware failure and repair events during the 
observation period is small. 
8.2 Research Overview 
The PCM-REL approach and its contributions have been described in mul-
tiple peer-reviewed publications [BZ09, BKBR10, BBKR11, BKBR11]; a 
preliminary integration of parameter dependencies in component reliability 
speciﬁcations has been developed in [KB09]. The most signiﬁcant work is 
an article in the IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering (TSE) jour-
nal [BKBR11], which is currently accepted for publication and available 
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in an online pre-print version. The article describes the combined consid-
eration of software and hardware failure potentials by PCM-REL, as well 
as its capabilities for usage proﬁle modelling and input parameter propa-
gation. Two reported case studies demonstrate and validate the approach 
for a business reporting system and an industrial control system. PCM-
REL’s capabilities for fault tolerance consideration are speciﬁcally covered 
in [BBKR11]. 
Further completed and ongoing research efforts build upon the approach 
or include it as part of a broader methodology. The European research 
project SLA@SOI [SLA12] has focused on the comprehensive and con-
sistent management of service-level-agreements (SLAs) across the stages 
of an IT-based service life cycle. Within the context of this project, meth-
ods for automated SLA negotiation have been developed, using PCM per-
formance predictions and PCM-REL reliability predictions for determin-
ing feasible SLA parameters. Corresponding prediction functionality has 
been integrated in an open source SLA management framework that consti-
tutes the main technological outcome of the project. Furthermore, method-
ologies for reliability assessment of web services and mashups have been 
created based on PCM-REL, and corresponding tool support has been in-
tegrated in a mashup composition platform developed by the German re-
search project COCKTAIL [COC12]. PCM-REL is also employed by an 
approach to multi-criteria optimization for automated improvement of soft-
ware architecture models [Koz11], and it is included in the corresponding 
PerOpterix optimization framework [KRKB12]. Other research efforts are 
targeted at an integrated consideration of business process and IT system 
reliability; this research is ongoing and has not yet resulted in a publica-
tion. Finally, PCM-REL is integrated in the overall open source PCM tool 
environment [FZI12], allowing for being used and further enhanced by any 
interested third parties. 
298 
8.3 Future Work Potentials 
8.3 Future Work Potentials 
While PCM-REL constitutes a comprehensive solution for architecture-
based reliability prediction of IT systems, several new research questions 
emerged during the development of the approach, and various aspects 
lend themselves to being further explored. These aspects can be roughly 
grouped into the following categories: (a) advanced methods for input es-
timations, (b) extended modelling capabilities, (c) extended analysis ca-
pabilities, (d) advanced evaluation of prediction results and (e) long-term 
future work potentials. 
Regarding input estimations (a), each PCM-REL instance includes reli-
ability annotations (namely software FOD probabilities, hardware MTTF 
and MTTR values and network FOD probabilities), and it can include fur-
ther parameters for model calibration (encoded in component parameters 
or otherwise included in the model). The ability to conduct all required 
input estimations with sufﬁcient conﬁdence is a crucial prerequisite for a 
successful application of the approach. An exemplary process of obtain-
ing input estimates has been demonstrated for the Astaro ASG case study, 
but the development of systematic estimation methods is not in the scope 
of the thesis itself and remains as an open task for future work. In spite of 
existing research efforts regarding software and hardware reliability estima-
tion, signiﬁcant challenges remain, and new methods are required that are 
speciﬁcally tailored to PCM-REL, providing adequate input metrics (such 
as software FOD probabilities) at adequate granularity levels (namely, dis-
tinguished according to FOD types and modelled PPOFs). The envisioned 
methods should consider the phase of application of PCM-REL (such as 
early design time versus system evolution) and the available information 
sources in each phase. An equally important effort should be devoted to 
the question how relevant statistical failure data can feasibly be collected 
during development processes and during a system’s ﬁeld operation, which 
can serve as a stable and comprehensive source of information for the re-
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quired input estimations. In order to achieve credible results, the develop-
ment of data collection and input estimation methods should take place in 
and be validated against the context of real-world industrial development 
processes. 
The existing modelling capabilities of PCM-REL (b) could be extended 
in various directions. Typically, any extension requires the modellers to 
provide more input information, and it may also require advanced analy-
sis methods to cope with the extended speciﬁcations. Hence, each possi-
ble extension has to be assessed against the potentially extended involved 
modelling and analysis efforts. According to the author’s appraisement, the 
following extensions promise the most signiﬁcant beneﬁts: 
• Active components and asynchronous component interoperations: 
These concepts are commonly found in event-based IT systems (and 
were also present in the Astaro ASG case study) but cannot directly 
be expressed in PCM-REL. An explicit support would enable a more 
direct and intuitive modelling of this class of systems. A corre-
sponding extension could build upon existing recent work integrating 
event-based communication in the PCM meta-model [KRK11]. 
• Reliability impacts through concurrency effects: Many FOD occur-
rences in multi-user/multi-tasking systems are induced by concur-
rency effects such as race conditions, starvations and deadlocks. 
PCM-REL allows for modelling such failure potentials in an implicit 
way only, by creating custom FOD types related to concurrency and 
specifying PPOFs with corresponding FOD probabilities. More ex-
plicit modelling capabilities would be desirable to support software 
architects in foreseeing and resolving concurrency issues at the soft-
ware architecture level. 
• Variance of input estimations: To account for the uncertainty of 
PCM-REL’s required input estimations, the approach could explic-
itly consider the involved variances, and it could calculate the corre-
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sponding variances of the resulting success and failure mode prob-
abilities. One of the possible applications of this extension is the 
ranking of design alternatives with a known degree of conﬁdence. 
While uncertainty analyses have been provided by related ASRP ap-
proaches, extending these analyses to a combined consideration of 
software and hardware failure potentials would constitute a new con-
tribution to the ﬁeld. 
• Stochastic dependencies between modelled failure potentials: Fail-
ure potentials in PCM-REL are modelled as being independent, while 
interdependencies do exist in reality. Examples include physical in-
terferences such as power outages affecting multiple hardware re-
sources at once, as well as crash failures of software processes affect-
ing all executed components. Likewise, multiple visits to the same 
PPOF during a usage scenario run may be stochastically dependent, 
with the result of the ﬁrst visit strongly inﬂuencing the success and 
FOD probabilities of all further visits. Capturing such stochastic de-
pendencies must be done with care to avoid overstraining modellers; 
still, the approach could beneﬁt from corresponding extensions. 
• Time-dependent failure potentials: A signiﬁcant class of software-
induced FOD occurrences refers to aging effects, which slowly de-
grade the service levels provided by the system’s software compo-
nents and are commonly tackled by measures of software rejuvena-
tion [HKKF95]. A time-dependent speciﬁcation of failure potentials 
such as software FOD probabilities could account for aging effects 
and would enable new kinds of analyses, such as the minimum and 
maximum system reliability within a given interval of the system’s 
mission time. 
• Extended behavioural speciﬁcations: PCM-REL’s capabilities to ex-
press system behaviour could be extended to achieve more ﬂexibility 
and higher expressiveness. Examples of possible extensions include 
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parametric speciﬁcations of FOD probabilities using the Stochastic 
Expressions (StoEx) language [Koz08], multiple alternative paths be-
tween modelled actions (instead of sequences only), as well as loop 
conditions that may change dynamically within a loop’s body be-
haviour. 
Further future work potentials speciﬁcally target PCM-REL’s analysis ca-
pabilities (c). To this end, the consideration of stochastic dependencies 
between multiple consecutive scenario runs would add further value to the 
approach. Especially (but not only) for hardware resource failures, longer 
periods of degradations or disruptions of system services can be expected, 
and the extent and frequency of such periods is an important information 
for the system’s users (beyond the averaged success probability of an in-
dividual scenario run only). Moreover, the analysis could be extended to 
account for the possibility of multiple FOD occurrences during service ex-
ecution. Such an extension would enable asking for the number of occurred 
FODs, rather than the individual failure mode probabilities only. 
Another category of extensions refers to the support for automated eval-
uation of prediction results (d). As the case studies reported in the thesis 
have shown, a single Markov analysis run may produce a high number of 
individual results, and many variable model parameters may exist whose 
values additionally inﬂuence the results. Hence, ﬁnding the most signiﬁ-
cant parameters and deriving solid result interpretations constitutes a chal-
lenge. Systematic methods for automated selection of experiment runs and 
interpretation of the obtained prediction results would provide improved 
assistance for answering the relevant design questions with respect to the 
system under study. Such capabilities could be built upon existing research 
efforts for PCM-based multi-criteria optimization [Koz11]. 
The discussion of future work potentials is not limited to the aspects 
mentioned so far. From a long-term perspective (e), additional possibilities 
for extensions and transfers of scientiﬁc results to new problem domains 
arise. To this end, modelling a system’s failure potentials does not only 
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lend itself to reliability predictions as described in the thesis – it can also 
be a basis for the consideration of further dependability attributes, such as 
availability, safety and integrity [ALRL04]. In particular, the differentiation 
of multiple failure modes allows for considering the criticality of failure 
occurrences and performing risk analyses [GPHG+03]. Such capabilities 
could be combined with existing PCM-based performance and cost predic-
tions and corresponding trade-off analyses [Koz11] for a holistic support of 
system design activities. Furthermore, PCM-REL’s separation of modelling 
concerns allows for supporting scenarios with strongly distributed design 
and development activities. For example, the reliability of service com-
positions could be predicted at composition time based on an automated 
synthesis of existing independent reliability models of the required basic 
services, taking into account the usage proﬁle and execution environment 
of the composition. Also, the approach could be used to efﬁciently evaluate 
the different variants of a software product line [CN01], representing the 
common set of core assets through an equivalent set of core speciﬁcations 
that are reused across all variants. Finally, further contributions may be 
achieved by extending PCM-REL towards new system domains, including 
embedded systems and cloud-based systems. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The PCM-REL approach presented in this thesis tackles the fundamen-
tal challenge of predicting the reliability of IT systems with component-
based software architectures, and it fulﬁls the initially formulated criteria 
of comprehensive reliability modelling and prediction. While being part 
of the ﬁeld of architecture-based software reliability prediction (ASRP), 
PCM-REL overcomes weaknesses of existing ASRP approaches, includ-
ing insufﬁcient scope (such as neglecting FT capabilities of a system un-
der study), missing differentiation (such as merging system behaviour and 
usage aspects in probabilistic model annotations) and an oversimpliﬁed 
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view on real-world failure processes and circumstances (such as using 
the same modelling constructs for software and hardware failure poten-
tials). Through its advanced modelling and analysis capabilities, PCM-
REL achieves the following main beneﬁts: 
• Improved decision support for software architects: PCM-REL sup-
ports a comprehensive set of design decisions, covering changes in 
a system’s software component structure, the component behaviours 
and their included FT capabilities, the usage of hardware resources 
by service execution, the physical distribution of the system to mul-
tiple computing nodes, the usage of system-external services, as well 
as the system’s usage proﬁle and its included usage scenarios. The 
approach realizes the decision support through providing explicit 
modelling constructs for all these architectural aspects. Furthermore, 
the analysis provides detailed prediction results for each evaluated 
architectural candidate, allowing for identiﬁcation of critical parts in 
the architecture or processing steps during service execution. 
• Increased reusability of model artefacts: Thanks to the differenti-
ated modelling of individual architectural views and aspects through 
PCM-REL, multiple variations of architecture speciﬁcations can re-
use signiﬁcant parts of an underlying model base, lowering the over-
all effort and error-proneness of the modelling activity. Component 
types speciﬁed in a PCM-REL repository model can be instantiated 
within multiple system models, which in turn can be assigned to a 
resource environment in different ways through multiple allocation 
models. Moreover, different usage proﬁles are expressed through 
multiple usage models referring to the same system model. 
• Support of a truly distributed component-based development pro-
cess: The separation of modelling concerns provided by the approach 
allows for multiple envisioned developer roles in a distributed devel-
opment process to independently contribute their respective parts of 
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an architectural speciﬁcation; each role provides only the information 
that it naturally possesses. Building upon the methodology of the ex-
isting PCM approach, the envisioned roles include component devel-
opers, software architects, component deployers and domain experts. 
These beneﬁts support the primary goal of PCM-REL to be applicable and 
relevant to real-world software development processes; further important 
features in this respect are the provision of a design-oriented modelling 
language readily understandable by software architects, the consequent as-
sessment of system reliability from the user’s point of view and the cor-
responding utilization of the failure-on-demand (FOD) concept, as well as 
the provision of comprehensive and ready-to-use tool support for reliability 
modelling and analysis. 
From a broader perspective, PCM-REL contributes to the overall vision 
of a systematic consideration of reliability throughout system engineering 
processes. Such a systematic approach should replace the currently still 
prevalent best-effort strategies to eliminate as many failure potentials as 
possible until resource and budget limits are reached. An attitude is re-
quired accepting failure potentials as a natural part of an IT system rather 
than the result of failed development and production processes. Then, the 
impacts of such potentials can be quantiﬁed, predicted and set in relation to 
the system’s architecture. As a result, system reliability will be much more 
plannable. Operators of IT systems and providers of IT-based services will 
be able to interoperate on the basis of contractually speciﬁed quantitative 
service reliability parameters. Quality assurance efforts will be allocated to 
those parts of a software architecture where they exhibit the highest bene-
ﬁts. Reliability targets of IT systems will be achieved more efﬁciently and 
with higher conﬁdence, ultimately leading to a more sustainable support of 
businesses, communities and everyday life through these systems. 
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